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ABSTRACT
It has become commonplace to argue that the liberal-communitarian debate, which has 
characterised Anglo-American political thought for the last two decades, has now been 
exhausted. However, there is little consensus over who actually had the better of the 
debate or alternatively, how, and even whether, it is possible to synthesise some of the 
key insights of the two conflicting schools of thought. In this thesis, it will be argued 
that this can partly be explained by the fact that the debate was largely misconceived in 
the first place. This is due firstly to the fact that the ideological differences within the 
two camps are so vast as to render the terms virtually meaningless as binary categories. 
Secondly, some of the key protagonists on both sides of the debate actually display 
some of the same faults. This will be shown by juxtaposing Rawls’s political liberalism 
with Sandel’s civic republicanism. While these two projects are usually regarded as 
antithetical, it will be shown that both enterprises are similarly flawed due to their 
mistaken assumption that it is possible to transcend the foundationalism / anti- 
foundationalism dichotomy by legitimising normative political theory with reference to 
perceived historically shared understandings alone rather than metaphysical 
foundations. The thesis will then consider Habermas’s communicative ethics, which 
offers a different account of how to redeem normative political theory without 
presupposing metaphysics. It will be argued that, while Habermas is correct to resist the 
post-modernist critique which rejects the possibility of universalist conceptions of 
morality per se, he fails to assuage the criticisms of a diverse array of liberal sceptics 
who dispute the possibility of dispensing with metaphysical foundations altogether. The 
thesis will conclude that Rawls’s, Habermas’s and Sandel’s normative projects are all 
weakened by their underestimation of the level of ideological competition, which all 
strands of the liberal tradition confront in the public sphere.
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INTRODUCTION 
Deontological Liberalism versus Utilitarianism
Contemporary communitarianism, at least in its philosophical guise is generally 
associated with the writings of four prominent political theorists who became 
famous at the beginning of the 1980s, namely, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer.1 One can also with some qualifications include 
Benjamin Barber in this list.2 This philosophical movement is inspired by its 
attempt to challenge and provide an alternative to the egalitarian liberalism 
espoused by John Rawls in his seminal work A Theory o f Justice and the libertarian 
liberalism of Robert Nozick, which was equally famously articulated in Anarchy 
State and Utopia. The latter work was composed as a rejoinder to the former by 
attempting to demonstrate that the programme of economic redistribution proffered 
by Rawls was incompatible with his professed commitment to individual liberty. 
However, for political theorists whose work has become subsumed under the label 
communitarianism there has been a much greater emphasis on the philosophical 
similarities which exist between the two works.
Both Rawls and Nozick were in agreement that the traditional philosophical 
foundations which had underpinned liberal political thought were inadequate. Both 
theorists intended to show that in contrast to the claims of arguably the most famous 
figure in the liberal pantheon, John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism could not offer a 
sound anchor for liberal principles such as respect for individual rights because it 
could not take seriously the distinction between persons. As the principal objective 
of utilitarian thought is to maximise the general welfare, utilititarians end up 
treating society as an organic whole. As a consequence, both Rawls and Nozick
1
argued that under a utilitarian scheme, some individuals could be used as a means to 
the happiness of others, thereby compromising each individual’s right to be treated 
as an end in himself.4 At the same time, neither Rawls nor Nozick wished to forfeit 
the features of utilitarianism which accounted for its appeal to many classical 
liberals; namely, its abstention from judging people’s values which seemed to 
encourage a spirit of tolerance at variance with much of the history of Western 
political thought preoccupied as it has been with asserting the possibility of 
discerning a particular conception of the good life which society should be 
structured to promote and indeed inculcate in the citizenry at large.
The problem which contemporary liberals such as Rawls and Nozick sought to draw 
attention to is that while utilitarianism’s concern to maximise overall happiness 
precluded it from making qualitative distinctions between people’s ends, its 
emphasis on the importance of aggregating individual preferences meant that the 
success of individual rights was dependent on empirical foundations that were both 
unreliable and potentially unfair. While Mill accorded a high weight to justice and 
individual rights and thus opposed consequentialism, his ultimate reason for doing 
so was that the requirements of justice “stand higher in the scale of social utility, 
and are therefore of more paramount obligation, than any other”.5 Thus, Mill aimed 
to give a special weight to justice and individual rights while retaining a teleological 
foundation by arguing that the sanctity of rights could be legitimised through its 
correlation with the human end which served as the underpinning of all moral and 
political theory, namely that of achieving happiness. 6
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The fundamental problem with this line of reasoning in the eyes of Rawls and 
Nozick is that from their perspective, empirical principles such as maximising 
utility are an inadequate basis for preserving morality for two principal reasons. 
Firstly, defending rights on instrumental grounds leaves them precarious and 
contingent rather than absolute; secondly, such a defence cannot respect the inherent 
dignity which all humans possess. As a consequence, the principal innovation of 
deontological liberals such as Rawls and Nozick was to resuscitate the Kantian 
deontological tradition in which the right rather than being relative to the good as 
was the case with utilitarianism was instead independent of it. Kant argued that it 
was impossible to root the moral priority of justice in the realm of empirical 
contingency. The moral law is prior to all empirical interests and therefore cannot 
presuppose any particular conception of the good. The fundamental difference 
between deontological and teleological ethics is, as explained by Kant, that the basis 
of the moral law is to be found in the subject not the object of practical reason. No 
empirical end but rather ‘a subject of ends, namely, a rational being himself, must 
be made the ground for all maxims of action’. 7 Thus, from a deontological 
perspective, priority is accorded not to the ends we choose but rather our capacity to 
choose them
By adopting this line of reasoning, both Rawls and Nozick asserted that liberalism 
can only be defended by providing an account of rights that does not depend on 
utilitarian maxims or indeed, any particular conception of the good.8 Rawls makes 
this argument explicit towards the end of A Theory o f Justice where in claiming that 
teleological doctrines are ‘radically misconceived’, he states:
3
It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles 
that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under 
which these aims are to be performed...We should therefore reverse the 
relation between the right and the good proposed by teleological doctrines 
and view the right as prior.9
In accordance with this philosophical distinction between the right and the good, 
Kantian liberals proposed a distinction between a framework of rights and liberties 
which were inviolable and conceptions of the good which were permitted within 
that framework. As a consequence of this, they were able to allocate moral priority 
to the principles of right and justice without favouring any particular conception of 
the good which the state would be duty bound to enforce. Therefore, the Kantian 
conception of the person which perceived the self as free and independent that 
Rawls and Nozick aimed to retrieve, led to the instantiation of a political ideal in 
which considerations of justice always assume priority over other more particular 
aims. In the eyes of Kantian liberals, rights possess an absolute or at least a primary 
status, which even a democratically elected polity cannot override. Thus, for 
example, liberals who espouse the deontological ethic will defend the right to free 
speech not on the grounds that free speech possesses any intrinsic worth in itself 
such as for example being integral to the good of political participation as was the 
case with the civic republican perspective or that it was essential to establishing the 
difference between true beliefs and false ones as utilitarians such as Mill might 
argue. Rather, from a Kantian perspective, it was defended on the basis that to 
restrict freedom of speech would hamper individuals’ ability to pursue their own 
ends and determine for themselves which beliefs they wished to subscribe to. The 
protection of individual autonomy was thus what was considered paramount.
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Deontological Liberalism's Philosophical Incoherence
The principal purpose of communitarianism as embodied in the works of the 
theorists listed above has been to contest the foundational priority which 
deontological liberals have given to the right in relation to the good on both 
philosophical and sociological grounds. Thus, most communitarian political 
theorists propound the following ‘truths’ which as articulated by (the classical 
liberal) David Rasmussen can be summarised as follows;
that human beings are naturally social; that ethical relativism is an 
inadequate moral theory; that liberty cannot be defined or understood 
without an ethical commitment; that any theory of rights capable of 
motivating human conduct must ultimately be based on a conception of the 
human good; and that rights are not ethically fundamental. 10
Communitarians have argued that in the light of these truths, contemporary 
liberalism is philosophically incoherent in that it fails to appreciate that the good is 
prior to the right (in the sense that moral norms are derived from and justified in 
terms of the good). Furthermore, as a consequence of this fact, liberalism is 
sociologically incapable of nurturing the very liberal culture, which its proponents 
are so anxious to promote. The argumentative strategy employed by the 
communitarians can be likened to what logicians call “modus tollens”. If p, then q; 
not -q therefore not -p. In other words, if one is to hold that the right is prior to the 
good then the 'truths' outlined above must be denied. However, these truths cannot 
be denied. Therefore, it is erroneous to adhere to the view that prioritising liberty 
can be the central concern of normative political theory. Instead, what is at stake is a 
conflict between competing conceptions of the good life.
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Framing the debate this way is arguably a more fruitful way of getting to grips with 
what lies at the heart of the liberal-communitarian dispute and in particular, to 
assessing to what extent the communitarian critique of liberalism succeeds, than 
presenting it as one polarised between liberals who prioritise individual liberty at 
the expense of community and communitarians who do the opposite. The problem 
with the latter view is that it leads one to assume that communitarians are cultural 
relativists who conflate the ontological fact that individuals are nurtured within 
particular communities with the normative claim that these communities ought to be 
valorised irrespective of the substantive ideals which animate them, which might, 
for example, include slavery or racial intolerance. As this thesis will show, one 
leading communitarian theorist, Sandel has attempted to distance himself from this 
depiction of communitarianism by asserting in contrast to MacIntyre that shared 
understandings are insufficient to ground a theory of justice. Following Aristotle, 
Sandel asserts that the values of a community can only be judged in terms of the 
moral ends which they serve. Thus, although Sandel does not frame it in these terms, 
the good life, on his account is a transcendent value rather than one which can be 
reduced to the ends which a particular community may subscribe to.11
At the same time however, as Rasmussen points out, it is open to liberal theorists to 
concede that the good is prior to the right and therefore agree with the 
communitarian critique of deontological liberalism without at the same time 
accepting that this in any way diminishes liberalism’s key normative tenets. As 
Rasmussen argues, the ‘truths’ outlined in the quotation above which 
communitarians claim illustrate liberalism’s incoherence can in fact be used as a 
means for advocating the central primacy of liberty. As we shall see, if the liberal-
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communitarian debate is reformulated as one concerning the philosophical and 
cultural prerequisites for the maintenance of a liberal political order, then it still 
possesses much contemporary relevance. In the process, however, such a 
reformulation will entail the collapse of the rigid boundary lines which often seem 
to distinguish liberals from communitarians. This is not a consequence of the fact 
that an ideological consensus has been achieved between the two sides as has been 
commonly assumed (at least if one infers from this that either side has been shown 
to be victorious or alternatively, that both sides have converged on common ground). 
Rather, it is because the degree of internal heterogeneity encompassed within both 
the liberal and communitarian movements is so vast. Key ideological and 
philosophical disputes are often better explained by exploring the affinities between 
liberal and communitarian strands of thought which converge on the embrace of a 
notion of autonomy (whether individual or communal) as the central conception of 
the good and those which reject it, as shown in more detail below. Before I do this 
however, it is important to flesh out more clearly what is allegedly at stake between 
the two sides.
In accordance with the structure developed by Benjamin Barber in the first part of 
Strong Democracy, it is useful to understand the communitarian critique of 
liberalism as one consisting of an attack on liberalism at four different levels.12 
These can be described in short as a repudiation of contemporary liberalism’s 
foundations, (what Barber calls liberalism’s pre-conceptual frame), entwined with 
an attack on the epistemological and psychological assumptions which allegedly 
animate contemporary liberal thought. Finally, and largely as a consequence of the 
first three perceived deficiencies in modem liberalism, communitarians claim that
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liberalism is an impoverished normative theory whose defective conception of 
human nature means not only that it fails to account for the importance of the value 
of community, but also cannot even supply the motivational resources requisite to 
the promotion of individual liberty.13 To start with liberalism’s foundations, 
communitarians have often accused modem liberals such as Rawls and Nozick of 
employing the same form of deductive reasoning which enamoured their 
predecessors in social contract philosophy. Both theorists have sought to establish 
inertial frames which can serve as the foundation for political theorising, a non- 
negotiable rest position which is pre-moral without being arbitrary or non-moral. In 
the case of Rawls, the construction which performs this task is the “original 
position” which is composed of fictitious persons who devoid of any particular 
characteristics or special psychologies, reason from principles which all can be 
expected to accept.
Although, much more implicit than in Rawls’s theory, the sacredness of individual 
autonomy constitutes Nozick’s rest position. The advantage of forging chains of 
reasoning such as those of Rawls and Nozick is that the consensus which cannot be 
achieved from discussion over competing intuitions, can instead be attained by 
arguing from a starting premise which all rational people can concur with through to 
determinate political conclusions which, however unpalatable, (because it is the 
final link in the chain of reasoning), they are duty bound to accept. The inertial 
frame thus becomes the very epitome of rationality, aptly described by Arthur 
Lovejoy as ‘uniformitarian rationality’ in which by commencing from an immutable 
origin, one can follow a chain of reasoning through to determinate political 
conclusions.14 The flaws in this strategy as communitarians are quick to point out is
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that while they unleash their philosophical weaponry in defence of their reasoning 
from A to N, they leave A undefended because it is the condition for reasoning 
about justice rather than a component in the theory of justice. Communitarians 
believe that this reductionist chain of reasoning results in liberal theorists conjuring 
an epistemological frame which produces a propensity towards philosophical 
dualism in which theory is separated from concrete reality. As Barber states, “The 
knower is cut off from the known, epistemology is isolated from ontology, thought 
is radically differentiated from action, and fact and value are identified as residents 
of hostile universes”. 15
As I will show in Chapter One, these observations are particularly pertinent to 
Sandel’s critique of Rawls. Many communitarian critics extend their critique of 
liberalism by arguing that its affection for deductive reasoning and its embrace of a 
speculative mode of thinking in which speculative foundations are contrasted with 
concrete realities is complemented by a conception of human nature which 
promotes an asocial individualism in which society is nothing more than an arena 
for naked egoisms to squabble. MacIntyre claims that liberals write “as though we 
had been shipwrecked on an uninhabited island with a group of other individuals, 
each of whom is a stranger to me and all the others”.16 Finally, communitarians 
argue that the pre-conceptual, epistemological and psychological frames taken 
together, far from securing liberty actually breed dangerous cultural pathologies 
such as fundamentalism as deracinated individuals seek meaning and identity in 
sectarian groups which are inimical to liberal ideals. In all these respects, 
contemporary communitarians accuse modem liberals of repeating the mistakes of 
their philosophical ancestors such as Hobbes and Locke.
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Liberalism's Epistemological Blindness
The communitarian thinker who will receive the most attention in this thesis is 
Michael Sandel, who articulates the most sophisticated critique of the deontological 
liberalism of which he regards Rawls as the exemplar. Sandel’s critique ought to be 
differentiated from the conventional critique of liberalism in that he does not accuse 
Rawls of the sins which are often attributed to liberals such as the claim that he 
promotes rational egoism. In Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, Sandel dissected 
Rawls’s attempt to retrieve deontological liberalism from the untenable 
metaphysical assumptions which Kant had saddled it with. Rawls believed that the 
notion of a prior and independent self had to be ‘detached from its background in 
transcendental idealism’ and recast within ‘canons of reasonable empiricism’.17 The 
Kantian conception in its original form suffered from obscurity and arbitrariness by 
positing a noumenal being, whose rescue from contingency could only be bought by 
denying it its human situation. Thus, in Sandel’s words, ‘Rawls takes as his project 
to replace Kant’s deontological teaching by replacing Germanic obscurities with a 
domesticated metaphysic more congenial to the Anglo-American temper”.18 This is 
what Sandel calls ‘deontology with a Humean face’.
Sandel does not believe Rawls’s project succeeds, for it either fails as deontology or 
reproduces the disembodied subject, which Rawls had tried to avoid. It is important 
to understand, however, the sense in which Sandel believes Rawls’s project fails, as 
this has often been misunderstood. A claim often made by critics of liberalism, 
particularly by those who focus on what they regard as its psychological frame 
outlined above, is that the trumpeted independence of the deontological subject is 
incoherent and or devalues such communitarian sentiments as altruism and
10
benevolence. On this view, liberals disregard the fundamentally ‘social’ nature of 
man, the fact that we are conditioned beings ‘all the way down’.
Thus, the claim by deontological liberals that in contrast to their predecessors their 
key assumptions do not presuppose ‘any particular theory of human motivation’ and 
is thus neutral as to what values a political order should affirm is rejected because 
prioritising the individual subject biases the conception in favour of individualistic 
values at the expense of communal virtues. As Sandel rightly notes, deontological 
liberalism is not vulnerable to this objection because it misunderstands the nature of 
the neutrality which it claims to provide. It does not claim to be neutral in that it 
admits all values and ends, but only that it prescribes a foundation that is not 
dependent on any particular values or ends. Cooperative virtues are not inconsistent 
with this liberalism. The psychological objection fails therefore to appreciate that 
the deontological view is making an epistemological rather than a psychological 
claim to neutrality. 19 In understanding this, Sandel’s critique ought to be 
differentiated from other critics, most notable MacIntyre’s, which tends to conflate 
the epistemological and psychological critiques or at least does not adequately 
distinguish between them in the way that Sandel's does. Sandel instead concentrates 
his focus on Rawls’s epistemological claim arguing that his Kantian conception of 
autonomy as a being that freely chooses his own ends slips into a metaphysics 
where it is held that it is possible to define a self independently of all the ends that 
he may possess. Sandel questions whether it is possible to determine the identity of 
a human self through reference to its capacity for agency alone. He argues that 
identity also encompasses the actuality of a person’s choices in which individuals 
weave their life plans into a coherent narrative which shapes their conception of
11
themselves. Thus, as Benhabib, concurring with Sandel says, “the conception of
selves who can be individuated prior to their moral ends is incoherent. We could not
* * 20know if such a being was a human self, an angel or the Holy Spirit.”
Renouncing Kantian Metaphysics
Much of the ferment generated by the liberal-communitarian debate originated from 
the attempt by liberals to respond to this Sandelian critique of the Kantian 
conception of the person. This conception of the self allegedly presupposed an 
unencumbered self in which the values and ends espoused by individuals were 
chosen voluntarily rather than being constitutive of one’s identity. What was of 
particular interest was how Rawls himself would respond. As Sandel notes, Rawls 
had two options open to him. He could either defend the priority of the right over 
the good by reaffirming the Kantian conception of the person or he could detach it 
from the Kantian conception of the person altogether.21 In subsequent articles which 
culminated in the publication of Political Liberalism, Rawls unequivocally took the 
latter course. Rather than focusing on the debates which were prominent at the time 
Rawls wrote A Theory o f Justice, namely, utility versus rights and libertarian versus 
egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice, he instead focused his attention on the 
issues prompted by the third wave of debate inaugurated by communitarian critics 
of liberalism. In particular, he aimed to show that contrary to the Communitarian 
critique, liberalism as he conceives it can be defended without presupposing any 
controversial conception of the person at all. Rawls now claimed that the case for 
liberalism was political rather than metaphysical and thus, the priority of the right 
over the good could be defended by the fact that in liberal democracies, reasonable 
people cannot be expected to converge on any particular conception of the good. As
12
people will always subscribe to incommensurable religious and philosophical 
worldviews, it is pointless to try and obtain agreement as to which one embodies the
truth and preferable to try and seek agreement on principles of justice instead which
22can be disaggregated from any particular conception of the good.
As political liberalism does not depend for its justification on any one of these 
moral or religious conceptions, it is presented as a “freestanding” view which 
“applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself’. It is imperative on this 
account to isolate the political from the non-political sphere in order for the 
distinction between the political conception of justice and comprehensive 
conceptions of the good to be sustained. Rather than drawing upon doctrinal claims, 
his political liberalism is founded on ideas ‘implicit in the public political culture of 
democratic society’.24 Rawls’s revised political conception of justice has produced 
an even more voluminous literature than even A Theory o f Justice. Post-modern 
liberals such as Richard Rorty praised Rawls for jettisoning metaphysical notions 
such as the nature of selfhood and attributed to him the Deweyan view that liberal 
theory could dispense with philosophy and derive its normative substance instead 
with reference solely to the disciplines of history and sociology. Indeed, Rorty even 
claimed that it was misleading to think of Rawls’s view as ‘right-based’ as opposed 
to 'goal-based'. As the notion of ‘basis’ was not at issue, only the extent to which he 
has succeeded in systematising the shared understandings of modem societies, his 
theoretical approach was actually closer to Walzer’s than Dworkin’s.25
Other political theorists agreed with Rorty that Rawls’s later work represented a 
retreat from the Kantian universalism of A Theory o f Justice, but regarded this as an
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occasion for regret rather than rejoicing.26^  Theory o f Justice had acquired such 
acclaim because it appeared to resuscitate the tradition of ethical and political 
reflection embodied in the works of thinkers such as Aristotle, Hobbes and Kant 
which had lain dormant for many decades due to the influence of logical positivism. 
Now, Rawls in recasting his theory of justice had seemed to abandon the attempt to 
provide a morally compelling universal theory and substituted for it the inherently 
conservative aim of showing that liberal ideals were in conformity with our current 
social understandings. Thus, Rawls had reduced the justificatory task to the 
practical one of discovering an ‘overlapping consensus’. Rawls thus agreed with the 
communitarians that elucidating ideas of justice is a form of social and historical 
phenomenology rather than the positing of a noumenal realm. This enabled liberals 
to trump communitarians at their own game by arguing that they better reflected 
current communal practices than they did.
Indeed, not only had liberals trumped communitarians at their own game. They also 
seemed to have turned the tables on them by showing that it was in fact they who 
were wedded to abstract, ahistorical conceptions of human nature which were 
divorced from the communities in which individuals lived their everyday lives. 
Theorists such as Sandel and MacIntyre, while disputing the Kantian notion of the 
person still believed that normative philosophy could not do without a theory of the 
moral subject that was non-contingent. 27 While communitarians eschewed 
liberalism’s rationalist epistemology, they were wedded to an empirical realism 
which required the same degree of generalization from concrete reality as the liberal 
mode of abstraction. In addition to its critique of Rawls for example, Liberalism and 
the Limits o f Justice posited “an empirical reality independent of our understanding,
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conditions of our existence that hold regardless of whether we recognise them” such 
as the constitutive nature of our communities.28 The problem with this position is 
that it risks the accusation that the ideal community of communitarian theorists is as 
much of a cipher as the disembodied Kantian subject which they excoriate, ignoring 
the reality of conflict, hierarchy and exclusion implicit in real communities. This 
accusation is buttressed by the fact that whereas liberals’ conception of the political 
sphere is formal in that it represents the mechanism for the application of individual 
rights, communitarians’ conception of the political sphere is formless in that it is 
never theorised.29
The publication of Democracy’s Discontent, Sandel’s second major work has often 
been perceived as a response to this criticism. In the same way that A Theory o f 
Justice tried to justify a deontological theory without transcending an empirical 
foundation, so Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice called for historical reflection 
while proceeding by philosophical abstraction. Thus, in both works, the 
philosophical presuppositions of the authors stifled their normative projects. In 
Democracy’s Discontent, Sandel appears to jettison his earlier empirical realism 
substituting historical inquiry for logical analysis. This has even led one theorist to 
conclude that Sandel has repudiated philosophy as the foundation of political
30  •  •theory. While he still wishes to challenge contemporary liberalism, his emphasis 
has switched from a philosophical critique to one showing that contrary to the 
claims of modem liberals, notions of individual rights defined in a negative sense 
are not exhaustive of America’s shared understandings.
15
The apparent discrediting of foundationalism in favour of contextualism is not 
confined to political theory. Nearly thirty years ago, Thomas Kuhn stunned the 
scientific community when he explained scientific revolutions in terms of paradigm
31 •shifts rather than a progressive accumulation of knowledge. Thinkers across 
diverse disciplines started to speak in terms of historicity rather than progress, 
undecidability rather than certainty, thick description rather than explanation, and of 
common forms rather than universals. Thus, an erstwhile Kantian like Rawls could
32converge with a former Marxist such as MacIntyre in rejecting universal truths. 
The question which needs to be addressed now is to what extent this transformation 
was genuine. It is the contention of this thesis that at least in relation to Rawls and 
Sandel, their apparent shift away from foundationalism has been exaggerated. Both 
theorists are tom by the tensions between their commitment to substantive 
philosophical ideals (political liberalism in the case of the former, civic 
republicanism in the latter) on the one hand and a commitment to cultural diversity 
on the other. Furthermore, because they also believe that the latter can either be 
assimilated to or at least coexist with the former, they tend to underestimate the 
challenge which radical pluralism poses to their theories.
In order to understand these tensions, it is necessary to elucidate a conflict which 
has become particularly prominent in the liberal tradition although as I will show it 
also impacts upon communitarianism as well. This is the debate over whether 
autonomy or diversity should serve as liberalism’s normative guiding principle. 
This debate is of more fundamental importance to current philosophical concerns 
than the one between political and comprehensive liberalism or indeed between 
foundationalism and historicism. In particular, the necessity of having to come
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down on the side of autonomy or diversity or finding a way of synthesising the two 
values illustrates the impossibility of abstaining from making substantive 
judgements as Sandel’s capacious republicanism and Rawls’s political liberalism in 
their different ways attempt to do.
Two Conceptions of Liberalism
A common assumption which has underpinned the liberal philosophical tradition 
since its inception is the possibility of reconciling autonomy and diversity within a 
single theoretical framework, a belief which extends from the classical liberals 
through to Rawls (in both his earlier and later work). This assumption has become 
increasingly tenuous in recent years as especially in relation to multiculturalism and 
religion, it has become commonplace for liberal theorists to prioritise one over the 
other. Thus, one group of liberal thinkers which includes theorists such as Amy 
Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, Susan Moller Okin, Don Herzog and Will Kymlicka 
have argued that the central liberal commitment is to promote autonomy.33 For 
example, Herzog says, “Parents need to teach their children to be critical 
thinkers...Children taught the skills of questioning their own commitments are 
better off. They can sculpt their own identities”.34 Defenders of another kind of 
liberalism articulated by thinkers such as Chandran Kukathas, William Galston and 
John Gray have argued that the central liberal commitment is to protect cultural 
diversity.35
The debate has crystallised around the question of whether the state should tolerate 
or even respect the right of internal groups to diminish the individual autonomy of 
their members and preclude them from reconsidering and revising their beliefs. On
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one side of the debate the liberal feminist Susan Moller Okin has argued that the 
maintenance of cultural and religious minorities means tolerating patriarchial 
traditions which are anathema to women’s freedom. At the other extreme, Kukathas 
has outlined a version of liberalism defined purely in terms of toleration and 
freedom of association in which cultural and religious groups are insulated from
36state intrusion even if their traditions and practices are violent. Therefore, one 
strand of liberalism sees the state as an essential means for safeguarding liberty 
against sectarian communities whereas the other regards those communities as the 
arenas in which liberty is nurtured. This debate between autonomy and diversity is 
not simply a product of contemporary theory but is integral to the historic 
development of liberalism although it has often been obscured by the contrast 
between libertarian and welfare liberalism or negative and positive liberty and more 
recently by the dispute between political and comprehensive liberalism. As Jacob 
Levy correctly states, the distinction between autonomy and diversity does not 
correlate with the distinction between Berlin’s two concepts of liberty. Rather, it is a 
difference of understanding over what constitutes the principal threat to negative 
liberty which for both sides remains integral to the liberal tradition.37 Those 
theorists who emphasise diversity see the centralised state as the principal threat to 
individual freedom whereas the proponents of autonomy are concerned to avoid 
thick religious and cultural communities circumscribing the freedom of their 
members. This dispute is not only of a philosophical nature but also one with 
important social-institutional elements for it concerns the extent and normative 
importance attached to the political community in a liberal social order.
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Comprehensive or ‘Civic’ liberals such as Stephen Macedo argue that the state has 
the right to inculcate in citizens the civic virtues requisite to the sustenance of a 
liberal democratic polity. Macedo concurs with communitarians that liberal regimes 
no less than other regimes depend on citizens possessing the appropriate civic 
virtues. He thus assigns an important role to the political community in socialising 
individuals into conformity with liberal convictions. Diversity liberals reject the 
political community being given such an overarching role. They argue that by 
circumscribing freedom of association in this way crucial aspects of human 
existence are rendered subordinate to the civic sphere. Thus, contemporary liberals 
such as Macedo repeat the errors of civic totalism which liberalism was meant to 
correct. Irrespective of which side one thinks has got the better of this debate it 
should be clear how it transcends the conventional liberal-communitarian categories. 
Both sides can be described as communitarian although they differ greatly over 
which communities should be prioritised (the political community in the case of one, 
local communities in the case of the other). Both sides also advance comprehensive 
theories, which reject the possibility of state neutrality and affirm instead competing 
theories of the good. Thus, civic liberals such as Stephen Macedo affirm an 
Enlightenment monism while diversity liberals articulate a notion of tolerance 
which in the case of Galston and Gray at least, is underpinned by a substantive 
commitment to value pluralism.38
At first sight it may seem that Rawlsian liberalism is closer to the latter position 
than the former. Rawls’s recognition of the existence of irreducible pluralism in the 
non-public sphere means that he rejects the idea of the political community as an 
architectonic association. As Chapter Three will show, in the third and relatively
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neglected part of A Theory o f Justice, Rawls argued that his principles of justice 
could be made congruent with our private worldviews through employing a moral 
psychology similar to that of Lawrence Kohlberg’s. It was Rawls’s recognition that 
such a view presupposed a comprehensive conception of the good that led him to 
write Political Liberalism where he attempted to defend his principles of justice
•3Q
without appealing to a comprehensive conception of autonomy. Nonetheless, his 
continuing commitment to a normative monism leads him to prioritise the political 
community within which all other communities are subsumed. This is further 
buttressed by an advocacy of a conception of autonomy (although he now defines it 
as solely political) and an insistence on the importance of political stability 
consistent with his previous work. There remains a stress on the need to constitute 
diversity in order to ensure the social reproduction of liberal citizens which draws 
him back into the arms of Enlightenment liberalism. His conceptual aim of forging 
an ideal of political liberalism as a free-standing doctrine while retaining its 
monistic determinacy cannot be reconciled.
The debate over whether political theory should favour a conception of autonomy or 
one of toleration is not confined to the liberal tradition. It is also one which affects 
the communitarian tradition although it is much more implicit. This is because 
while communitarians are very eloquent in attacking the priority of the right over 
the good, they are much vaguer over which conception of the good ought to be 
proffered instead. Pursuant to this, communitarians are just as divided or just as 
ambivalent as to the status which ought to be attached to the political community as 
liberals are. Whereas MacIntyre clearly rejected the political community as a locus 
for conceiving an alternative to liberalism, Sandel is much more ambivalent. The
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reason for this ambivalence can be adduced to his oscillation between a republican 
conception of autonomy which privileges the political community over other 
communities and the notion of an encumbered self which takes root in constitutive 
communities which may or may not value civic attachments. In the end, Sandel 
seems to come down on the side of the former. As Thomas Hurka states, 
communitarians tend to conflate the perfectionist thesis that the state may 
legitimately pursue objective human goods with the relativist thesis that what is 
good in a community may be determined by its own traditions and values.40 In his 
recent work, Sandel is at pains to disentangle these two conflicting notions of the 
good over the right and affirm only the former thesis thus differentiating, his 
position from Walzer with whom he is often associated.41 This attempt at a 
clarification of his normative alternative to liberalism however is problematic for 
two principal reasons. Firstly, there is his ongoing reluctance to acknowledge the 
extent to which this position also commits him to the need to abstract from and 
revise peoples’ particular ends in the way that he has accused liberals of doing. 
Secondly, as Chapter Two will show, Sandel is extremely vague about which 
objective theory of the good should be installed as an alternative to liberalism. This 
vagueness is not simply an idiosyncratic defect in Sandel’s project but is testament 
to the wider ambiguity in communitarian thought over whether it wishes to 
reconceptualise liberalism on teleological grounds or offer a substantive alternative 
to the liberal tradition altogether.
Beyond the Autonomy-Toleration Debate: Habermas's Discourse Ethics
While it can be argued that conceptualising much of contemporary political theory 
as one best explained by the conflict between the competing goods of autonomy and
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toleration, it still leaves unaddressed the question over which side of the debate has 
got the better of the argument. This thesis will defend the claim that both autonomy 
and tolerance are integral components of the liberal tradition and thus both sides are 
wrong to try and define each other out of the debate. In order to try and find a 
normative theory which will better synthesise these two aspects of liberal 
philosophy I will, in the final part of the thesis, interrogate the body of ideas 
encompassed within communicative ethics which receives its most influential 
exposition in the work of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas’s discourse theory of 
morality has been perceived by many commentators as a welcome corrective to the 
defective metaphysics which characterises both the liberal and communitarian 
positions- atomism in the case of the former, holism in the case of the latter. More 
specifically, Habermasians have argued that the fundamental achievement of 
discourse theory has been to transcend the foundationalism- anti-foundationalism 
dichotomy which continues to enmesh thinkers in both the liberal and 
communitarian schools of thought. In contrast, the seeming virtue of communicative 
ethics is its apparent ability to foster a non-foundationalist and pluralistic 
understanding of political discourse while simultaneously redeeming a universalist, 
cognitivist and formalistic conception of justice. 42
Habermas employs a transcendental-pragmatic mode of justification to accomplish 
this feat by arguing that practical discourse contains within itself certain operative 
presuppositions which have normative content. Thus, according to Habermas, as 
soon as anyone enters into argumentation they already accept certain normative 
rules of discourse which they cannot eschew without lapsing into performative 
contradiction. Consonant with this attempt to ground a principle of universalisation
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on the basis of propositions embedded within the rules of argumentation is a 
refashioning of Kant’s categorical imperative. Following Kant, Habermas continues 
to sharply differentiate between beliefs and values which are universalisable and 
those which are particular with only the former retaining moral legitimacy. 
However, his position is distinctive in that it replaces the Kantian model of solitary 
moral consciousness with a ‘dialogical’ model in which questions of social justice 
rather than being redeemed a priori are instead subject to appraisal in public 
discourse. Discourse theory is thus distinguished from conventional reformulations 
of Kantian liberalism such as Rawls’s, in that rights are not derived a priori from a 
monological procedure such as the original position. Instead, they attain 
legitimation by reference to actual dialogic processes conducted within the public 
sphere, processes which themselves contain a normative commitment to human 
rights. By this seemingly circular reasoning, it would appear that Habermas has 
resolved the controversies which bedevil modem political thought such as the 
perceived conflict between individual rights and popular sovereignty more 
successfully than two of the other options canvassed in this thesis; Namely, 
Sandel’s pluralistic republicanism and Rawls’s political liberalism.
The selection of Habermas’s communicative ethics as a more plausible candidate 
for adoption by pluralistic, post-metaphysical societies than either Kantian 
liberalism or communitarianism is one that will be greeted with scepticism by a 
variety of conflicting schools of thought. Most of these criticisms focus on his 
continuing belief in the possibility of salvaging the legacy of the Enlightenment 
without presupposing metaphysical foundations. These criticisms have been aimed 
from two different directions. On one side, post-modern and value-pluralistic critics
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such as Stanley Fish and John Gray have castigated his position as representing a 
rationalist flight into utopia.43 Fish in particular has argued that Habermas’s faith in 
the consensual powers of human reason as a basis for the legitimation of moral 
norms does little more than reproduce the prior Enlightenment bias for excluding 
difference and particularity from the public sphere. From Fish’s perspective, 
Habermas’s discourse ethics is disabled in a similar fashion to classical liberal 
conceptions of morality by its erroneous insistence that citizens can divorce 
themselves from concrete conceptions of the good in order to critically reflect upon 
them from an impartial perspective 44 As an uncompromising social constructionist, 
Fish claims that this is an impossible feat to perform. Habermas’s position has also 
been assailed from within the liberal tradition by both the autonomy and diversity 
promoting liberals discussed above. Liberal proponents of a substantive conception 
of autonomy have taken issue with Habermas’s view that it is possible to redeem a 
universalist notion of morality while simultaneously eschewing metaphysical 
foundations.45 They argue that his attempt to dissolve normative hierarchies in 
which political discourse is beholden and therefore shaped by antecedent moral 
norms cannot be achieved. From their perspective, Habermas’s own theory of 
intersubjective recognition requires a prior substantive, foundational commitment to 
liberal principles of rightness which shapes the form which democratic deliberation 
takes. Therefore, in the eyes of autonomy-promoting liberals, it is erroneous to 
believe that the Enlightenment project with its commitment to moral ideals such as 
critical rationality and the fallibility of worldviews can be reduced to collective self- 
rule as Habermas argues. Rather, not only are the moral ideals which inform the 
Enlightenment project and collective self-rule conceptually distinct, but the latter,
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when still attached to particular worldviews which resist sublimation into universal 
modes of discourse, may even undermine the former.
A similar argument has been pushed from the opposite direction by diversity 
promoting liberals. Their fear, most clearly articulated by William Galston, is that 
Habermas’s discourse theory represents a paradigmatic example of a prevalent view 
amongst political theorists that tacitly views public institutions as plenipotentiary 
and thus assigns to the political sphere a general authority over subordinate 
associations.46 Galston calls this ‘civic totalism'.47 Galston would acknowledge that 
the species of civic totalism embodied by Habermas’s communicative ethics should 
be differentiated from those adumbrated by Aristotle, Rousseau and Hobbes, all 
three of which are underpinned by a comprehensive conception of what is required 
for human flourishing.48 However, it shares in practice with them a belief in the 
ultimate primacy of politics. Furthermore, by affirming the view that the only limits 
on democratic power are the requisites of democracy itself, Habermas, is in effect, 
drawn away from limited government- which views rights as a bulwark against 
political authority- towards civic totalism whereby rights are subjected to public 
scrutiny. Thus, both autonomy and diversity promoting liberals, despite their 
conflicting metaphysical foundations, are united in condemning Habermas’s attempt 
to reduce liberalism to democracy, which he calls the co-originality thesis, affirming 
instead that liberal principles must be securely anchored on substantive foundations 
of some kind.
In this thesis, it will be argued that the postmodernist critique, at least in the form 
articulated by Stanley Fish, against Habermas’s communicative ethics fails. Fish’s
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argument that Habermas’s distinction between ethical norms that are universalisable 
and those which are parochial cannot succeed because all norms lack objective 
status, is flawed. It is perfectly possible to distinguish between post-conventional 
modes of moral reasoning, i.e. modes of reasoning that require individuals to 
subject their own worldviews to critical reflection and conventional moralities 
which abjure such comprehensive reflexivity. Fish’s failure to acknowledge this can 
be adduced to the fact that his starting premise, anti-foundationalism, is in itself 
neutral between competing worldviews such as secular rationalism and religious 
fundamentalism as it regards both as articles of faith, neither one any more true than 
the other. By adopting the same neutralist standpoint that he castigates liberals for, 
he cannot differentiate between comprehensive moralities which assume a reflexive 
position and those which cannot.
At the same time, however, it has to be recognised that responding to Fish’s critique 
in this way also serves to validate the concerns outlined above by autonomy and 
diversity promoting liberals as to the impossibility of liberalism (in this case, in the 
form of Habermas’s discourse theory) assuming a neutral position in relation to 
metaphysical worldviews. In order for discourse theory to succeed even at a 
conceptual level, it requires for its operation, prior substantive commitments such as 
for example, universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity. This, of course 
would appear to legitimate the concerns of diversity promoting liberals who would 
point out that even liberal societies are suffused with illiberal communities which 
would resist subjecting their norms to external critique and would further argue that 
asking them to do so when they represent no threat to the wider liberal society is in 
itself a betrayal of the key liberal norm of toleration. It will be argued that
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Habermas’s failure to account for this fact due to his view that the ascent to 
modernity has rendered metaphysical worldviews obsolescent is a major defect in 
his theory. Furthermore, this defect cannot be remedied as Benhabib argues, by 
simply jettisoning Habermas’s rationalist epistemology, for it still leaves intact a 
commitment to a secular, universalist and reflexive culture which will disadvantage 
traditionalist conceptions of the good.49
Liberalism in an Age of Globalisation
Sandel’s republicanism, Rawls’s political liberalism and Habermas’s discourse 
ethics all represent distinctive efforts to move beyond the liberal-communitarian 
debate by proffering rival political theories which each claims is best equipped to 
deal with the complexity of post-modern societies. It is therefore striking to note 
that all three attempts are hamstrung by the same theoretical and empirical defects. 
To take two examples that will be explored at some length in this thesis; Firstly, all 
three theorists are overly sanguine about the possibility of rendering religious 
conceptions of the good compatible with their preferred philosophical worldviews. 
They assume too easily that religious belief systems can be harmonised with their 
understanding of the form which public discourse should take in post-modern 
societies, whether that discourse be republican, liberal or democratic. Secondly and 
in part related to this, all three theorists tend to assume that the onset of modernity 
has been coupled with the hegemony of the liberal political tradition and thereby 
underestimate both the extent to which liberalism has engaged the public sphere not 
as a hegemonic ideology but rather as an intellectual competitor which has both 
confronted and been shaped by alternative ideological worldviews. The failure to 
recognise this has led Sandel, along with other communitarians, to attribute to
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liberalism sins which it has not committed and made both Rawls and Habermas 
complacent about the prospects of retrieving a normative consensus on Kantian 
liberal principles without the supporting edifice of Kantian foundations.
Value pluralists such as John Gray have interpreted the failure of the liberal and 
communitarian traditions to achieve a rational normative consensus on Kantian 
principles of justice or a unified conception of the common good in a way which 
adequately addresses the degree of pluralism embedded within post-modern 
societies as a reason for dispensing with the Enlightenment project altogether.50 
Rather than trying to retrieve the metaphysical foundations which previously 
sustained the Enlightenment project prior to the attempts by Rawls and Habermas to 
relocate it on non-metaphysical grounds, we should simply acknowledge that the 
ineradicable existence of competing agonistic identities renders redundant all 
universal metanarratives including that of Enlightenment liberalism. On this view, 
neither liberal nor communitarian modes of thought have adequately incorporated 
into their philosophies the insights of late modem value-pluralism because liberal 
individualist and communitarian conceptions of the human subject converge in a 
blindness to the reality of moral conflict. It will be argued that Gray is correct to 
castigate theorists such as Rawls and Habermas for being overly optimistic in 
thinking that their neutered versions of the Kantian project can be made 
synonymous with the cultural evolution of late-modem societies.
Gray is however, far too pessimistic about the prospects for salvaging Kantian 
liberalism in the twenty-first century which can be partly attributed to his failure to 
recognise the extent to which value pluralism not only pertains to moral conflicts
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between incommensurable moral worldviews but also to conflicts within these 
worldviews. As the last chapter will demonstrate, an intriguing example of a 
comprehensive doctrine harbouring divergent ethical beliefs is that of modem 
Catholicism. One principal reason to account for this ethical diversity is the 
influence which Kantian liberalism has come to exert in the evolution of Catholic 
thought as evidenced for example in its embrace of the value of religious freedom 
and its restrictive understanding of just war theory. In regard to the latter instance, 
The Catholic Church’s migration towards a de facto pacifism most clearly 
embodied in its opposition to the Iraq war is a particularly powerful demonstration 
of the extent to which the Enlightenment project, not withstanding communitarian, 
post-modernist and value pluralist criticisms to the contrary, remains more relevant 
than ever to the era of late modernity.
Conclusion
This thesis will conclude that, for all their apparent differences, Sandel's civic 
republicanism, Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's communicative ethics 
are all characterised by the same basic failing. This can be described as their 
inability to comprehend the extent to which the existence of reasonable pluralism in 
post-Enlightenment societies challenge not only the likely practical success, but also, 
more importantly, the philosophical coherence of their respective political theories. 
All three political theories privilege a civic conception of autonomy which 
translates into a very expansive notion of the public sphere to the detriment of the 
concrete and the particular. This results in the vitiation of one of the alleged virtues 
of all three theoretical conceptions: Namely, their greater ability to accommodate 
cultural diversity than comprehensive liberalism. This may not be immediately
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apparent in the case of Rawls's and Habermas's political thought because they claim 
that their versions of liberal theory differ from comprehensive liberalism in 
extricating public reason from reliance on any sectarian comprehensive doctrine. In 
contrast, it will be argued in this thesis that they both surreptitiously smuggle 
epistemological and metaphysical assumptions into their conceptions of public 
reason, assumptions which manifest themselves in a democratic totalism which 
accords lexical priority to the political over the non-political sphere.
The substantive nature of Rawls and Habermas's projects is often disguised by their 
apparent conviction that the normative substance of political liberalism is consistent 
with the historical evolution of late modem societies towards a post-metaphysical 
standpoint. This argument not only negates the ideological competition which 
liberalism as a political doctrine continues to encounter within even Western 
societies. It also fails to acknowledge the existence of competing conceptions of 
liberalism, conceptions that manifest themselves in divergent understandings of the 
relationship between the public and non-public spheres. The civic conceptions of 
liberalism embraced by all three thinkers canvassed in this thesis (including Sandel's 
liberal republicanism) greatly overestimate the possibility of ideological consensus 
within the public sphere. In addition, they are also equally defective in their 
insensitivity to the level of intrusion that they permit within the background culture 
of civil society. It will be argued however, that the remedy to this civic totalism 
embodied within all three thinkers' projects can be located within the liberal 
tradition itself. One can appreciate the many insights which the postmodernist and 
value pluralist critiques of contemporary liberalism have yielded in recent years, 
most notably, its scrutiny of the perceived Enlightenment monism which continues
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to animate contemporary proponents of liberalism. However, its wholesale rejection 
of the notion of public reason is not to be recommended. While the conceptions of 
public reason adumbrated by Rawls, Habermas and Sandel are indeed defective in 
that they posit an abstract political realm in which conflicts between comprehensive 
doctrines can be either transcended or resolved, post-modernist and value-pluralist 
critics make the opposite error. Their agonistic conception of the public sphere 
presupposes the existence of conflicting ideological vocabularies thus yielding an 
understanding of politics as one characterised by radical indeterminacy. However, 
replacing a unitary ideal of public reason with a conception of the political which 
negates public reason altogether is no solution to confronting the problem of 
crafting a normative framework which respects the existence of reasonable 
pluralism. A more fruitful alternative would be to limit the scope of the public 
sphere a priori by imposing the extrinsic constraints supplied by a substantive ideal 
of negative liberty. While such a stance would fatally undermine Rawls's and 
Habermas's attempts to reconcile liberalism with democracy on a philosophical 
plane, the more capacious notion of the public sphere which would result, is more 
faithful to liberalism's aspiration to reconcile the Enlightenment project with the 
ineradicable existence of cultural diversity.
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CHAPTER ONE: SANDEL’S ELUSIVE CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
Introduction
In the 1980s, Michael Sandel published Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice which, 
by virtue of its penetrating analysis led to his establishment as one of the most 
important communitarian critics of deontological liberalism.1 Sandel attempted to 
engage this species of liberalism, of which he regarded Rawls as its most articulate 
exponent, at a philosophical level. In particular, he claimed that the philosophical 
assumptions underpinning deontological liberalism are incoherent and presuppose a 
defective conception of human nature, both morally and empirically. Sandel made 
two crucial claims about deontological liberalism which have generated much 
controversy and provoked a significant amount of defensive reaction amongst 
liberals. Firstly, he posited the teleological argument that the priority of the right 
over the good, which lies at the core of the liberal enterprise, is conceptually flawed 
because justice is relative to the good, not independent of it. More significantly, he 
advanced the distinctively Communitarian view that the liberal vision of human 
nature in which man is viewed as an autonomous agent unencumbered by prior 
moral ties fails to appreciate the importance of constitutive attachments of 
community in the development of a moral subject. Thus, Sandel claimed that liberal 
theory was premised on a set of implausible metaphysical views about the nature of 
the self.
One of the most ironic features of the Liberal-Communitarian debate is that the 
Communitarian critiques of liberalism, including Sandel’s, were soon to be 
criticised, (especially by theorists who considered themselves anti-foundationalists) 
for exhibiting the same level of abstraction in their work that they had excoriated
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liberal theorists for.2 Thus, while Sandel eloquently attacked the disembodied 
Kantian self that he believed underpinned the liberal enterprise; his own conception 
of the moral subject was arrived at through philosophical reflection rather than 
through grounding normative theory in concrete empirical circumstances. As a 
consequence, Sandel was accused of replacing a disembodied Kantian self with an 
equally disembodied Communitarian self, an ideal-typical abstraction which had 
just as little relationship to the actual social and cultural contexts which real humans 
inhabit. In particular, a charge that became just as prevalent against Communitarian 
as well as liberal theorists was that they had failed to properly execute the task of 
political philosophy. For example, it was pointed out that the political dimension 
was as undertheorised in Sandel’s writings as it was in Rawls’s. As John Wallach 
notes, “Where liberal theorists offer a constrained view of the political realm, 
communitarian critics such as MacIntyre and Sandel barely have a view of it at all. 
What was too formal in Rawls becomes quite formless (for MacIntyre and Sandel).3
The indeterminacy which characterises the political nature of Sandel’s project led to 
two objections being placed against his theory as it was formulated in Liberalism 
and the Limits o f Justice, conventionalism and utopianism. Both of these suspicions 
can be adduced to the acontextualism and ahistoricism which permeated his 
conceptual framework. In relation to the first charge, that of conventionalism, 
Sandel was often criticised for failing to provide an external standard to adjudicate 
between desirable and undesirable constitutive communities and for not taking 
sufficient note of the intolerance and exclusivity which characterise many tightly 
knit communities.4 John Gray provides a plausible explanation for this oversight. 
The problem with all communitarian critics of liberalism is that they invoke a
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community that no one has ever lived in. Whereas, real communities are 
characterised by distinctive hierarchies and bigotries, communitarians presuppose 
an ideal community divorced of the practices of subordination and exclusion. In 
other words, noumenal selves have been replaced by noumenal communities.5 Thus, 
Sandel’s failure to spell out the political implications of his work has led him to be 
accused of both communal relativism and abstract universalism.
In many respects, Democracy’s Discontent, his most recent work, can be seen as an 
attempt to respond to these criticisms and to clarify the normative implications of 
the communitarian project at least as far as he perceives it.6 Rather than attacking 
liberalism exclusively from a metaphysical and epistemological angle, he attempts 
to interweave conceptual analysis with an historical interrogation of the political 
culture of the United States over the past three centuries with the purpose of 
demonstrating how the philosophical defects of Rawlsian liberalism which he 
delineated in Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice are responsible for the malaise 
which he believes currently afflicts public life in the United States, principally, a 
sense of “loss of self-government and an “erosion of community.7 Sandel claims 
that the notion of the unencumbered self which animates contemporary liberalism 
and has acquired the status of being the hegemonic public philosophy in American 
culture is particularly ill-equipped to address these discontents. He concludes that 
we ought to embrace civic republicanism as an alternative. For Sandel, the 
intellectual resources which this tradition provides-a public philosophy that eschews 
conceptions of ourselves as rational, atomistic agents and instead yields a 
conception of freedom and personhood which emphasises the importance of 
communal attachments and participation in democratic self-govemance-are
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necessary ingredients for repairing badly flawed American political institutions. The 
greater part of Democracy’s Discontent is dominated not by an abstract analysis of 
philosophic texts, but rather by an analysis of judicial opinions, political speeches, 
etc thus illustrating the centrality of republican citizenship to American history. The 
purpose of this exercise is at least in part to show that far from exhausting 
America’s shared understandings, the current pervasiveness of liberalism is in fact a 
fairly recent and pernicious development.
It can be argued that one reason why Democracy’s Discontent has been greeted 
favourably in so many quarters on both the left and the right is that it attempts to 
address a theme prominent in social theory since Max Weber. This is what Tom 
Hoffman describes as the paradoxical predicament of the modem individual who 
despite his extrication from traditional theological and philosophical belief systems 
remains as unfree as ever. He is oppressed by the very social structures which 
liberated him from traditional institutions, the bureaucratic state and the market. As 
these institutions owe their existence to the public philosophy of contemporary 
liberalism, Sandel argues that it is essential to jettison this philosophy and retrieve a 
richer conception of liberty which embodies the needs of individuals for community 
and collective self-government.8 Sandel’s thesis can thus be construed as positing 
civic republicanism as a normative response to this resurgence of Weberian despair 
within the specific context of American consumerist society. This chapter will argue 
that unfortunately, civic republicanism, at least as Sandel develops it, is wholly ill- 
suited to this task. The substance of Sandel’s position is beset with numerous 
problems, both theoretical and empirical.
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Perhaps the most significant problem pertaining to Sandel’s thesis is the sharp 
dichotomy which he posits between civic republicanism and liberal voluntarism and 
the way in which he depicts these alternatives as exhaustive of the conceptual 
possibilities open to citizens attempting to confront the social and economic ills 
facing modem liberal democracies. Sandel’s earlier work posited a contentious 
dualism between unencumbered and radically encumbered selves. Rather than 
relaxing this dichotomy, Democracy’s Discontent if anything sharpens it. He 
uncritically attributes the former notion to procedural liberalism and the latter to 
civic republicanism. At no point does he adequately engage the arguments proffered 
by many liberals in reaction to his former book with the aim of demonstrating that 
liberal philosophy does not presuppose the unencumbered self nor is hostile to 
conceptions of civic virtue and communal identity.9 Even more pertinently, Sandel’s 
own account of civic republicanism is greatly lacking in detail. We receive little 
clear idea about which civic virtues are most appropriate for the contemporary 
world. Sandel fails to explain what the substance of the substantive republic ought 
to be. Furthermore, Sandel does not seem to appreciate that civic republicanism by 
according principal priority to the virtues of political participation and democratic 
deliberation may actually threaten constitutive moral identities whose adherence to 
conceptions of the good such as totalistic religious belief systems may be 
incompatible with a republican polity which values politics above all else. It will be 
argued below that this ambiguity is a product of Sandel’s oscillation between civic 
republicanism and sectarian communitarianism.
Sandel’s occlusion of the exclusionary aspects of republicanism is also evident in 
his sanitised account of republican history. As historians such as Rogers Smith and
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James Kloppenberg have eloquently articulated, the language of republicanism was 
often deployed for dubious ideological purposes. These included the perpetuation of 
gender and racial hierarchies and the legitimisation of imperialist practices, both 
domestically and abroad.10 Sandel also ignores the pervasive religiosity which has 
permeated much of American political discourse and the extent to which it has 
intertwined with republican themes to legitimise exclusionary civic practices. This 
chapter will conclude that the limitations which attend Sandel’s dichotomy between 
procedural liberalism and civic republicanism in his account of American history 
sharply diminish the salience of the normative arguments which Sandel offers for 
the retrieval of the republican tradition. Indeed, his conceptualisation of the political 
universe in terms of opposing and incommensurable worldviews fails to adequately 
comprehend the complexity of the public realm and the extent to which it is 
enveloped by multiple ideological strands which interact and conflict with one 
another in such a way as to dissolve the rigid conceptual categories formulated by 
Sandel. This is not to suggest that the attempt to elucidate a coherent public 
philosophy is misplaced, as certain postmodernists would claim.11 Only that it 
cannot be done at the abstract level, which despite superficial appearances to the 
contrary, Sandel couches his argument
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice and Democracy's Discontent
Sandel’s belief that Kantian liberalism is theoretically flawed is the fundamental 
assumption which unites all his work from Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice 
through to Democracy's Discontent. However, there are also three important 
differences between the two books which reflect a change in emphasis between 
Sandel’s earlier and later work. Firstly, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, in
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Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, Sandel was largely positing an ontological 
thesis.12
His principal aim was to show how the unencumbered self is a human impossibility. 
By contrast, in Democracy’s Discontent, he is primarily making a normative claim, 
to argue for the importance of reviving civic republicanism, a public philosophy 
which has always been latent in American history. This helps us to understand the 
second key difference between the two books which is that Sandel has subtly moved 
away from the language of community which he used in Liberalism and the Limits 
o f Justice  to embrace instead the language of civic virtue. A clue to why he has 
made this change can be found in a remark from his review essay of John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism written a couple of years before Democracy’s Discontent where 
he states
the term communitarian is misleading ...insofar as it implies that rights 
should rest on the values and preferences that prevail in any given 
community at any particular time. Few, if any, of those who have challenged 
the priority of the right are communitarians in this sense.13
Sandel’s primary concern is that the language of community obscures what is really
at stake in the debate between liberals and their communitarian critics and leads to a
distortion of the latter’s positions. Sandel is aware of the potential
misunderstandings involved in invoking community as an ultimate philosophical
standard. As Sandel makes clear in his review essay, it was not his intention to
legitimate community in the abstract as the ultimate locus of authority as some
critics have assumed, but rather to point out that Rawlsian liberals by prioritising the
right over the good do not (and cannot) pay sufficient attention to people’s
substantive commitments. Sandel evidently feels that certain misinterpretations of
his work resulted from the perception that he viewed community as an
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indiscriminate good, in particular the criticism expressed by liberal critics that 
Sandel neglected the fact that the common good which could come to constitute our 
identities might be evil and /or coercive. Of course, appealing to the language of 
civicism and republican virtue does not by itself alleviate this fear and one of the 
criticisms of Democracy’s Discontent, which I will examine is that Sandel still does 
not supply a sufficient conception of what the common good might consist of. If 
this is the case, the fears of critics that his alternative to liberalism may legitimise 
undesirable communities would remain valid.
The third key difference to note between Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice and 
Democracy’s Discontent is that ironically, in certain respects the latter book is more 
representative of the communitarian ideal than the former because whereas 
Liberalismjmd the Limits o f Justice was a critique of liberalism at an abstract and 
universal level, Democracy’s Discontent is concerned with analysing the 
consequences of liberalism in one particular society, i.e. the United States. His latest 
book is, as Michael Walzer states, an exercise in ‘immanent social criticism’ which 
he regards as ‘social criticism as it ought to be written’.14 Whereas Sandel aimed in 
his first book to expose the theoretical failings of liberalism, his primary objective 
in Democracy’s Discontent is to show how these theoretical defects have infected 
American politics in practice. As Ronald Beiner notes, whereas the earlier book told 
us that regardless of what certain liberal philosophers said, selves have deep 
attachments and are rooted in constitutive communities, his more recent book 
argues that procedural liberalism with its emphasis on an unencumbered self can do 
much to uproot us from these constitutive communities in practice.15 It is important 
to emphasise that Sandel still denies the coherence of the notion of the
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unencumbered self. It is not the unencumbered self which is the problem so much as 
the mistaken belief which procedural liberals hold that individuals can or should 
become unencumbered. It is the attempt to persuade citizens through public 
discourse and judicial laws that they are unencumbered selves which has had a 
corrosive effect on the American polity.
Sandel aims to show the interrelationship between theory and reality and how the 
latter is the consequence of the former, as is illustrated when he states in the preface 
to Democracy’s Discontent, “this is the sense in which philosophy inhabits the 
world from the start; our practices and institutions are embodiments of theory”.16 
Sandel further writes that “my aim is to identify the public philosophy implicit in 
our practices and institutions and to show how tensions in the philosophy show up 
in the practice”.17 The fact that Sandel uses the term public philosophy is indicative 
of the fact that his aim in Democracy’s Discontent is not to write an abstract book in 
political theory but rather to try and interpret to the American people firstly, what is 
the public philosophy which pervades their constitutional, political and social 
practices; Secondly, why it has made them feel discontented and thirdly, and more 
positively, how it is possible, by examining and reflecting upon America’s 
particular traditions and history to resurrect an alternative public philosophy which 
more authentically represents the American political tradition and can consequently 
cure the discontents which currently afflict American public life.
The Main Thesis of Democracy fs Discontent
I now wish to outline Sandel’s thesis in Democracy’s Discontent before going on to 
consider some of the key issues which have arisen from his book. In a similar way
42
to contemporary conservatives, Sandel regards American history as a tragedy. The 
loss of self-government and the erosion of community together define the anxiety of 
the age. This is the consequence not of the absence of public philosophy but 
because the wrong public philosophy has become historically predominant: 
“broadly speaking, republicanism predominated earlier in American history 
liberalism later”. 18 Sandel aims to show that contemporary liberalism fails to 
answer democracy’s discontents.
Whereas in his first book, Sandel tries to show philosophically how Rawls relied on 
too thin a theory of the human self, his aim in Democracy’s Discontent is to show 
historically how liberalism fails to address the anxieties and frustrations that have 
come to afflict American politics over the last fifty years. Sandel blames both 
contemporary liberals and conservatives’ inability to answer people’s yearning for 
self-government and community on this commitment to the public philosophy of 
procedural liberalism, in which government does not affirm any particular 
conception of the good life, but merely provides guarantees of individual rights so 
that people can choose their ends and values for themselves. In contrast, the civic 
republican tradition which Sandel favours has an entirely different notion of liberty 
in which individuals achieve their freedom through political participation 
concerning the nature of the common good. Unlike liberals, republicans believe that 
individuals must not merely be concerned with their private ends, but with the good 
of the community as a whole. This requires citizens to have a sense of belonging 
and attachment to the community of which they are a part. Citizenship is much 
more demanding in the republican as opposed to the liberal tradition, (according to 
Sandel) because it stipulates that politics cannot be neutral about the qualities and
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character of citizens, but rather is concerned with the formative project of educating 
citizens in the civic virtues required for self-government. This distinction can be 
neatly summed up by stating that whereas Sandel thinks that liberalism consists of a 
juridicial conception of the citizen, republicanism in contrast possesses a political 
conception.
Democracy's Discontent is divided into two main sections. The first section 
explores the development of the doctrine of the unencumbered self through the 
history of constitutional law. Sandel argues that the Supreme Court has been pivotal 
to the creation of the procedural republic. In issues such as religious liberty, 
freedom of speech, privacy rights and family law, the Supreme Court has shifted 
away from assessing the substantive content of practices and beliefs in the interests 
of the common good to simply upholding individual rights on the basis of legal 
neutrality over what constitutes the good life. Sandel argues in contrast that when 
deliberating over constitutional freedoms, judges should not exclude conceptions of 
the good as they do in the procedural republic, but instead as they have done for the 
bulk of American history, legitimise freedoms on the basis of the civic virtues 
which they foster. In addition to the changes in constitutional law, there have been 
parallel changes in political economy, the discussion of which forms the second 
much longer part of Democracy’s Discontent. In this section, Sandel argues 
eloquently that before the Second World War, public debate focussed on what he 
calls the ‘political economy of citizenship’, which consists of what economic 
arrangements are required to produce virtuous citizens. From the beginning of 
American history through to the age of the progressive reformers, political economy 
was largely a debate about citizenship. Thus, in the presidential contest of 1912
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between Woodrow (‘New Freedom’) Wilson and Theodore (‘New Nationalism’) 
Roosevelt, they were both agreed that “economic and political institutions should be 
assessed for their tendency to promote or erode the moral qualities self-government 
requires”.19 Thus, from the American Revolution to the early twentieth century, all 
sides of the political spectrum were united in upholding the political economy of 
citizenship.
Sandel believes that it was the Keynesian revolution in fiscal policy which emerged 
in the 1930s that heralded the new era of detaching economic debates from their 
traditional concern with citizenship. “Keynesian fiscal policy is neutral... in its 
assumption that government should not form or revise or... judge, the interests and
90ends its citizens espouse”. From this point onwards, Keynesianism became 
predominant in determining the nature of economic policy. Regardless of whether 
the administration was Republican or Democrat, in the fifty years following the 
New Deal, economic policy was, according to Sandel, oriented towards the 
stimulation of consumption over production. Modem politicians of all stripes 
became obsessed with ‘prosperity and fairness’ and completely ignored the 
republican concern with cultivating particular virtues of citizenship. Sandel states 
that “The Keynesian revolution can thus be seen as the counterpart in political 
economy of the liberalism that emerged in constitutional law after World War II, as 
the economic expression of the procedural republic”.21 Ultimately, Keynesianism 
made procedural liberalism America’s economic as well as political philosophy.
While Sandel argues eloquently that the last four decades have seen the near total 
eclipse of civic republicanism and the predominance of procedural liberalism, he
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asserts (I will argue later somewhat paradoxically) that the feelings of popular 
disillusion and frustration that so many felt with American politics were clearly 
articulated by many leading politicians from the 1960s onwards: in particular, he 
cites the examples of George Wallace, Robert Kennedy and Presidents Carter and 
Reagan, who for all their marked differences had in common the fact that they all 
successfully tapped the mood of discontent with the current political agenda by 
moving beyond the ideals which animated procedural liberalism and emphasising 
instead the themes of self-government and community. George Wallace, one of the 
early exponents of the politics of protest was a charismatic southern populist whose 
campaign against a distant federal government that regulated so many aspects of 
individuals’ lives while failing to respond to the key concerns of ordinary 
Americans resonated with many people.
It is Robert Kennedy, however, whom Sandel considers best addressed the feeling 
of powerlessness amongst the American people and offered the most promising 
political vision to remedy these anxieties. He realised that despite the fulfillment of 
the liberal political project, Americans still felt exposed to vast impersonal forces 
beyond their control. Kennedy discerned that this loss of agency was due to the 
erosion of self-government and community. He sought to remedy this discontent by 
decentralising political power, thus marking a break with New Deal Liberalism 
which had been prepared to use concentrated national power as a means of 
expanding individual rights and entitlements. However, Kennedy realised that the 
welfare state failed to enhance and may even erode the civic capacities required for 
self-government. Kennedy aimed to restore the civic dimension by fighting bigness 
and over-concentration of power and to attempt to bring political and economic
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institutions under the democratic control of citizens. He thus came up with 
innovative proposals such as the creation of Community Development Corporations 
which were community-run institutions with the purpose of channelling 
development to accord with local needs. Kennedy’s ultimate objective was to adapt 
Jefferson’s republican vision to modem times, by reversing “the growing 
accumulation of power and authority in the central government in Washington, and 
returning that power of decision to the American people in their own local 
communities”.22
According to Sandel, in the decades which followed, Jimmy Carter and Ronald 
Reagan both attained the Presidency by articulating the frustrations which 
Americans continued to feel towards politics. They campaigned as anti­
establishment figures that would restore American confidence and pride. Sandel 
argues that ultimately however, their Presidencies failed to address the underlying 
discontents which they eloquently diagnosed in their election campaigns. The basic 
problem with Carter’s administration was that the moralism and managerialism 
which defined his politics failed to substantiate the purposes and ends which 
government should serve. In accordance with the reigning public philosophy of 
procedural liberalism, Carter’s program of open, honest, accountable government 
and managerial efficiency abstracted from any substantive moral or political ends. 
Whereas some critics have blamed Carter for conducting a ‘passionless presidency’, 
Sandel states that the real problem was that “his was a purposeless presidency. 
Honesty and efficiency...are not ends but ways of pursuing ends; they do not in 
themselves constitute a governing vision” 23
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Jimmy Carter was succeeded by Ronald Reagan who was elected on the promise of 
restoring American mastery. His significance for Sandel lay in the fact that he 
moved beyond the confines of procedural liberalism and evoked the ideals of self- 
government and community. Ultimately, however, he too failed to stem Americans 
frustration with their political condition. Sandel attributes the underlying reason for 
this failure to the fact that Reagan’s politics embodied two contradictory strands of 
American conservatism. On the one hand, there was an individualist, libertarian 
strand which celebrated the free market and upheld the voluntarist conception of 
freedom. This strand of conservatism fitted in comfortably with the terms of the 
procedural republic as it repudiated the notion of government forming the character 
of its citizens. Wearing his libertarian hat, Reagan stated that “we believe that 
liberty can be measured by how much freedom Americans have to make their own 
decisions”.24 In contrast to this libertarian strand, there was also a civic strand which 
by evoking a communal ethic contradicted the assumptions of procedural liberalism 
(which included the libertarian conservatives). It was this communal strand of 
Reagan’s politics, which emphasised the importance to public life of morals rather 
than markets which resonated with large sections of the American people. It was his 
evocation of the communal values of family, neighbourhood, religion and patriotism 
which distinguished Reagan not only from libertarian conservatives, but more 
generally from the predominant liberal public philosophy. In a similar vein to 
Kennedy, Reagan called for “an end to giantism, for a return to the human scale...it 
is this activity on a small human scale that creates the fabric of community”. 25
Unfortunately, however, while Reagan campaigned as a civic conservative, he 
governed more as a market conservative. While the communal strand of Reagan’s
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politics was reminiscient of the republican concern with concentrated power, he 
seemed preoccupied purely with the dangers of big government whereas traditional 
republicans including Robert Kennedy were equally worried about the effects of big 
business as well. Reagan however completely ignored the disempowering 
consequences of concentrated economic power. Sandel invokes Christopher Lasch 
who states that “Reagan’s rhetorical defence of ‘family and neighbourhood’ could 
not be reconciled with his championship of unregulated business, which has
Of*replaced neighbourhoods with shopping malls and superhighways”. Thus the most 
promising opportunity of reviving the civic republican tradition for decades was 
squandered. Unfortunately, the Reagan-era Democrats were not able to capitalise on 
this continued mood of discontent. While Democrats did criticise what they 
perceived as the unfettered capitalism of the Reagan administration, they did so in 
terms of fairness and distributive justice. Thus, by remaining wedded to rights- 
oriented liberalism, they missed the mood of discontent. Democrats lacked the 
intellectual resources to meet the popular aspiration for self-government. Once the 
party of dispersed power, they had come in recent decades to embrace a strong 
welfare state. Thus, Sandel argues that “from the New Deal to the civil rights 
movement to The Great Society, the liberal project was to use federal power to 
vindicate individual rights.. .the individual and the nation advanced hand in hand”.27
Sandel’s American History
One of the most commented upon aspects of Sandel’s thesis is the extent to which 
his historical narratives have been criticised for being at best selective, at worst 
reductionist to the point of caricature.28 Sandel’s sanitised account of American 
history, is greatly flawed as historians such as Rogers Smith note, due to his
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proclivity for translating key historical events into a version of either civic 
republicanism or procedural liberalism.29 This not only leads to a truncated account 
of American history but results in Sandel frequently overlooking the extent to which 
a republican vocabulary has been utilised for ideological ends which he would 
presumably not wish to endorse. This can be aptly illustrated by citing the following 
examples. A serious anomaly in Sandel’s historical narrative is its neglect of 
religious themes in constituting the identities of American citizens and in shaping
America’s self-image. Thus, as Barry Shain and others have noted, for most
• ™colonial Americans, liberty meant subscribing to the will of the Christian God.
This understanding of liberty can be contrasted not only with Kantian conceptions 
of liberty, but also with republican notions of freedom which locate political 
authority within popular institutions rather than by reference to an external moral 
authority such as God. Much of the impetus for the revolutionary cause was 
generated not by the desire to forge an American Republic, but rather by the need 
for colonialists to fulfil their providential mission as a “redeemer nation”.31 The 
interweaving of republican and Christian themes in the Revolutionary period was 
aptly summarised in Sam Adam’s description of the new nation as a ‘Christian 
Sparta’.32
The influence of Puritanism on the republican tradition explains why republicans 
have often had a very conservative view of what it means to be a citizen. This can 
be seen from Sandel’s own historical narrative where there is a stress on such 
virtues as obedience, respect for authority and religious piety. Furthermore, as 
Sandel’s own sources show, the republican tradition is infused by a strong 
aristocratic component. For example, the framers of the constitution were much
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concerned by the proliferation of mass politics in the state legislatures. 
Revolutionary leaders such as Madison believed that for republican ideals to be 
fulfilled, a ‘natural aristocracy’ of merit and virtue would have to replace the 
artificial aristocracy of heredity and patronage. They believed that ordinary people 
were too absorbed in their own private interests to possess sufficient virtue to 
govern directly and instead proposed to have government led by enlightened 
statesmen.33
One of the most astonishing and frankly offensive omissions from Sandel’s thesis is 
his failure to discuss the dispossession and near genocide of native tribes as a by­
product of the Westward expansion of the colonial settlers. As Smith states; “one 
could read his book and never realise that the North American continent was not 
simply waiting for the taking by Europeans”.34 The western North American 
territories, (all of which were occupied by Indian tribes) are described by Sandel 
uncritically as ‘open land’ which attracted the Republican party due to the 
opportunities which it presented for preserving the agricultural way of life, which 
fostered virtuous citizens. Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison considered 
westward expansion a critical condition for the achievement of a republican political 
economy.35 Thus, as Kymlicka points out, not only has Sandel neglected to mention 
the presence of native Indians on lands which were to be colonised, he actually 
provides an example whereby the promotion of civic humanist virtues is attained at 
the expense of liberal justice. The promotion of civic humanism as an intrinsically 
valuable conception of the good life could only be sustained by westward 
expansion, which in turn necessitated the displacement of the native population. 
Kymlicka then asks a pointed question which is obscured by Sandel’s abstract
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dichotomy between liberal voluntarism and civic republicanism: Namely, does the 
cultivation of a civic humanist conception of the good life justify the injustices 
which were perpetrated on the Indian population?36 While it seems highly unlikely 
that Sandel would answer the question in the affirmative, (especially bearing in 
mind his progressive instincts), his failure to address the question is a major defect 
in his argument.
The Elusive Nature of Sandel’s Civic Republicanism
The above example illustrates Sandel’s failure to critically interrogate the historical 
sources which he cites in order to show the prevalence of republican rhetoric 
throughout American history. As a consequence, liberal suspicion over the political 
implications of prioritising republican freedom over liberal justice will continue to 
fester. Even theorists sympathetic to the republican project have raised concern over 
Sandel’s vagueness in explaining which conceptions of virtue and which communal 
goods should animate a revived republican philosophy. In order to comprehend this 
degree of abstraction and indeterminacy in what is supposed to be a work of 
analytical history, it is useful to examine the strikingly similar parallels in terms of 
the critical reception which have greeted both Rawls and Sandel from the 
publication of their first works to its later crystallisations.
One reason why the liberal-Communitarian dispute is often considered to be 
exhausted is the belief that political liberals such as Rawls and Stephen Holmes, by 
historicising their projects and thus justifying their commitment to liberal ideals 
through locating their appeal within the context of modem constitutional 
democracies have in effect pulled the mg from under the feet of the
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Communitarians.37 It was no longer possible to charge liberal political theory with 
abstract universalism. Furthermore, liberal theorists had seemingly turned the tables 
on Communitarians by not only extricating themselves from the claim of abstract 
metaphysics but also by asserting that it was in fact Communitarians such as Sandel, 
who were guilty of metaphysical foundationalism and ahistoricism. Thus, Jeffrey 
Stout damningly concluded, “The main problem with communitarian criticism of 
liberal society... is its implicitly utopian character...When you unwrap the utopia 
the batteries aren’t included”.38 Thus, in the eyes of anti-foundationalists such as 
Stout and Rorty, Communitarianism is hamstrung by the fact that it offers this 
reinterpretation of political philosophy as a hermeneutic enterprise merely through 
abstract philosophical reflection rather than an empirical evaluation of the
TOcircumstances of everyday life. This is rather paradoxical given 
Communitarianism’s commitment to the importance of situated identities and 
historical embeddedness as the kernel of normative political theory. Thus, 
Communitarian works such as Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice suffer from a 
major disjunction between form and content. Whereas, in terms of content, 
Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice was infused by an appeal for a shift from 
conceptions of hypothetical circumstances in which antecedently individuated 
subjects are posited to one emphasising the prevalence of embedded selves, this 
argument was formulated through a method of philosophical abstraction strikingly 
similar to that imputed to Rawls.
Some commentators have interpreted Democracy’s Discontent as a response to this 
criticism. Thus, Amy McCready in particular has claimed that Democracy’s 
Discontent is an attempt to remedy this failing by providing the methodological
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readjustment necessitated by the substantive arguments presented in Liberalism and 
the Limits o f Justice.40 If normative theory is shaped by an understanding of human 
beings as socially constructed, then it must correspondingly depend on empirical 
disciplines like history and sociology rather than philosophy for the development of 
substantive political ideals to inform the constitution of particular societies. Thus, 
McCready argues that Democracy’s Discontent not only completes the argument of 
Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice but supersedes it. The philosophical procedure 
of the latter is eschewed in favour of a methodology championing empirically 
grounded inquiry.41 On this interpretation, it is suggested that while Sandel helped 
to initiate the Communitarian challenge to liberalism, he is also the heir to 
liberalism, both chronologically and conceptually, for he tries to improve upon 
Rawls, (I presume McCready means here the early Rawls), as Rawls tried to 
improve upon Kant by renouncing the metaphysical in favour of the empirical. In a 
similar fashion to Rawls, Sandel imperfectly executed his project in his first work 
by seeking only conceptual verification for his normative theory and thus 
unwittingly ended up reproducing the noumenal subject, which he argued was the 
logical outcome of Rawls’s conceptual constructions. Democracy’s Discontent was 
written to remedy this error.
I believe that this reading of Sandel’s later work is, at best only partly correct. It is 
mistaken in the same way that the initial interpretation of Rawls’s later work is 
mistaken in that it presupposes that both thinkers have jettisoned substantive 
political philosophy in favour of the much more modest task of articulating the 
convictions and beliefs which shape Western constitutional democracies, although 
in reality, Rawls implicitly and Sandel explicitly confine their mode of reference to
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the United States. On this reading liberals and Communitarians have converged in 
repudiating universality and abstract metaphysics and become enamoured with 
historical and cultural particularism instead. However, as stated in the introduction 
to the chapter, Sandel has explicitly distanced himself from a conventionalist 
reading of his work and tried to insulate himself from Gutmann’s famous charge 
that “he wants us to live in Salem but not to believe in witches” through the 
adoption of his self-professed republicanism.42 Rather than discarding conceptual 
analysis in favour of historical inquiry as McCready claims, Sandel, just like Rawls, 
remains committed to the idea of synthesising the two by reconciling a historicist 
methodology with determinate philosophical conclusions. Both thinkers attempt to 
show that an accurate excavation of their country’s political and cultural traditions 
would result seamlessly in the substantive philosophical positions they end up 
advocating, whether it be procedural liberalism in the case of Rawls, or civic 
republicanism in the case of Sandel.
In this context, it can be argued that the much lauded hermeneutic or historicist turn 
in normative political theory which has allegedly received its most influential 
articulation in the maturation of Rawls’s and Sandel’s political projects is of only 
secondary importance to their desire to vindicate the divergent metaphysical 
positions which have animated their theories since their inception. In the case of 
Rawls, as will be claimed in a later chapter, history is invoked in a peculiarly 
teleological manner to illustrate the triumph of liberalism over its ideological 
competitors and its consequent emergence as a hegemonic public philosophy. Rawls 
aims to invest this triumph with normative significance by claiming that it 
demonstrates how liberal ideals can be extrapolated from within the confines of
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Western societies rather than through the delineation of abstract, universal 
principles. Through the employment of this strategy, he attempts to neutralise the 
Communitarian charge of ahistoricism. In what can be judged as a response to the 
later Rawls’s attempt to extricate liberalism from metaphysical disputes by 
embedding a liberal self within the political culture of constitutional democracies, 
Sandel states:
The justification of liberalism must...depend on moral argument, not 
cultural interpretation or appeals to tradition alone...They must after all 
affirm a conception of the person in which the self is prior to its ends. They 
cannot avoid confronting the difficulties that this conception of the person 
entails.43
This point is well taken. Indeed, the difficulties embodied in the attempt by political 
liberals to ground a Kantian conception of the self through appeal to the allegedly 
liberal shared understandings which govern constitutional democracies will be 
discussed in a later chapter. The critical point to note here is that Sandel also, by his 
own admission has to transcend cultural interpretation and invocations of tradition 
and affirm a conception of the person ‘confronting the difficulties that this 
conception of the person entails’. The tentative and even detached way in which he 
views the historical sources which shape his narrative precludes him from being 
able to do so.
The fundamental problem which Sandel confronts is that he too is exploiting history 
in order to buttress his normative faith in civic republicanism. In a similar fashion 
to Rawls, whose historical account of the evolution of Western constitutional 
democracies serves as the empirical basis for proclaiming the salience of liberal 
political ideals, Sandel seems equally keen to demonstrate in response, the extent to 
which republican thinking was embedded throughout much of American history.
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The fact that both Rawls’ and Sandel’s historical methodologies furnish two 
contrasting public philosophies can be explained in the following way. Both 
theorists are intent on portraying American history as a template dominated by one 
or, in the case of Sandel, two hegemonic public philosophies. The result of this 
strategy is that alternative ideological traditions which resist absorption within these 
reified categories are either excluded altogether or are assimilated to procedural 
liberalism or civic republicanism. The result of the former is the minimalisation of 
ideological competitors to either procedural liberalism or civic republicanism. The 
latter, by contrast, ensures that liberalism and republicanism are defined in such a 
broad way that the degree of diversity embodied within these two traditions is 
completely occluded. This has particularly unpalatable implications for Sandel’s 
thesis. As discussed earlier in the chapter, Sandel’s republicanism is too sanitised in 
the sense that it overlooks the extent to which a republican vocabulary has been 
used to legitimise the existence of nativism, racism, slavery and even genocide. The 
point is not to suggest that Sandel endorses the employment of a republican 
vocabulary for these purposes. Rather, it is to question the extent to which it is 
possible or even desirable to retrieve a republican discourse to serve the 
contemporary needs which Sandel believes are being neglected by procedural 
liberalism.
It is important to note that Sandel has an additional burden to that of Rawls in 
invoking a historically situated political argument to assert the contemporary 
relevance of civic republicanism. To begin with, Sandel accepts (in my opinion 
wrongly), that Rawls has provided a largely accurate account of the assumptions 
and beliefs which constitute American political discourse. He thereby accepts the
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Rawlsian view that procedural liberalism is now hegemonic in this country. Rather 
than simply accepting that Rawls has provided the best articulation of the shared 
social understandings which animate the American polity, as he might have done, 
had he really been the thorough-going conventionalist he has sometimes been 
depicted as, Sandel instead argues for the importance of subjecting these liberal 
assumptions to critical examination. At the same time, he wishes to situate his 
critique of procedural liberalism firmly within the tradition of immanentist thinking 
as a whole. Therefore, he has to argue that despite its contemporary predominance, 
procedural liberalism is not characteristic of the American tradition as a whole. As 
Flathman says, Sandel’s attempt to demonstrate the pervasiveness of republican 
thinking within the theory and practice of American democracy is intertwined with 
the view that elements of this tradition remain embedded even if subconsciously in 
the American psyche thus explaining the angst and alienation which Americans 
currently experience with their all-pervasive liberal public philosophy. The strength 
of Sanders critique on the importance of reviving civic republicanism depends on 
evidence that it is implicit in the minds of the ‘we’ he is speaking to.44
Thus, Sandel is forced to perform a difficult balancing act in attempting to launch a 
substantive critique of procedural liberalism which he blames for many of the ills 
which he believes confronts the American polity while at the same time trying to 
ensure that this critique is not divorced from the beliefs and values of the ‘we’ 
whom he is addressing. The problem for Sandel is that by his own admission, those 
beliefs are centered on a commitment to procedural liberalism. Sandel leaves 
himself open to the charge that he is much more worried about the decline of civic 
republicanism as a prominent tradition in American public life than the constituency
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to whom his argument is directed, most of whom embrace procedural liberalism. As
Flathman rather damningly puts it:
What the book amply demonstrates...is that Sandel himself deeply laments 
the absence or severely diminished resonance of the republican beliefs and 
values for which...he expresses his admiration. On this interpretation, he 
attributes the same regret to his fellow citizens, because, apparently holding 
that merely abstract, external or philosophically unsituated critiques are both 
philosophically jejune and practically futile, his own critique would 
otherwise be hoist, both theoretically and practically by its own petard.45
Thus, critics such as Flathman are basically arguing that there remains a
contradiction between the historicist methodology in which Sandel appears to be
trying to tease out the social meanings implicit in the American constitutional
tradition and his own substantive public philosophy which is predicated on
transforming hyper-individualistic consumers into committed citizens attempting to
ascertain the public good. If this argument were to be accepted it would seem to
reintroduce the problem of utopianism which as stated in the Introduction to this
chapter, has often been levelled against communitarian thought. As even potentially
sympathetic commentators of Sandel’s argument have noted, critics could easily
interpret his thesis as a nostalgic yearning for an irrecoverable civic republican
dream which as Sandel’s own narrative shows, has long been rendered fruitless by
the emergence of procedural liberalism. It would thus be a classic example of what
Stephen Holmes calls ‘deprivation history’, a hankering after a past golden age
which can no longer be resurrected 46 Indeed, Sandel himself lends weight to this
claim when in responding to his critics he asserts: “Any sober political theory must
distinguish between optimism and hope. If the diagnosis presented in Democracy’s
Discontent is correct, there are reasons to doubt that the civic aspirations of the
republican tradition will be realised in our time”. 47
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Sandel is forced inexorably to this pessimistic conclusion by the logic of his own 
historical analysis which in the words of the American historian Eric Foner exhibits 
a “tendency to see republicanism and liberalism as ideologies that flourished 
sequentially, with one replacing the other, rather than outlooks coexisting 
throughout our history”.48 The historical evidence evinced by Sandel to justify this 
two-dimensional portrait actually suggests a much more complex picture with 
liberal and republican themes overlapping with each other throughout key moments 
of American history. Furthermore, as illustrated above, even to the extent that 
Sandel shows that the civic republican strand of political thought was dominant at 
certain points of American history, this cannot be properly understood without also 
analysing the specific context within which the vocabulary of civic republicanism 
was mobilised. As Sandel’s historical narrative shows, the language of civic 
character formation has been reconciled both with contrasting modes of economic 
organisation and with very different understandings of the nature of the American 
polity. Thus, for example, civic republicanism has been associated with both 
political and economic localism on the one hand and national centralization on the 
other. In addition, the formative project has been aligned with both agrarian and 
manufacturing modes of production and even by the 1920s, large corporations 
which had previously been regarded as an obstacle to the formation of good
• -  49citizens.
The more general problem is that the content of ‘our’ civic virtue was largely 
undefined throughout American history, and consequently, remains so in Sandel’s 
account, focused as it is on demonstrating the mere abstract existence of a 
republican vocabulary without ever considering the purposes and motivations to
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which that vocabulary was deployed. This is important for the reasons demonstrated 
by political theorists such as Kymlicka and Smith. If the republican project has 
traditionally been harnessed to further the aims of American expansionism with the 
consequent subjugation and even genocide of key groups of people such as blacks 
and American Indians, then it raises serious questions about the desirability of 
reviving civic republicanism unless it can be uncoupled from what Sandel would 
regard as these distortive ideological influences. The fundamental problem with 
Sandel’s account of American history is that he fails to even acknowledge the 
existence of these ideological influences due to his compression of complex bodies 
of theory and practice into no more than two categories which cannot contain them.
Sandel has attempted to respond to critics of Democracy’s Discontent who have 
argued that his account of civic republicanism leaves unanswered either the content 
of the civic virtues which he wishes to promote or the political institutions needed to 
nurture them, thereby making it difficult to assess the viability of republicanism as a 
normative alternative to procedural liberalism. Sandel claims that he is not trying to 
evade the political implications of republicanism such as those elucidated by 
Thomas Pangle.50 It will be recalled that Pangle extracted from Sandel’s account of 
American republicanism a litany of civic virtues which included obedience to 
authority, religious faith, and reverence for tradition and a love of country. Sandel 
acknowledges Pangle’s claim that Democracy’s Discontent has “hidden away in 
embarrassment” the aristocratic component of republicanism premised on the belief 
that only virtuous and disinterested statesmen are entitled to govern.51 He responds, 
however, that the reason for this hesitation is not that he is attempting to avoid the 
political implications which emanate from republican thought. Rather, it is in order
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to show how republican ideals have informed the American political tradition 
through much of its history. He states that the fact “that republicanism is sufficiently 
capacious to inform different political and economic outlooks is no argument 
against it. Procedural liberalism, which has its libertarian and egalitarian versions, is 
similar in this respect”.52 Unfortunately, this response is inadequate in that it fails to 
seriously address the question of whether civic republicanism represents a coherent 
philosophical worldview which can be modified to fit diverse social and economic 
contexts as Sandel implies.
An alternative interpretation which this chapter has courted is that the unity which 
Sandel ascribes to American history centring on the ubiquitous presence and 
dominance of the republican paradigm is largely illusory. It is purchased only at the 
cost of occluding the degree to which republican ideas have been encompassed 
within mutually exclusive value systems such as the democratic republicanism 
epitomised by Rousseau which prioritised secular civic goods and belief systems 
which framed public discourse within a religious context. Compounding this 
problem is his Kantian error of failing to take into consideration the rhetorical 
dimension of ideology and in the context of American history, the way in which the 
language of republicanism can be mobilised to disguise the hierarchical power 
relations which have constituted American political culture (as in any other polity) 
since its inception. Sandel’s mistake here can be at least in part traced to his 
cognitive approach which as Michael Freeden has argued resulted in the dominant 
Anglo-American school of political philosophers underestimating the contingency 
and fragmentation that all ideologies have to forebear in their encounter with 
empirical reality.53
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Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show that it is a mistake to argue that Democracy’s 
Discontent represents a major divergence from Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice 
despite the marked difference in form and style between the two works. The central 
purpose of Democracy’s Discontent is to synthesise history and philosophy with the 
ultimate aim of demonstrating the normative failure of procedural liberalism to 
adequately account for the constitutive self-understandings which animate 
American political culture. Underpinning the theoretical approach which Sandel 
adopts in Democracy’s Discontent is a desire to show that ideas far from being 
irrelevant have played a commanding role in American history and indeed serve as 
the filter through which Americans perceptions of themselves and their environs can 
be understood. In this context, he aims to repudiate not only behaviourist and other 
modes of inquiry which dismiss ideas as irrelevant to understanding practice but 
also species of relativism which stipulate that providing an accurate account of a 
community’s social practices is exhaustive of philosophical reflection. It is essential 
for Sandel to distance himself from this form of extreme anti-foundationalism 
because it leaves open the possibility for liberals to argue that their philosophy most 
accurately depicts the constitutive understanding ‘we’ have of ourselves. Sandel 
cannot countenance this response for he remains wedded to the view that 
deontological liberalism is philosophically flawed in that it produces a defective 
conception of the self, an unencumbered self which is severed from the constitutive 
attachments which give it meaning. Sandel wishes to argue that the apparent 
dominance of the unencumbered self in American political practice can be adduced 
to a false philosophical anthropology which by fostering conceptions of 
hypothetical beings as representations of ourselves has resulted in ‘our’ current
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collective misunderstanding of the true nature of human freedom. Sandel believes 
that the inchoate ‘discontent’ or Weberian despair experienced by the modem 
individual can be traced to the illusory promise of freedom proffered by liberal 
political theory.
While this belief in the ontological and normative inadequacies of contemporary 
liberalism provides a continuous thread linking Sandel’s earlier and later work, 
Sandel came to recognise the importance of situating his own philosophical 
anthropology within concrete historical contexts. He came to recognise his failure to 
do this in Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, a work which mirrored the 
deontological liberalism which he so strongly criticised in that it too aimed to 
abstract from the particular in order to supply a universal understanding of human 
nature which was non-contingent. This was a defect which he attempted to remedy 
in Democracy’s Discontent. The resurrection of Civic Republicanism which Sandel 
produced in the latter work as an alternative to liberal voluntarism was designed to 
serve a dual purpose: On the one hand it corresponded with the philosophical 
anthropology outlined in Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice in its rejection of the 
unencumbered self and its alternative stress on the importance of communal 
contexts in shaping individual character. Secondly, it was an ideological tradition 
which had been pervasive in American political culture for much of its existence 
and therefore could be presented as an indigenous home-grown alternative to 
contemporary liberalism. In this way, Sandel hoped to reconcile the contingent with 
the non-contingent, the empirical with a pre-empirical understanding of the self. 
Rather than discarding the Rawlsian notion of reflective equilibrium, he attempted 
to improve upon it by showing that, at least within the American context, persons
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reflective intuitions would converge in an endorsement of the principles animating 
republican rather than liberal political theory.
Unfortunately, despite the boldness of this endeavour, it suffers from parallel 
problems to those which afflict the Rawlsian project. The multiplicity of ideological 
traditions which constitute American political culture means that Sandel’s attempt 
to provide an ideal-type historical account of how civic republicanism came to play 
a dominant role in that society until it was tragically usurped by an alien liberalism 
which violated the nation’s collective understandings cannot withstand historical 
scrutiny. While the historical narrative which informs Democracy’s Discontent is 
often illuminating, it suffers from the author’s desire to imprison the disparate 
historical phenomena which he discusses within the restrictive confines of the 
Republican paradigm. The virtue of Democracy’s Discontent lies in its recognition 
that philosophies embody ideas which are in part representations of concrete 
practices and correspondingly, that philosophical ideas are implicit in a society’s 
practices and institutions. This is a welcome antidote both to political scientists who 
attempt to explain historical developments by reference to interests and theorists 
who regard ideas as existing in an ethereal vacuum. Sandel’s ability however, to 
execute this project in practice is vitiated by the fact that his continued adherence to 
the metaphysical commitments which informed Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice 
means that he cannot fulfil his objective of reconstituting normative theory from a 
procedure predicated on abstract theory to a practice situated in history. The 
historical inquiry which shapes much of the book is conducted with the purpose of 
vindicating ahistorical notions which have already been established in advance. In
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short, his approach remains one which is a priori and deductive rather than inductive 
in orientation.
Of course, whether one considers that to be objectionable depends on whether one 
believes in both the possibility and desirability of political theory as a post­
metaphysical enterprise. It will be argued in future chapters; in particular, through 
an examination of the work of Rawls and Habermas, that neither proposition can be 
sustained and that furthermore, the necessity of metaphysics does not and indeed, 
should not preclude an acknowledgement of the insights stemming from the 
contextualist turn in political theory. The point to be noted here is that such a project 
cannot be undertaken in the manner that Sandel has attempted, in which he tries to 
initiate a convergence between form and content, by merging the ahistoricism of the 
former with the historical substance of the latter. Such an approach is not only 
responsible for Sandel’s distorted account of American history but also his inability 
to supply civic republicanism with any determinate content as he wishes to occlude 
the ideological pluralism which animates American political culture by sublimating 
it into his republican public philosophy. Indeed, the fact that republican discourse 
has been mobilised to support ideological perspectives derived from divergent 
epistemological and metaphysical bases casts serious doubts on to what extent it can 
be regarded as a coherent public philosophy at all.
This point is largely obfuscated in Sandel’s work due to his failure to explore the 
relationship between ideology and pluralism. The rationalist bias implicit in 
Sandel’s work means that his analysis fails to take into consideration the extent to 
which a seemingly praiseworthy philosophical vocabulary (such as one premised on
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a republican conception of liberty) can be used to rationalise much less savoury 
political objectives. This partly explains why the interaction between republicanism 
and conservative traditions such as ascriptive inegalitarianism go largely unexplored 
in his account. At the same time, Sandel is no less aware than the later Rawls of the 
reality of irreducible pluralism in modem societies. In the sections of Democracy ’s 
Discontent, where he engages in primarily normative rather than historical analysis, 
he attempts to demonstrate that republicanism can adopt a more accommodating 
approach to cultural diversity than procedural liberalism.
As the next chapter will argue, he is not successful in this endeavour because his 
alternative normative vision suffers from a similar conflation of conflicting belief 
systems as that which besets his historical analysis. Civic republicanism can no 
more perform the political function which he sets out for it than the historical one 
and for largely similar reasons. Sandel presents contemporary American politics, 
like American history, in terms of a dichotomy between liberalism and illiberalism 
with the former very much in the ascendant. By adopting such a stance, Sandel not 
only replicates the defects of his historical analysis by conceptualising one public 
philosophy (in this case liberalism) as a dominant political culture but fails to evince 
the level of diversity within the liberal tradition itself. As a consequence, Sandel's 
attempt to formulate in Democracy’s Discontent, a pluralistic form of republicanism 
in relation to normative issues such as abortion and homosexuality fails. Sandel 
believes that procedural liberalism, by precluding critical engagement between 
competing conceptions of the good where questions of state coercion are at stake in 
order to respect reasonable pluralism impoverishes political discourse.
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At the same time, he wishes to distance himself from the classical, Rousseauean 
strand of republicanism which by promoting a narrow vision of the common good, 
makes the opposite error of failing to take reasonable pluralism seriously. Sandel 
thus proposes the adoption of a deliberative model requiring critical discussion 
between conflicting substantive visions with the aim of obtaining normative 
consensus over which one represents the more appealing substantive civic ideal. 
Unfortunately, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, such an approach will 
merely reproduce the failings of Sandel's historical analysis. It is impossible to 
subsume irreconcilable metaphysical worldviews within an all-embracing 
republican conception of liberty. Such an effort will either result in an affirmation of 
substantive liberalism or in the adoption of some form of communitarian 
conservatism. While Sandel wishes to respect-the reasonable pluralism of modem 
liberal polities, even his modulated version of republicanism commits him to the 
view, that as in classical republicanism, such pluralism can be overcome. This 
notion represents a dangerous utopian illusion, which risks imperilling the 
achievements of Enlightenment liberalism.
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CHAPTER TWO: CIVIC LIBERALISM, CULTURAL CONSERVATISM 
AND LIBERTARIAN MULTICULTURALISM: THREE CONFLICTING 
STRANDS IN COMMUNITARIAN THOUGHT
Introduction
The last chapter argued that Democracy’s Discontent presented us with what in 
effect is a domestic equivalent of Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis 
with public discourse being driven by a conflict between two rival and 
incommensurable worldviews, procedural liberalism and civic republicanism with 
the former increasingly displacing the latter with nefarious consequences for 
American democracy.1 While this view of American politics as a gladiatorial 
contest between two rival belief systems informs Sandel’s historical analysis, it is 
much less apparent in his critique of procedural liberalism where his attack on that 
philosophy’s adoption of a neutral framework of rights and justice as a basis of 
adjudication for substantive moral and ethical issues such as abortion and 
homosexuality does not depend on him adopting a republican perspective. As Joan 
Williams notes, republicanism plays little role in the two chapters of the book where 
he discusses concrete issues such as the role of religion and free speech in the 
American polity.2 When Sandel finally comes to addressing the question of how to 
apply republican ideals in a contemporary society informed by the empirical 
realities of multiculturalism and incommensurable conceptions of the good, he 
explicitly disavows the classical republican model which articulated a substantive 
vision of the ethical life of the community, in which the common good was unitary 
and pluralism inherently subversive of communal harmony.
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Sandel’s principal aim in the parts of Democracy’s Discontent where he attempts to 
articulate a normative alternative to procedural liberalism is to gesture however 
tentatively in the direction of a more progressive brand of republicanism which can 
be differentiated from cultural conservatism which (though unacknowledged for 
most of the book) has the potential as William Connelly puts it, to transform 
republican virtues into weapons of cultural war in order to attain a univocal 
conception of the common good.3 As a consequence, however, as the discussion in 
this chapter will illustrate with particular reference to the issues of abortion and 
homosexuality, Sandel’s attempt to defend the progressive values which are also 
cherished by contemporary liberals without presupposing the priority of the right 
over the good forces him to collapse the dichotomy between the radically 
encumbered and the unencumbered self which animates his philosophical 
theorising. The radically encumbered self that had represented the cornerstone of 
SandeTs normative political theory appeared as Hilliard Aronovich argued, to be a 
residue of Aristotelian ontology or Burkean sociology.4 The assumption was that as 
encumbered selves, we discover our values and obligations which in turn provide us 
with a code for how we should live. By contrast, the unencumbered self of 
contemporary liberalism which Sandel excoriates is, as Richard Rorty puts it, an 
existentialist, Californian self “which can somehow sit back and choose ends, 
values and affiliations without reference to anything except its own momentary 
pleasure”.5
There are two principal ways in which liberals have chosen to respond to SandeTs 
critique of the unencumbered self. The first is the minimalist or procedural liberal
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response which is most eloquently articulated by Rorty.6 Rorty rejects the idea that 
liberalism needs to be saddled with a metaphysical notion such as the 
unencumbered self and questions the level of abstraction at which Sandel’s analysis 
is posed. It is possible, he believes to defend liberalism and even incorporate 
republican ideals of participatory government without becoming embroiled in 
metaphysical disputes about the nature of the self or for that matter whether the 
right is prior to the good or vice versa. An alternative liberal response formulated by 
comprehensive liberal theorists is to accept Sandel’s claim that the right cannot be 
prior to the good and to foreswear the aspiration to neutrality and instead defend 
liberalism on the basis of comprehensive moral ideals. On at least one occasion 
Sandel states that his quarrel is not with comprehensive liberalism but only with 
procedural liberalism. In an article subsequent to the publication of Democracy’s 
Discontent he avers that “My objection to this liberalism is not that it emphasises 
individual rights but that it seeks to define and defend rights without affirming any 
particular conception of the good life”.
This chapter will argue that Sandel is correct to stipulate against minimalist 
liberalism that moral and ethical conflicts cannot be resolved without appealing to 
particular conceptions of the good. However, as will be shown by an exploration of 
the debates concerning abortion and homosexuality between progressives and 
cultural conservatives, Sandel’s rejection of the normative views underpinning 
cultural conservatism and his rejection of the possibility of forging a political and 
social consensus around one particular conception of the good which sustains the 
latter position leaves Sandel much closer politically to the liberals he excoriates 
philosophically than the cultural conservatives who may share his desire for a return
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to a politics of civic virtue. Sandel fails to recognise this due to his apparent 
conviction that it is possible to obtain a normative convergence on the adoption of 
liberal progressive values once disputes on issues such as homosexual rights are 
transposed from a discourse of rights into one based on a discussion of conflicting 
goods. It will be argued in this chapter that the belief in the possibility of such a 
convergence neglects the true extent of reasonable pluralism in modem liberal 
democracies emanating from the existence of conflicting comprehensive moral 
doctrines. Furthermore, the possibility that deliberative discussions may transpire in 
the endorsement of illiberal doctrines such as those posited by cultural conservatism 
means that liberals should be reluctant to endorse Sandel’s invitation to discard the 
language of individual rights.
The conflict between a pluralistic vision of democratic politics and a narrower, more 
restrictive one is not the only tension in Sandel’s thought. Irrespective of whether 
Sandel embraces the collectivist or pluralist strand of the republican tradition, he is 
led into privileging the political community over other constitutive communities. 
From the perspective of proponents of diversity-based liberalism, the notion that 
politics enjoys a general authority over subordinate communities is a view not only 
evident in the communitarian theories of Aristotle and Rousseau, but also in the
Q
work of civic liberals such as Macedo and Dagger. The potential lack of 
congruence between the principles animating constitutive communities in which 
individuals’ identities are shaped and the principles constituting public institutions, 
however inclusively they may be conceptualised, is a tension implicit in Sandel’s 
thought which he never addresses. It will be argued in this chapter that the tension 
between these two strands of communitarian thought runs parallel to and indeed
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cross-cuts the distinction within the liberal tradition between autonomy-based 
liberalism, which privileges the political community, and diversity-based liberalism, 
which asserts the right of constitutive communities to declare their independence 
against the polity.
These tensions are particular evident in Sandel’s political thought. On the one hand, 
he unfavourably juxtaposes procedural liberalism with a not too clearly defined 
version of the formative project which advocates abstraction from individuals’ 
particular ends in order to pursue perfectionist ideals thus invoking the prospect of a 
far greater degree of government coercion than that sanctioned by procedural 
liberalism. This position is particularly in evidence in relation to issues such as 
abortion, homosexuality and free speech as will be outlined below. On the other 
hand, his attack on procedural liberalism for being insufficiently attentive to cultural 
diversity leads him in the opposite direction. Contemporary versions of liberalism 
are castigated for failing to understand that individuals are situated selves who 
cannot be expected to abstract from their constitutive ends in order to foster 
autonomous choice as advocated by procedural liberals. In this context, Sandel’s 
arguments are more reminiscent of Chandran Kukathas’s classical liberal 
multiculturalism which represents the very antithesis of the formative projects 
pursued by perfectionist liberals and civic republicans alike. It will thus be argued in 
this chapter that Sandel’s oscillation between competing versions of perfectionism 
on the one hand and sectarian multiculturalism on the other means that he cannot 
supply a coherent philosophical alternative to the procedural liberalism, which is the 
basis of his critique.
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Two Competing Versions of Pluralism
One of the most remarkable features of Sandel’s thesis is the disjunction between 
the conservative nature of his civic historiography and the progressive conclusions 
which he nonetheless believes can be arrived at by resuscitating republican ideals. 
His historical narrative and the history of civic republicanism more generally 
unearth a powerful exclusivist strain in republican thought whereby communal 
particularisms are assimilated to a state sponsored comprehensive conception of the 
good. This exclusivist aspect of republicanism was premised on the belief that civic 
homogeneity was a prerequisite for a functioning polity. Sandel claims however that 
republicanism is not intrinsically predicated on the fostering of cultural 
homogeneity. Thus, his starting point for contemporary political theorising is not 
only an acknowledgement of but indeed an affirmation of the existence of religious 
and ethical pluralism. Far from desiring to erase that pluralism and impose a 
univocal conception of the good in its place, as classical republicans would have 
demanded, Sandel claims to be able to supply a theory which is more respectful of 
that pluralism than procedural liberalism is, while at the same time continuing to 
subscribe to the formative project. I will be discussing the nature and merits of 
political liberalism in much more detail in the following chapters. It is sufficient to 
note here that for political liberals such as Rawls and Rorty, the only way to 
establish a consensus on principles of justice is to prescind as far as possible from 
discussion on all substantive religious and ethical views as reasonable disagreement 
on these issues cannot be eliminated. The laws and principles which constitute a 
polity characterised by irreducible reasonable pluralism must be established by 
reasons which make no appeal to any particular comprehensive conception of the 
good. This has been aptly described as ‘the strategy o f abstraction’.9 The solution
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to the existence of value pluralism is to abstract from one’s particular ethical and 
religious convictions in order to legitimate laws with reference to reasons that can 
be shared by everyone in a diverse polity.
Sandel rejects this liberal strategy of abstraction arguing that liberals are wrong to 
preclude appeal to substantive moral and religious values when determining issues 
of justice. His principal argument is that the liberals’ reliance on the strategy of 
abstraction subordinates substantive moral concerns to a pragmatic interest in 
securing peaceful social cooperation.10 Sandel believes in contrast that it is only by 
engaging conflicting comprehensive moral doctrines in deliberative discussion that 
one can arrive at principles of justice that can legitimately be accepted by everyone. 
Thus far from erasing diversity or at least confining it to the private sphere, Sandel 
argues for the possibility of reasoning over our conceptions of the good. The 
differences between Sandel’s approach to value pluralism and the liberal conception 
of toleration which he criticises can be better understood by juxtaposing it with the 
minimalist liberalism of Rorty.11 One of the most telling criticisms that Sandel 
makes against minimalist liberals is that their attempts to achieve a consensus on 
principles of justice by abstaining from metaphysical disputes is incoherent. If their 
attempts to forego metaphysical controversies by asserting ‘the priority of the 
practical’ are to succeed, then they must deny that “any of the moral or religious 
conceptions it brackets could be true. But this is precisely the sort of controversial 
metaphysical claim the minimalist liberal wants to avoid”. However, “if the liberal 
must...allow that some such conceptions might be true, then what is to assure that 
none can generate interests sufficiently compelling to burst the brackets, so to 
speak, and morally outweigh the practical interest in social cooperation”. 12
77
to ih
M Sandel is correct then minimalist liberals appear to be impaled on the horns of a 
dilemma which can be summed up as the impossibility of evading the cognitive- 
non-cognitive dichotomy. If they attempt to affirm the impossibility of establishing 
cognitive truth claims then they are committed to a specific metaphysical position 
which belies their claim to have developed a minimalist liberalism. On the other 
hand, if minimalist liberals refuse to take refuge in non-cognivity and instead 
concede that certain metaphysical beliefs may be true then it is unclear on what 
grounds these beliefs can be overridden by a practical interest in social cooperation. 
Rorty’s response to this is to argue that liberalism ought to be defended by simply 
evading substantive philosophical disputes such as cognitivity versus non- 
cogpitivity and instead assert that liberalism eschews all philosophical foundations 
and ought to be preferred on historical rather than philosophical grounds. Quite 
Simply-as he puts it, “such republics have the best track record among the regimes 
which we have tried so far”.13
The differences between the approaches proffered by Sandel and Rorty manifest 
themselves in their contrasting responses to the abortion controversy. On the one 
hand, Sandel argues that one cannot defend abortion rights without making 
assumptions about the value of fetal life and in particular, demonstrating that fetuses 
are, in the relevant moral sense, different from babies. In order to do this, one must 
engage the moral-theological question of when human life begins. Thus, the 
mustm alist liberal position is unsustainable in that it attempts to address the abortion 
noneucarithoutoonfrbntingrthat key question. Rorty, on the other hand, argues that it 
speak, andamaryltociconfrpMi it. Instead, in his typically idiosyncratic style, he
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suggests that rather than engaging the substantive moral and religious doctrines at 
stake, we should try and change the subject from “When does human life begin”? 
To “How can some unprincipled and wishy-washy consensus about abortion be 
hammered out”?14 Thus, Rorty claims, in essence that the philosophical 
controversies which have made the abortion debate so intractable are best mediated 
by discarding the need for a public philosophy altogether.
There are two observations which need to be made about this debate. First of all, it 
confirms the point made earlier in the chapter that SandeTs apparent hermeneutic 
turn and his seeming disavowal of abstract theorising does not mean that he has 
ended up embracing the same anti-foundationalist stance as that espoused by 
pragmatic liberals such as Rorty. Put simply, whereas the latter wishes to discard 
metaphysics completely when confronting political dilemmas such as abortion, the 
latter argues that metaphysics are indispensable. Secondly, in my opinion, Sandel 
has the better of the argument. In arguing for the view that one ought to “value 
democratic consensus more than anything else”, Rorty’s pragmatism is in danger of 
usurping his liberalism in that he is prepared to compromise on virtually anything in 
order to maintain peace as the ultimate value, including even slavery (if the 
historical circumstances happened to be advantageous to its advancement). Rorty 
attempts to retrieve his position from the pitfalls of relativism by recognising that a 
society promoting the goal of peace at virtually any price can only succeed if it is 
prepared to instil in citizens the civic virtue of having as few metaphysical 
commitments as possible. However, in the process, Rorty’s pragmatism becomes 
increasingly dogmatic. This suspicion is confirmed when Rorty, in his response to 
Sandel, implies that minority positions ought to regard the virtues of tolerance and
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compromise as overriding their metaphysical convictions which may, in other 
circumstances, require dissent or even secession from the polity.15 In the case of 
abortion, the price of compromise is far greater for those who equate abortion with 
murder than for those who think it is morally permissible. Therefore, it is 
impossible for liberals to maintain neutrality on the issue without presupposing tacit 
consent for the practice in question.
While Sandel is eloquent in demonstrating that political disputes cannot avoid 
metaphysical arguments such as disagreements over when human life begins, or at 
least cannot do so without instituting a level of dogmatism which subverts the 
procedural liberal’s commitment to pragmatism, this in itself does not constitute an 
argument for civic republicanism. In particular, it does not show in what way a 
liberal metaphysics would differ from a republican metaphysics. After all, as 
Hillaird Aronovitch points out, while one could be persuaded by the need to affirm 
the priority of the good over the right, this does not in itself justify a collective or 
common good as the prior thing.16 Sandel tends to elide this point by sliding from 
saying that rejecting the priority of the right necessitates endorsement of the idea of 
the public good. However, it is obvious that one does not conceptually follow the 
other and indeed, is unlikely to do so in the current empirical circumstances 
suffused with irreducible pluralism, stemming from the erosion of any one 
overarching philosophical worldview. While Sandel attempts to acknowledge the 
existence of this deep diversity, it is not clear that he truly appreciates its extent, 
drawn as it is from a multiplicity of competing conceptual frameworks sustained by 
incommensurable moral premises and as a result, conflicting conceptions of civic 
virtue. One reason for this oversight is his failure to appreciate the extent to which
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some religious belief systems depart so sharply from secular moral vocabularies as 
to make consensus on certain political disputes impossible. This can be illustrated 
briefly in relation to abortion and homosexuality.
Sandel argues that the liberal urge to abstain from metaphysics constitutes violence 
against encumbered selves whose commitments to certain core values and 
obligations such as the sacred nature of unborn life cannot be compromised without 
compromising their very selves. At the same time, however, he believes that by 
engaging in public deliberation over fundamentals, it is possible to achieve a 
consensus in favour of abortion and homosexual rights. In the case of abortion, 
Sandel believes that it can be demonstrated that a fetus is sufficiently lacking in the 
attributes of a person thus invalidating objections to abortion. As Aronovitch rather 
damningly states, however, “for Sandel to believe that any such agreement about the 
fetus and personhood could be reached now or in any near future, he must be 
imagining a world utterly unlike the actual one”.17 More interesting is SandeTs 
defence of homosexual rights in the sense that in this case he attempts to justify 
them in a way which is distinctive and in his opinion more compelling than liberal 
arguments. Liberal defences of homosexuality are couched in terms of the right of 
autonomous, unencumbered selves to shape their own lives in accordance with their 
own fundamental values and commitments. Sandel argues for a new approach 
emphasising the moral goods which homosexual practices promote such as love and 
responsibility which thus makes them worthy of the same degree of respect as is 
accorded to heterosexual practices. “The substantive answer {as opposed to the 
voluntarist one}... claims that... the connection between heterosexual and
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homosexual relations is not that both are the products of individual choice but that
1 Rboth realise important human goods”.
I do not have the space here to explore this argument in any detail. I merely want to 
make two observations as it relates to Sandel’s argument for jettisoning liberal 
voluntarism in favour of civic republicanism. Firstly, it is unclear why his 
‘substantive’ solution cannot be co-opted by liberal advocates of homosexual rights 
in order to complement rather than replace voluntarist arguments for homosexuality. 
Secondly, Sandel’s defence of homosexuality shares the same fundamental 
limitation as the liberal argument which he criticises, namely, its fundamentally 
secular nature. A Republican defence of sexual diversity can only be purchased at 
the cost of alienating cultural conservatives who believe that the good of procreation 
is integral to the moral worth of human sexual relations. This is, of course the 
position of the Catholic Church who avail themselves of both scripture and natural 
law to condemn homosexual practice as ‘deviant behaviour’ subversive of the 
common good.19 These metaphysical teachings are completely alien to Sandel’s 
secular republicanism and leave him exposed to the charge that he is no more 
sensitive to the religious beliefs and values of encumbered selves whose thinking is 
not broadly ‘progressive’ than that of liberal voluntarism. Sandel’s embrace of 
sexual diversity requires an irreconcilable divorce from communal traditions of faith 
who, while sharing Sandel’s yearning for a politics devoted to the common good, 
differ from him on what the nature of that common good should be.
Of course, Sandel might respond that his revised conception of civic republicanism 
is cognisant of this fact. No agreement is likely to be fostered between for example,
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a conservative Catholic, who perceives same-sex desires as an objective disorder 
which must be regulated, and a progressive republican, who wishes to emphasise 
the intrinsic goods which homosexual relationships furnish. However, Sandel's 
concentration on the philosophical divide between a liberalism that prioritises 
individual choice and a republicanism, which privileges civic goods, glosses over 
this point. As a result, he fails to appreciate the potential adverse consequences for 
the very homosexual practices, which Sandel believes that the liberal politics of 
individual autonomy fails to properly esteem. Sandel attempts to assuage this 
concern by arguing that a failure to explicate the moral worth of homosexuality is 
"unlikely to win for homosexuals more than a thin and fragile toleration".20 It is 
therefore erroneous to understand Sandel’s position as one endorsing majoritarian 
democracy. Rather, he clothes his alternative to liberal public reason in the 
seemingly inclusive language of deliberative democracy, which requires citizens’ 
moral convictions to be interrogated rather than simply confirmed in an unreflective 
manner.
Indeed, he states explicitly in his review of Rawls’s Political Liberalism that the 
very abstractness of the conception of public reason contained within that work is 
liable to generate the very disenchantment which will give rise to the intolerant 
fundamentalisms which political liberalism is designed to curtail 21 He thus argues 
that the deliberative model, which he espouses is better equipped to provide a secure 
anchor for the ideals which political liberals aspire to promote. In effect, Sandel is 
asserting that his philosophical worldview is better placed to defend civil liberties 
than political liberalism. Even if this argument is correct he fails to acknowledge 
that its very recognition of the complexities of a pluralistic society mean that it will
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be no more welcoming of cultural conservatism than political liberalism is. The 
conception of mutual respect which underpins his deliberative model in contrast to 
more traditional variants of communitarianism will be regarded as anathema by 
religious conservatives amongst others. Sandel, therefore, finds himself impaled on 
the homs of a dilemma: On the one hand, liberals will be concerned that Sandel’s 
model of deliberative democracy as with all models of deliberative democracy risks 
subordinating individual rights to processes of democratic deliberation. Cultural 
conservatives by contrast will share similar concerns from an opposite perspective. 
They will be unwilling to subject their conceptions of civic virtue which most often 
are informed by a transcendent theological framework to the vagaries of discursive 
procedures, which may prove unsympathetic to such views. In effect, this is the 
price which Sandel pays for trying to eschew civic republicanism’s exclusionary 
tendencies. The price of trying to reconcile civic republicanism with a pluralistic 
society is to adopt the rhetoric of the former while leaving it devoid of any
meaningful substance in order to court the possibility of convergence between
22incompatible moral worldviews.
Civic Republicanism and Sectarian Multiculturalism and Perfectionist 
Liberalism: Three Incompatible Worldviews
The previous section illustrated that Sandel’s attempt to foster a pluralistic 
republicanism will ultimately prove no more congenial to cultural conservatives, 
who wish to utilise the power of the state in order to furnish their conceptions of 
traditional morality, than the framework provided by political liberalism. This 
leaves unresolved, however, the question of whether Sandel’s thesis may prove 
more amenable to religious and other cultural communities, which, while also being
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illiberal in composition, have no desire to employ the power of the state to fulfil 
their conceptions of the good, but simply wish to insulate themselves from the 
power of the political community. It is at this point that the most serious ambiguity 
not only in Sandel’s political thought but in Communitarian thought more broadly 
becomes apparent. As a number of commentators have observed, there is, implicit 
in Sandel’s work, an unresolved tension concerning which type of community 
should be accorded precedence.23 On the one hand, his embrace of civic 
republicanism appears to assign pre-eminence to the political community. (This is 
true even in relation to the more pluralistic form which he attempts to advertise as it 
still regards the character of the citizen as being of paramount importance). The 
political community is integral to the formative project which republicanism 
promotes enshrining at its heart the possibility of discovering objective, 
metaphysical conceptions of truth that dictate the civic virtues which citizens are 
expected to cultivate. Thus, the suspicion of relativism that was sometimes levelled 
against Sandel, both by liberals and indeed critics sympathetic to SandeTs project, 
appears to have been definitively resolved. On the other hand, his continuing 
adherence to the language of encumbered selves moves Sandel in an altogether 
different direction, one which reignites the fear amongst both civic republicans and 
many liberals that his project remains relativist in nature by abjuring objective 
standards against which particular communal practices can be evaluated.
As Pangle notes, this confusion is exacerbated by the structure of Democracy’s 
Discontent. In both the Introduction and Conclusion and also throughout part two of 
the book, Sandel is principally concerned with divining the civic virtues needed for 
self-government. In part one, by contrast, his focus is on constitutive communities
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which embody spiritual goods, which may be in tension with self-government or 
even regard the state with outright hostility.24 This points to a wider problem in 
Sandel’s thesis, namely that the notion of the encumbered self does not provide the 
supporting foundation for republican freedom that Sandel seems to imply that it 
does. Sandel argues that in the same way that liberal voluntarism serves as an 
inadequate protection for homosexual rights, it also fails to secure religious liberty 
by misrepresenting the role of religious belief in people’s lives. Once again, Sandel 
aims to illuminate the progressive potential of his brand of republicanism by 
demonstrating that liberal voluntarism is insufficiently concerned for the social 
attachments which animate individuals in both their public and private lives. His 
scrutiny of Supreme Court decisions is conducted with the purpose of showing how 
this is especially true in the case of religion. Sandel argues that the language of 
individual autonomy which has buttressed the liberal case for religious freedom is 
flawed in that it fails to capture the moral importance of religion and has thus 
ironically led to illiberal consequences where religion is concerned.
The theoretical defect of the voluntarist view can be traced to its image of the 
unencumbered self which leads it to view religious beliefs as “worth of respect”, not 
because of their intrinsic importance, but rather in virtue of being “the product of 
free and voluntary choice” 25 However, religious beliefs cannot be translated 
without loss in this way. Sandel argues that recasting religious liberty as a particular 
instance of an individual’s right to choose his beliefs negates the fact that for 
encumbered selves religious beliefs are constitutive ends which divest persons with 
duties which they did not choose and which are derived from sources other than 
themselves. Sandel is certainly correct to suggest that his conception of religious
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liberty is distinctive from the one presupposed by procedural liberalism in that it is 
motivated not by a desire to protect individual autonomy but rather the 
‘encumbrances’ of individuals. However, it is not at all clear what it has got to do 
with civic republicanism. As Walzer points out, the most perceptive discussion 
which Sandel provides of encumbered selves in Democracy’s Discontent do not 
deal with citizens, but rather with members of sectarian religious communities such 
as the Amish, orthodox Jews etc. which have been described as ‘greedy’ by the 
sociologist Lewis Coser in that they aim to absorb the commitment of their 
members to the detriment of all other communities including the political 
community.26
As Peter Berkovitz points out, Sandel does not advocate in his criticisms of 
Supreme Court reasoning that it should reject liberal neutrality in order to take sides 
between competing theological doctrines such as for example, the dispute between 
fundamentalist Mormons and Catholic Conservatives (amongst others) concerning 
the moral and legal propriety of polygamy. Rather, he wants the Supreme Court to 
be more rather than less neutral in its reasoning by arguing that freedom of 
conscience not freedom of choice should undergird the Court’s deliberations.27 It is 
worth exploring briefly the closeness between Sandel’s language here and that 
employed by the libertarian political theorist Chandran Kukathas. Kukathas is 
concerned, like Sandel, to attack the liberal conception of autonomy which has been 
central to liberal thought and replace it with one emphasising tolerance. According 
to Kukathas:
Fundamental to the liberal standpoint is the conviction that individuals
should not be forced to act against conscience- to act in ways they
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consider wrong. It is the value of liberty of conscience which lies at 
the core of the liberal ideal of toleration. 8
Therefore, on occasions, one can glimpse in Sandel’s critique of the liberal 
conception of individual autonomy a desire not to replace it with a collectivist 
conception of the common good or even a pluralistic consensus embodying 
contrasting accounts of the good. Rather, it is an appeal for a more expansive 
notion of neutrality than that allowed by contemporary liberalism which does not 
exclude communitarian conceptions of the good. On this account, Sandel’s 
principal objective is not a ‘thick’ polity united around a substantive conception of 
the good -whether that good be individual autonomy or collective self-government 
which all communities are required to abide by but rather a ‘thin’ polity composed 
of many diverse communities adhering to different moral standards and 
possessing different codes of justice.29 Glimpses of support for this regime of 
toleration are evident in Sandel’s support for the Amish community’s demands to 
have partial autonomy over how their children are educated.
At this point, we seem to be a long way from the language of civic republicanism. 
Sandel’s criticism of the Kantian conception of personal autonomy seems 
motivated more by its inability to be sufficiently sensitive to illiberal communities 
which may not subscribe to personal autonomy as a worthwhile ideal. In the 
process, however, he once again, leaves himself vulnerable to the charge of 
relativism, the charge, which his adoption of the philosophy of republican self- 
government was meant to dispel. Thus, even critics sympathetic to his project 
have accused him of failing to provide an external, critical standard to adjudicate 
between different communities. Indeed, at one point, he simply asserts that ‘bad’
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communities may form ‘bad’ characters.30 In the event, however, there is good 
reason to believe that Sandel does not want to be seen as offering an 
undiscriminating embrace of the constitutive conception of community. He 
contends that “What makes a religious belief worthy of respect is not its mode of 
acquisition ...but ...its tendency to promote the habits and dispositions that make 
good citizens”.31 As Walzer points out greedy communities will fail this test 
because its members do not make good citizens. Indeed, the members of greedy 
communities have little interest in and indeed, might be totally hostile to the 
political community. Furthermore, if Sandel is serious in his view that only 
‘religious beliefs and practices’ which have ‘sufficient moral or civic importance’ 
from a republican perspective’ are worthy of ‘constitutional protection’ then he is 
even less sensitive to religious liberty than liberals are. After all, as Smith notes, 
many religious believers will be repelled at the notion that what they regard as 
being of intrinsic value ought to be subordinated to republican conceptions of the 
good.32
One ought not to be surprised that in the last analysis Sandel appears to adopt a 
much more circumscribed role for religious freedom than at first appears to be the 
case As will be recalled from the last chapter, he has aimed to make it clear in his 
more recent work that on no account should his position be conflated with cultural 
relativism. In this context, he has aimed to differentiate his political theory from 
both Michael Walzer and Alasdair MacIntyre with whom he is often linked.33 In 
contrast to the latter two, Sandel does not believe that shared values and shared 
understandings are sufficient to ground a conception of justice. As Colin McCann 
notes, from Sandel’s perspective it is a mistake to make any particular conception
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of community the sole arbiter of moral import without interrogating the 
constitution of that community. The good life is a transcendent value and 
therefore, must be perceived as a categorical imperative rather than a contingent 
socially-prescribed goal.34 Sandel is explicit in distancing himself from 
communitarianism as it is commonly understood in the Preface to the revised 
edition of Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice. Under the heading ‘Where 
Communitarianism Goes Wrong’, Sandel states that while he agrees with other 
communitarian writers such as MacIntyre whom he is often lumped together with 
that justice is relative to the good rather than independent of it, he means it in a 
different sense from them.35
Since the inception of the liberal-communitarian debate it has often been assumed 
that when communitarians argue that justice is relative to the good they mean by 
this that the values underpinning any particular community or cultural tradition 
determines what is just. Sandel rejects this species of cultural relativism asserting 
instead that principles of justice derive their moral legitimacy from the human 
ends which they are meant to serve. The fact that these ends may not be implicit in 
a particular community’s tradition does not constitute a decisive objection against 
them. (One may add, however, that Sandel must consider whether they are or not 
of considerable importance or otherwise he would not have devoted much of 
Democracy ’s Discontent to trying to unearth the existence of republican ideals as 
a constitutive feature of America’s communal traditions). Sandel asserts that this 
second way of identifying justice with particular conceptions of the good is not 
strictly speaking communitarian but rather teleological or perfectionist. He quotes, 
approvingly Aristotle who asserts that in order to define individual rights ‘it is
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necessary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of life. As 
long as that remains obscure, the nature of the ideal constitution must also remain 
obscure’.36 Sandel therefore criticises both liberal neutrality and 
communitarianism for the same reason. Namely that in their differing ways both 
doctrines preclude the making of critical judgements on the content of ends that 
rights promote.
It is important to emphasise this transition in Sandel’s thought. Between 
Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice and Democracy’s Discontent his theory has 
migrated from one which uncritically embraces a constitutive conception of 
community as an alternative to liberal voluntarism to one which posits a variant of 
perfectionism in order to provide the critical standard which he had heretofore 
failed to elucidate. Therefore criticisms of Sandel’s later work which tend to 
presuppose that he envisages communities in a manner akin to the virtuous 
Troglodytes of Montesquieu’s Persian Letters, a group of people whose identity 
was so bound up with their community that they could not imagine challenging its 
norms and values seems misplaced. However, this begs the question, of what 
precisely does Sandel’s teleological conception the good consist in? After all, we 
have seen so far that neither deliberative democracy nor cultural relativism strands 
of thinking which Sandel continues to appeal to, are up to the task. The most 
obvious answer is of course civic republicanism. However, as I will now show, his 
fear that civic republicanism will reproduce the same defects as 
communitarianism -intolerance, bigotry and oppression- ultimately leads him to 
discard this philosophy in favour of perfectionist liberalism.
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In the final part of this section I will provide two instructive examples which not 
only serve to illustrate Sandel’s endorsement of perfectionist liberalism, but also 
militate against his professed commitment to civic republicanism. The first of 
these is his account of the famous debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen 
Douglas concerning whether the federal state had a right to regulate slavery. From 
Sandel’s perspective, the debate revolved not around the question of whether 
slavery was moral, but rather on whether it was correct to abstain from making a 
moral judgement on the question in order to maintain political unity. Whereas 
Lincoln argued that public policy should express rather than avoid making a 
substantive judgement on the issue, Douglas averred that we should bracket the 
moral controversy concerning slavery in order to respect “the right of each state 
and each territory to decide these questions for themselves”.38 Sandel’s objective 
in highlighting this dispute is to demonstrate that while all contemporary liberals 
will instinctively concur with Lincoln that slavery is morally wrong their 
reluctance to appeal to comprehensive moral ideals in order to preserve political 
neutrality is a mode of argumentation which corresponds with Douglas rather than 
Lincoln. In order to refute Douglas’s position political liberals must violate their 
own neutrality and advocate support for a Kantian conception of the person, a 
stance which is explicitly refuted by minimalist liberalism.
It is not my intention to critique this argument in any detail. Rather, I wish to point 
out that even if Sandel is correct, what he has effectively done is side with the 
Kantian liberal Lincoln against the civic republican Douglas. Although Sandel 
does not say so, Douglas’s presumed neutrality itself rested on a comprehensive 
moral doctrine, the inviolability of states rights and the moral illegitimacy of any
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action by the federal state to curb those rights. As Smith states, Sandel obscures 
the fact that Douglas’s doctrine of popular sovereignty is an explicit example of 
the very American republicanism with an explicit appeal to self-government 
which Sandel himself endorses.40 Thus, while Sandel’s example may successfully 
refute minimalist liberalism, it does so at the expense of also condemning civic 
republicanism, as neither doctrine by bracketing substantive moral questions can 
adequately defend individual rights. While SandeTs equation of Douglas’s stance 
with the argumentative strategy of modem liberalism is both clever and 
provocative, it also serves to disguise the extent to which it was the embodiment 
of the racism that attached itself to states rights republicanism.
Sandel’s embrace of perfectionist liberalism at the expense of civic republicanism 
is also evident in his discussion concerning conflicts between free speech 
absolutists and those who wish to circumscribe free speech in order to reduce 
offence to certain constituencies of people. Sandel laments the fact that traditional 
justifications for free speech which emphasised its importance as a prerequisite for 
collective self-government have been displaced in favour of the belief that the 
moral worth of free speech derives from its importance in affirming the principle 
of respect for persons as individual selves. Consonant with this view, in recent 
decades, American courts have defended free speech in a way that is content 
neutral. In other words they have resisted passing judgement on the content of the 
speech which they are being asked to regulate. Sandel cites (amongst others cases) 
the famous example of Collin v Smith which involved attempts by the National 
Socialist Party to overturn injunctions by Skokie’s village government prohibiting 
them from marching in the town due to the fact that it contained a large number of
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Jewish holocaust survivors.41 The Illinois District Court sided with the plaintiffs 
arguing that content-based restrictions could only be justified “on the basis of 
imminent danger of a grave moral evil” 42
Sandel astutely points out that the philosophical assumptions which governed the 
conclusions which the Court reached in this case were not philosophically neutral, 
but were parasitical on a controversial moral theory of personhood which 
prioritised individual self-expression over claims asserting speech-inflicted harm 
to the identity of particular communal groups. Thus, Sandel provides an 
illuminating account of how the individualistic assumptions which he claims have 
dictated the trajectory of Supreme Court jurisprudence in recent decades has 
impacted on questions of free speech. He stipulates that by allowing the Nazi 
march to go ahead, the District Court failed to take cognisance of the fact that 
speech not only advocates, but also constitutes social practices. In addition, 
preserving free speech at all costs inhibits political communities from respecting 
the good of persons as situated selves. Many liberals will of course find this case 
rather discomfiting and that is no doubt one of the reasons why Sandel selected it. 
It is perhaps the most eloquent example Sandel provides in Democracy’s 
Discontent of how the good of respect for persons as situated selves can seem to 
outweigh the respect accorded to individuals as ends.
Sandel anticipates the response of the anxious liberal, namely, that the government 
must be neutral among ends in order to prevent majorities from prohibiting views 
which they happen to deplore. After all, while the disadvantage of allowing 
unfettered free speech may be that it results in groups such as the Nazis displaying
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intolerance towards vulnerable minorities as in the case of Skokie it also serves to 
protect groups campaigning for civil rights as was the case when Martin Luther 
King marched in white segregationist communities. A liberal may ask that if all 
speech need not be tolerated then what is to distinguish the case of the Nazis in 
Skokie from the civil rights marches in the South. The assumption behind the 
question is that curbing free speech is more likely to impact upon the latter than 
the former. Sandel’s answer is striking. Whereas the Nazis promoted genocide, 
Martin Luther King sought civil rights for blacks.43 In other words, one can 
adjudicate between the different instances of free speech depending on the 
substantive ends being pursued in each case. To be more precise, when it is 
substantive liberal ends that are being pursued then it is wholly legitimate to allow 
free speech while in other instances it can be prohibited. It is not my intention here 
to determine whether Sandel is correct to privilege the more restrictive 
understanding of free speech over the permissive one. I simply want to note that 
both of these competing understandings are largely liberal in substance. Sandel is 
no longer claiming as he did in relation to constitutive religious communities that 
the liberal voluntarist self privileges the ideal of critical reflection towards an 
individual’s particular ends at the expense of the situated self. Rather, his 
argument here is that its language of neutrality means that its ideal of critical 
reflection is formal rather than substantive. In its place, Sandel proffers a 
perfectionist liberalism which can supply the conceptual resources to challenge 
the values of constitutive selves whose attachments are inimical to the wider 
liberal community. In this context, his argument represents the very antithesis of 
communitarian relativism.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the false dichotomies which disfigure Sandel’s 
narrative account of American history are replicated in his philosophical analysis. 
In particular, his attempt to resurrect civic republicanism as a philosophical 
alternative to procedural liberalism is vitiated by his failure to delineate precisely 
what the substance of the substantive republic actually consists in. The elusive 
nature of Sandel’s republican project can be partly adduced to the fact that he 
aspires to articulate an inclusive strain of civic republicanism which is therefore 
less vulnerable to liberal objections of failing to take seriously the diversity of 
views and cultural beliefs which pertain to modem liberal democracies. Sandel’s 
abstract presentation of the formative project in the first chapter of Democracy’s 
Discontent, where he initially differentiates civic republicanism from procedural 
liberalism, gives the impression that his principal aspiration is to argue for the 
possibility of a unitary conception of the common good. By contrast, when he 
comes to discussing political and social issues that provoke much animated 
discussion such as homosexual rights and abortion, these distinctions have been 
modulated somewhat. Sandel argues instead that the formative project cannot be 
delineated a priori but can only be established through a deliberative discussion 
between competing conceptions of the good. Despite their apparent differences, 
the problem with both these versions of the formative project is that they are 
ultimately premised on the invocation of state coercion to further certain concrete 
ends. A deliberative dialogue based on trying to reach a normative consensus on 
what these ends should be will merely highlight the incommensurable 
metaphysical and epistemological commitments which animate competing 
conceptions of the good. Therefore, the attempt to find a unified conception of the
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common good is an illusory one and will simply end up reaffirming substantive 
liberal positions on issues such as abortion or result in the subordination of liberal 
rights to traditionalist conceptions of morality. Sandel does not appreciate that his 
legitimate point that it is impossible for the state to be neutral between competing 
conceptions of the good also vitiates his own aspiration to craft an overlapping 
consensus between diverse comprehensive doctrines which converge on a unified 
common morality.
Finally, this chapter has shown that Sandel not only oscillates between competing 
versions of the formative project, but in places, continues to employ a 
communitarian vocabulary which is at variance with his insistence that the good 
life is not relative to the shared understandings of a particular community but 
instead ought to be understood as having transcendent value. In particular, his 
continuing commitment to the notion of the radically encumbered self which is 
embedded in constitutive communities whose obligations are not subject to critical 
scrutiny drives him back in the direction of the very cultural relativism which he 
explicitly disavows. His ontological distinction between the unencumbered and 
encumbered selves simply does not map onto his normative distinction between 
procedural liberalism and civic republicanism. Thus, while the last two chapters 
have argued that Sandel’s proffered alternative to procedural liberalism fails both 
ontologically and normatively, it still remains necessary to explore whether 
Rawlsian liberalism really does presuppose the Kantian conception of the 
unencumbered self which Sandel saddles it with. In contrast not only with Sandel, 
but also with conventional wisdom, it will be contended that Rawls’s liberalism is 
actually communitarian in substance at both the ontological and normative levels.
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Once this argument has been made in Chapter Four, it will be possible to see how 
it in fact suffers many of the same defects which plague Sandel’s republicanism.
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CHAPTER THREE: RAWLS’S COMMUNITARIANISM
Introduction
In the last chapter it was argued that Sandel’s civic republicanism did not offer a 
satisfactory alternative to liberal individualism. His persistence in arguing that the 
philosophical options open to interrogation consist of either an unencumbered or an 
encumbered self is a particularly gratuitous example of ‘the fallacy of the false 
dilemma’ which continues to plague both Sandel’s work and the communitarian 
critique of liberalism more generally.1 The question still needs to be addressed however 
as to whether he is right to impute to Rawls the notion of the unencumbered self which 
presupposes that Rawls’s Kantian conception of human nature results in him espousing 
an atomistic ontology. Sandel seems to believe that the philosophical assumptions 
which informed A Theory o f Justice are still in place and that it is merely the way in 
which Rawls argues for these assumptions which have changed in his later work. By 
contrast, many other critics have argued that, while it is true that Rawls’s emphasis in A 
Theory o f Justice on a hypothetical social contract which presupposed rational and 
disembodied individuals left him vulnerable to the charge that he was guilty of asocial 
individualism, this is an impression which he rectifies in his later work where he 
attempts to ground his theory on more communitarian foundations. In the next chapter 
where I will discuss Rawls’s Political Liberalism I will endeavour to show that while 
Rawls’s theory is indeed communitarian this is not in the way that is commonly 
supposed. In this chapter through a discussion of A Theory o f Justice I will argue that 
contrary to conventional opinion, Rawls actually adopts a holistic rather than an
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atomistic ontology with the result that his theory is much less Kantian in its 
assumptions than is often supposed.
Justice Goodness and Congruence: Stability in Rawls’s Theory of Justice
A Theory o f Justice has been described as “the most substantial and interesting 
contribution to moral philosophy since the war”. The huge impact, which it made at 
the time of its publication, can be largely attributed to the fact that it revived 
substantive moral philosophy at a time when it was on the defensive. Moral scepticism 
which doubts that it is possible for moral beliefs to be underpinned by rational 
foundations has been pervasive throughout the history of Western political thought 
although it rarely became orthodoxy. This changed however, in the decades preceding 
the writing of A Theory o f Justice in which logical positivism and linguistic philosophy 
emerged as the dominant philosophical currents. Rawls book largely represented a 
reaction against these trends. It aimed to provide a substantive theory of justice in 
which it was not sufficient simply to formulate principles of justice, but also to show 
how they correlate with our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium. It was 
thus concerned with the critical question of how to maintain a public sense of justice 
and the specific institutions and practices requisite for its continued reproduction. 
Rawls’s theory of justice is based on Kant’s conception of the self and Rousseau’s 
moral psychology. As one reviewer argues, in the context of western thought, it can be 
seen as the culmination of the effort begun by Kant and Hegel and continued by 
idealists such as T H Green and Bernard Bosanquet to adapt Rousseau’s notion of the 
general will to modem liberal democracies.3 In constructing his theory, Rawls deploys
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a two stage strategy similar to that which takes place in Rousseau’s The Social Contract
and Emile. After formulating the principles of justice through the device of the original
position, he aims to show that our natural sentiments and moral psychology would
render such a conception stable. Fortunately, according to Rawls, the principles
developed in the original position cohere with ‘our nature as noumenal beings’.4 What
reason requires will be confirmed and sustained by the emergence of the appropriate
natural and moral sentiments:
Thus a well-ordered society satisfies the principles of justice which are 
collectively rational from the perspective of the original position; and from the 
standpoint of the individual, the desire to affirm the public conception of justice 
as regulative of one’s plan of life accords with the principles of rational choice.5
This chapter will proceed, firstly by elaborating upon the tools of liberal contract theory 
which Rawls employs in order to formulate his principles of justice. In addition, it will 
show the extent to which concentration by critics on these tools in isolation from the 
other aspects of his theory have prompted unwarranted claims that he relies on an 
abstract, unencumbered self. Then, I will move on to show how his theory of moral 
development contained within part III of A Theory o f Justice is based on the fostering 
of a social environment conducive to the cultivation of a sense of justice. In order to 
accomplish this task, he is forced to deviate away from the arid rationalism of Kant 
with his eviscerated moral psychology and turn his attention instead to moral 
philosophers such as Philippa Foot and Bernard Williams in formulating his views 
about the importance of moral sentiments.6
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The Original Position
In part one of A Theory o f Justice, Rawls aimed to derive a conception of justice from 
the deliberations of rational agents who were regarded as mutually disinterested. This 
reflects Rawls' initial intention of casting his conception of justice as part of a theory of 
rational choice. For this purpose, Rawls constructed an original position in which 
rational actors were subject to constraints of reasonableness, which guaranteed their 
impartiality in determining principles of justice. There was thus no need for the rational 
actors in the original position to be informed by a theory of moral personality which 
would require them to take into account the equal interest of all, for this impartiality 
was guaranteed by morally substantive situational constraints in which those agents 
choose principles for a system of fair cooperation. These normative constraints resulted 
in a veil of ignorance being thrown over the mutually disinterested though free and 
equal parties. Because they did not know what their status would be in the society, 
which it was their task to design principles of justice for, they were thus already 
constrained by their self-interest to reflect on what is equally good for all.
Rawls's adoption of a rational choice format provoked much criticism from theorists 
who believed that it simply was not possible to derive principles of justice from 
deliberations conducted between rationally choosing actors who are blind to issues of 
justice. Thus, Rawls' contractual approach to political theory, as exemplified in the 
original position, came under severe criticism from communitarians who believed that 
it represented a commitment to asocial individualism. One can identify in this line of 
attack two distinct senses in which Rawls's work is perceived as individualistic which
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are often misleadingly conflated together. The first sense in which Rawls’ view of 
society is regarded as narrowly individualistic can be attributed to the fact that people 
in the decisive choice situation {i.e the original position} are characterised asocially 
and ahistorically. This view can be defined as metaphysical individualism in the sense 
that it embodies an atomistic ontology. Critics have thus attacked Rawls's original 
position for being predicated on a metaphysically abstract view of persons in which the 
individual is regarded as prior to society. The second sense in which Rawls's theory is 
perceived as individualistic is based on the fact that people in the decisive choice 
situation are regarded as self-interested. This view can be defined as ethical 
individualism in the sense that individuals are characterised as acting for solely egoistic 
reasons.7 Thus critics have criticised Rawls for predicating his theory on an ethically 
impoverished conception of the person. For example, communitarians believed that 
Rawls by conceiving of politics as a forum in which people cooperate solely in order to 
further their own private interests neglected the importance of substantive goods whose 
content is defined communally. In particular, Rawls ignored the fact that for many 
people, the value of political community consisted of a constitutive attachment in which 
common institutions were regarded as intrinsic and not just instrumental goods.
Both these arguments seem to be based on the premise that because individuals in the 
initial choice situation are characterised either abstractly and/or self-interestedly, then it 
logically follows that a well-ordered society informed by Rawls's substantive principles 
of justice will also be atomistic and or egoistic. Such a position however seems to rest 
on a misconstrual of the role which the original position plays in Rawls's theory. In
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particular, it fails to recognise that the original position served as a heuristic device and
was not meant to be interpreted literally, as if those in it were actual persons. Indeed,
Rawls made that point perfectly clear in A Theory o f Justice:
The fact that in the original position the parties are characterised as not 
interested in one another’s concerns does not entail that persons in ordinary life 
that hold the principles that would be agreed to are similarly disinterested in one 
another...The motivation of the persons in the original position must not be 
confused with the motivations of persons in everyday life that accept the 
principles that would be chosen and have the corresponding sense of justice.8
Thus, even in A Theory o f Justice, Rawls makes it clear that the original position is a 
‘device of representation’ and is best interpreted as a figurative way of establishing the 
constraints which it is reasonable to place on individuals when engaged in deliberation 
over the principles of justice.9
Those critics who interpreted A Theory o f Justice as one designed solely for rational 
prudential agents failed to take seriously enough Rawls's distinction between rational 
and full autonomy. The parties who deliberate in the original position are characterised 
simply by rational autonomy. Rationally autonomous agents differ from fully 
autonomous ones in the sense that in determining the principles of justice which should 
be adopted from the available alternatives, the constraints of the reasonable are imposed 
from outside. "In their rational deliberations the parties...recognise no standpoint 
external to their own point of view".10 Rawls states that as merely rationally 
autonomous, the parties are no more than artificial persons fashioned to inhabit the 
original position as a device of representation. Citizens in a well-ordered society, by 
contrast, are frilly autonomous because they freely accept the constraints of the
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reasonable.
The principles of practical reason are no longer external impositions but are intrinsic
features of individuals’ moral personalities. Our capacities for practical reasoning as
applied to issues of justice are embodied in two moral powers which Rawls ascribes to
fully autonomous citizens: Namely, our capacity for an effective sense of justice and a
capacity to form, revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good. It is real life
citizens, who by affirming and acting upon the principles of justice that are fully
autonomous. Thus, from A Theory o f Justice through to Political Liberalism, Rawls has
consistently distinguished between the rational and the reasonable. In particular, in
Political Liberalism, Rawls states that the reasonable is not derived from the rational.
In an important footnote, Rawls makes this explicit stating that:
Here I correct a remark in Theory {A Theory of Justice}, p i6, where it is said 
that the theory of justice is part of the theory of rational decision... this is 
simply incorrect. What should have been said is that the account of the parties, 
and of their reasoning, uses the theory of rational decision, though only in an 
intuitive way. This theory is itself part of a political conception of justice, one 
that tries to give an account of reasonable principles of justice. There is no 
thought of deriving those principles from the concept of rationality as the sole 
normative concept.11
Rationality is self-regarding in that it relates to how citizens choose and order their 
ends. Rational agents lack the particular form of moral sensibility which constitutes 
reasonable agents: namely, the desire to engage in fair social cooperation on terms 
others might reasonably be expected to endorse. This point should have been obvious 
even from A Theory o f Justice. Even there Rawls stated that the distinctive features of 
the original position are meant to model the two moral powers which he attributes to
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citizens of stable constitutional regimes.12 The fact that autonomy in both Kant's and 
Rawls's theories is attributed to persons who are both reasonable and rational explains 
why moral psychology is important for Rawls in a way which does not pertain to 
traditional social contract theories. The latter, understood in a Hobbesian sense 
proceeded from what was understood to be people's given ends and attempted to forge a 
compromise between them. By contrast, Rawls understood that the moral powers are 
not fixed, but are shaped and developed within a shared public culture. Thus, any viable 
social contract depends on fostering basic institutions that will help develop our 
capacity for a sense of justice.13 It is for this reason that Rawls attaches so much 
importance to moral psychology as shall be shown below.
Rawls’s Principles of Moral Psychology
Rawls adopts a modernised version of Rousseau’s moral psychology in which through 
the neutralisation of man’s egoistic impulses individuals will be socialised into 
adopting a sense of justice. In one key respect, Rawls's theory represents an 
advancement over Rousseau’s. In his well-ordered society “the hazards of the... 
prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good”.14 Even 
in the good society Rousseau believed that there would be tension between the general 
will and individual interest. In this context, he was prepared to use coercion to reinforce 
our social habits. Rawls is more optimistic in speaking of “our natural sociability” and 
therefore anticipates convergence between the predicates of a just society and 
individuals' moral dispositions. It is in this respect that Rawls's work is truly original in 
that he claims to have resolved one of the classic conundrums of political philosophy
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without resort to the methods of indoctrination employed by Rousseau and other 
classical republicans: As Chapman states: “In the great society, what right permits is 
reconciled with what interest prescribes... collective and individual rationality 
coincide”.15 In a well-ordered society constructed in accordance with Rawls's theory of 
justice, individuals’ rational desires and their natural sentiments will be mutually 
complementary.16 Thus, Rawls believes that we are unified moral beings in which 
reason and feeling are interdependent. I will now examine Rawls's account of moral 
development in A Theory o f Justice in more detail with specific reference to chapter 
eight.
Rawls first grappled with the problem of how to secure the stability of his principles of 
justice in one of his earliest articles entitled ''The Sense o f Justice which forms the 
basis for the account of moral development embodied in the third part of A Theory o f 
Justice. In a suggestive opening phrase he cited Rousseau’s view in Emile “that the 
sense of justice is no mere moral conception formed by the understanding alone, but a 
true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of our primitive 
affections”.17 Rawls endeavours in the first part of the article to ‘set out a psychological 
construction to illustrate the way in which Rousseau’s thesis might be true’.18 He 
further adds; “in the psychological construction to follow, the stages of a development 
are described by which the sense of justice might arise from our primitive natural 
attitudes”.19 Before exploring this psychological construction in more detail it is worth 
briefly exploring how this account of moral development differs from that of Kant as he 
plays such a pivotal role in so many other respects in Rawls's work. Kant is adamant
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that feelings are to have no place in the establishment of morality. He states that “no 
moral principle is based on any feeling whatsoever.. .For feeling, no matter by what it is 
aroused, always belongs to the order of nature”, i.e nature, as contrasted with 
freedom.20 As Susan Moller Okin notes, Kant is only able to come to the conclusion 
that feeling and love have no place in the foundations of morality because he neglects a 
very important type of human love.21 In his The Doctrine o f Virtue, Kant defines two 
types of love. The first he calls ‘practical love' which can sometimes result from the 
activation of the duty to help others. Such moral feelings, far from leading to principles 
of morality, as they do on Rawls's account, are merely derivative from independently 
established principles. The second type of moral feeling, which he elucidates, is 
affective love which, belonging to the order of nature rather than that of autonomy or 
reason, is restricted from playing any role in the formulation of moral law.
The account of moral education, which Kant presents towards the end of The Doctrine 
of Virtue, illustrates the dichotomy, which he asserts exists between emotive feelings on 
the one hand and rational moral development on the other. In the context of a dialogue 
between teacher and pupil, the teacher questions the pupil, and then, “the answer which 
he methodically draws from the pupil’s reason must be written down and preserved in 
precise terms which cannot be easily altered, and so be committed to the pupil’s 
memory”. These memorised pieces of reasoning are then reinforced by the teacher’s 
good example and the example of others 22 This rationalist account of moral education 
is deficient in that it reduces love to two types. Firstly, the sense of benevolence that 
emanates from the acknowledgement of duty and the affective love, which he describes
110
as “mere inclination”. In doing so, Kant fails to realise the importance of one’s 
upbringing and social environment in acquiring a sense of justice. In complete contrast, 
Rawls is totally aware of the emotive as opposed to the merely rational character of the 
sense of justice. He is thus concerned with exploring in chapter eight how and under 
what circumstances a sense of justice can arise from more ‘primitive’ affections’.
In a much neglected section of A Theory o f Justice Rawls stressed the importance of 
the family as the earliest school of moral development and accorded it a pivotal role in 
the fostering of just citizens. This is in stark contrast to political theorists both past and 
present. While past philosophers such as Rousseau and Hegel argued for the key role of 
the family in the moral development of citizens, they nonetheless adhered to a public/ 
private dichotomy which enabled them to endorse inegalitarian, hierarchical family 
structures. They did not question the extent to which this may be incompatible with the 
socialisation of children into the demands of just citizenship. Contemporary political 
theorists have been equally inattentive to questions of justice within the family. 
Communitarians for example, most notably Sandel, have argued that justice is a 
remedial virtue, which is required only when the shared norms of a group disintegrate 
and are replaced by conflict over the distribution of necessary goods. Instead of justice, 
private associations such as families are constituted by benevolence and spontaneous 
affection. Thus, the progenitors of modem liberalism such as Locke and Kant relegated 
the family to the realm of nature, which was subordinated to the sphere of justice. 
Sandel argues similarly that the family is ‘beyond justice’ in the sense of being too 
elevated for the principles of justice to be necessary.23 Therefore, both Sandel and Kant,
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despite their contrasting conceptions of human nature, presuppose a dichotomy between 
the domains of justice and emotional feeling.
In A Theory o f Justice, Rawls attempts to transcend this dichotomy through his 
psychological construction which is comprised of three stages. These stages are the 
morality of authority, the morality of associations and the morality of principles.24 The 
first stage is concerned with the interaction between children and their parents. The 
love, which a parent expresses for his child, is reciprocated in turn by the child, who 
correspondingly develops a strong sense of self-worth. As Rawls states:
the parents must love the child and be worthy objects of his admiration. In this 
way they arouse in him a sense of his own value and the desire to become the 
sort of person they are...In the absence of affection, example, and guidance, 
none of these processes can take place, and certainly not in loveless 
relationships disrupted by punitive threats and reprisals.25
Rawls emphasises that the child’s love for his parents does not have a rational 
instrumental explanation. “He does not love them as a means to achieve his initial self- 
interested ends”.26 Rather, the child’s love is a response to the fact that they first loved 
him. The child’s love and trust will manifest itself in a desire to respect the parents’ 
injunctions. While a child will be tempted to transgress these parental precepts, once he 
has given in to temptation he will experience feelings of guilt for disobeying the 
parental injunctions. This is what Rawls describes as authority guilt. The absence of 
guilt feelings would betray the absence of love and trust.
The second stage of moral development is the morality of association. This stage
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encompasses many different associations including the school and the neighbourhood. 
Our membership to these associations enables us to move through a sequence of roles 
and associations through which our moral understanding increases. Through 
participation in associations, we develop the capacity to take up the point of view of 
others and to see things from their perspective. Without this experience, “We cannot 
put ourselves into another’s place and find out what we would do in his position” which 
we need to be able to do in order “to regulate our own conduct in the appropriate way 
by reference to it”.27 Those who take part in the various associations of society develop 
their “capacity for fellow feeling” and “ties of friendship and mutual trust”.28 Thus 
Rawls states that just as in the first stage certain natural attitudes develop towards the 
parents, “so here ties of friendship and confidence grow up among associates. In each 
case certain natural attitudes underlie the corresponding moral feelings: a lack of these
• 29feelings would manifest the absence of these attitudes”.
It is only when individuals have passed through the first two stages in which they 
acquire attitudes of love and trust that they are able to progress to the more Kantian 
third stage, the morality of principle. It is here that the individual develops a common 
allegiance to the principles of justice themselves as the highest-order principles 
regulating their society. The morality of principles holds that if “we and those for 
whom we care are the beneficiaries’ of just institutions, those institutions and the 
benefits we derive from them will “engender in us the corresponding sense of justice”. 
Consequently, “we want to do our part in maintaining these arrangements”. When we 
act contrary to our sense of justice we will encounter “feelings of guilt by reference to
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• •  • • anthe pnnciples of justice”. Rawls asserts that the morality of principles is the highest
stage in the individual’s moral development. Unlike the first stage it does not depend
on the relationship with our parents. Nor, as in the case of the morality of association
does it depend upon the ties of friendship that we have established towards particular
persons. It depends solely upon our commitment to the principles of right which
transcend these contingencies. If we violate these principles, we feel guilty not because
we have injured our parents or friends but because we have hurt people whom we have
never been acquainted with. In this context, Rawls states that the sense of justice ‘is
continuous with the love of mankind’.31 As Rawls states:
Our moral sentiments display an independence from the accidental 
circumstances of our world, the meaning of this independence being given by 
the description of the original position and its Kantian interpretation.3
Thus, in a surprising twist, Rawls ends up endorsing a Kantian conception of the person
by adopting a moral psychology vastly different from the one that underpinned Kant’s
own writings. In contrast to Kant with his arid, rationalistic account of moral learning,
in which any feelings antecedent to the establishment of moral principles were rendered
illegitimate, Rawls appreciates the importance of feelings in the development of moral
thinking. As Schwarzenbach notes, in this respect Rawls work evinces close similarities
with Hegel’s concept of expression. In positing this concept Hegel aimed to overcome
the rigid Kantian dualities such as those between mind and body, and reason and desire.
As Schwarzenbach argues:
In contrast to Kant’s view, where the physical, mechanical world forever 
remains a foil to our transcendental freedom, the sensuous material world in 
Hegel (including our own sensuous desire) is viewed as the necessary medium 
in which our freedom is embodied and revealed.33
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Hegel’s departure here from Kant also seems to be fully accepted by Rawls. In
“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”, Rawls stated explicitly that his thought
should be viewed as an attempt to overcome the many dualisms of Kantian
philosophy.34 Our ability to acquire a sense of justice depends greatly on the moral
character of the environment in which this takes place. This is clear from Rawls
statement that the principles of moral psychology are ‘reciprocity principles’.35 Rawls's
conception of justice is anchored in reciprocity. This can be seen from a crucial passage
where Rawls states that the three stages of moral psychology governing the
development of the Rawlsian self:
assert that the active sentiments of love and friendship and even the sense of 
justice, arise from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good. 
Because we recognise that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in 
return.. .The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind.36
Each of the three stages of moral development (the morality of authority, the morality 
of association and the morality of principles) depends on the one prior to it which 
means that the family takes on a pivotal importance as the foundation stone for the 
development of a sense of justice. Justice requires the participation of other selves to be 
preserved. As Alejandro notes, the Rawlsian self develops sentiments and attachments, 
not out o f itself but through the influence which is attained from its interaction with 
other selves. Justice does not rely solely on altruism in which we are moved by the 
general good but depends on a social context in which we react to ‘the actions of 
others’.37
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The Relationship between the Ethic of Justice and the Ethic of Care
It should be clear in the light of this account of how individuals come to acquire a sense 
of justice that Rawls does not view moral agents as disembodied selves as certain 
communitarian and feminist critics have suggested. The principles of right are not 
acquired by isolated individuals, but are dependent upon social institutions and 
associations in which the self participates. The self is not disembodied or 
unencumbered as critics such as Sandel would have it. As this section has attempted to 
show, by analysing Rawls psychological construction, Rawls’s account of moral 
development actually starts from the perspective of the concrete other and only in the 
final phase of moral development does it become committed to impersonal principles of 
right. Nonetheless, a number of critics have argued that the adoption of the perspective 
of the “generalised other” by fully autonomous adults in the final phase of moral 
development negates the importance of the concrete other. Benhabib, for example has 
argued that in Rawls original position, “the other as different from the self, 
disappears...Differences are not denied; they become irrelevant”.38
Susan Moller Okin has attempted to refute this argument in a compelling reconstruction 
of Rawls’s theory where she disputes the claim that it involves the promotion of 
impartiality and universalisability at the expense of recognition of otherness and 
difference.39 She states that when citizens step behind the veil of ignorance they are not 
mutually disinterested, but rather have cultivated capacities for empathy, benevolence 
and equal concern for others as for the self. As she notes, individuals will never actually 
be in an original position. The purpose of the device is to persuade us as moral subjects
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to consider the needs and concerns of every other person, however different they may 
be from ourselves. Thus, as Okin states, “We, who do know who we are, are to think as 
if we were in the original position” and did not know who we are.40 Thus, in striving 
for a broader conception of justice, Okin argues eloquently that the original position 
should be perceived not as an abstraction from the needs and concerns of particular 
persons but rather as inclusive of them. Okin writes “To think as a person in the 
original position is not to be a disembodied nobody.. .Rather, it is to think from the 
point of view of everybody, of every ‘concrete other’ whom one might turn out to 
be” 41 Adherence to the principles of justice requires moral persons to develop qualities 
of character which equip them to display an equal concern for the social and other 
human differences of their fellow citizens. In other words, Okin argues that Rawls’s 
theory of moral development is not based solely on a formal and abstract notion of 
mutual respect, which expresses an epistemological blindness to the features which 
individuate among selves in society. Rather, it embodies a much more content and 
context oriented notion of equal concern.
Okin’s reconceptualisation of the original position as a device of empathy and 
benevolence fostering a voice of care and concern for others rather than one which 
promotes a view of individuals as mutually disinterested maximisers has the merit not 
only of being much more attractive to communitarian and feminist critics. In addition, 
it is also much more congruent with Rawls’s own account of moral development 
presented in Chapter Eight of A Theory o f Justice, which stresses the importance of 
cultivating the affective capacities that underlie our sense of justice. It can be added
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furthermore that it is much more consistent with the thick republican conception of 
citizenship which he develops in Political Liberalism in which much emphasis is 
placed on citizens inculcating political virtues such as tolerance and fairness.42 Okins’s 
argument that the original position should not be represented as a “rational choice” 
model is reinforced by Rawls’s shift in emphasis in Political Liberalism from the 
rational to the reasonable. While the atomistic agent can exercise rationality, reasonable 
individuals operate in a social context for to be reasonable entails a commitment to a 
social order in which reciprocity is possible. Thus, as Frazer and Lacey note, the shift in 
focus from the rational to the reasonable means that the idea of reciprocity can no 
longer be seen as merely a means to ensuring the stability of justice as fairness. Rather, 
it represents a constituent value which underpins justice as fairness 43 This argument 
would seem to support the critical attention which Okin pays to the principles of moral 
psychology in the third part of A Theory o f Justice which as we saw earlier constitute 
principles of reciprocity governing the development of the Rawlsian self.
Nonetheless, Okin’s critique remains open to a number of objections. For example, 
Benhabib, in responding to Okin’s critique, agrees that she has greatly enriched 
Rawls’s theory in highlighting its emotive or affective bases. She asserts however that 
Okin’s reinterpretation of the moral structure of Rawls's theory so that it embodies both 
impartiality and empathy and care for others is undermined by the epistemic constraints 
which the original position and the veil of ignorance place on Rawls’s moral subjects.44 
In order to assess the cogency of this argument we must briefly review the debate 
between the ethic of justice and the ethic of care as exemplified by the work of
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Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. This will in turn enable us to consider more 
fully the utility of Rawls’s theory as a means of reconciling these two seemingly 
divergent conceptions of morality.
The relationship or otherwise between the ethic of justice and the ethic of care has been 
a central concern of feminist theory since the publication of Carol Gilligan’s In A 
Different Voice, which initiated a critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s stage theory of 
moral development.45 In contrast to Kohlberg, Gilligan argued that men and women’s 
moral sensibilities developed differently. Whereas Kohlberg’s formalistic conception of 
morality emphasises the importance of individuals learning moral principles (namely 
principles of justice) and then applying them to concrete situations, Gilligan argues that 
women develop in a ‘different voice’ which prioritises emotional connectedness and 
responsiveness to concrete needs.46 In her view, these two voices which she coined an 
“ethic of justice” and an “ethic of care” respectively are “fundamentally incompatible”. 
Whereas justice stresses impartiality and universality, the ethic of care bases moral 
obligation on concern for particular relationships. In contrast to this view, a number of 
arguments have emerged suggesting that justice and care are complementary 
dimensions of morality. At first sight, as Dale Snauwert notes, there appears to be a 
marked divergence in the basic orientation of each conception. While the ethic of 
justice requires separation, the ethic of care embodies attachment. Separation is a 
necessary requirement for being able to judge moral claims impartially. Attachment on 
the other hand is needed for care, for care is rooted in empathy. Nonetheless, both the 
ethic of justice and the ethic of care presuppose reversibility. As Snauwaert asserts:
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Moral development for both ethics is constituted by the enlargement of one’s 
capacity for reversibility; one’s capacity for care and fairness respectively are 
based upon the degree one is capable of identifying with other persons. Thus, 
one’s capacity for both care and fairness is based upon the expansion of one’s 
identity...as one’s identification expands or contracts, one’s capacity to respond 
and, thus to act morally expands or contracts. This is the essence of reversibility 
as a moral foundation and it applies to both care and justice.47
Two key points can be derived from this claim. Firstly, it is wrong to dichotomise, as a 
number of care theorists do between learning the correct principles on the one hand and 
developing moral dispositions on the other. As Lawrence Blum argues, while justice 
entails applying correct principles, “what it takes to bring such principles to bear on 
individual situations involves qualities of character and sensibilities which are 
themselves moral and which go beyond the straightforward process of consulting a
•  •  •  4 8principle and then conforming one’s will and action to it”. In other words, the ethic of 
justice no less than the ethic of care requires the cultivation of the virtues of empathy 
and reciprocity. Secondly, despite appearances to the contrary, the ethic of care is based 
on a universal commitment to our shared humanity. For example, one of Gilligan’s 
subjects proclaims that we have a duty to “that giant collection of everybody...the 
stranger is still another person belonging to that group, people you are connected to by 
virtue of being another person” 49 Gilligan herself admits that the motivation of the 
ethic of care is “that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be 
left alone or hurt”.50 Thus, as Blum notes, while Gilligan states that “each person is 
embedded within a web of ongoing relationships, and that morality...consists 
in...emotional responsiveness toward the individuals with whom one stands in these 
relationships”, she means this web to encompass all of humanity rather than one’s
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immediate circle of friends. Thus, the web of relations expands beyond the personal to 
embrace an ontological interdependence.51
On the basis of this account, it would seem that Okin is correct to argue that Rawls’s 
theory of justice is well placed to capture the notion of morality as an integration of 
justice and care. His account of moral development in which individuals’ progress from 
the morality of authority through to the morality of principle corresponds to the 
sequence of enlarged identification implicit in the work of many care theorists. 
However, a number of care theorists, most notably Benhabib, while acknowledging the 
interdependence of reason and feeling and justice and care in Rawls’s work, argue that 
it still fails to adequately address the standpoint of the concrete other due to the 
epistemic restrictions which the veil of ignorance places on moral reasoning.52 Her 
point is not that Rawlsian selves are egotistical agents nor does she deny Rawls's 
commitment to moral reciprocity. Rather, her focus is on the epistemic constraints 
which the veil of ignorance imposes on the parties, which, by denying them knowledge 
of their key characteristics such as what conception of the good they would embrace, 
cannot as a consequence define themselves in distinction from other selves. The veil of 
ignorance forces individuals to think solely from the perspective of the generalised 
other at the expense of the concrete other.
Benhabib claims that reciprocity and reversibility can only be imperfectly realised in a 
theory which is limited to the perspective of the generalised other at the expense of the 
concrete other. She stresses that that the difference between the general and the
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concrete other is not that one is universalised while the other is not. (She describes the 
former as substitutionalist universalism and the latter interactive universalism). Rather, 
it is the fact that whereas the former only stresses our humanity, the latter emphasises 
our human individuality. There is no moral requirement in the original position to face 
the "otherness of the other".53 She argues that while "respect for the other and their 
individuality is a central concern of Rawlsian theory, the Kantian presuppositions 
which also underpin it are so weighty that the equivalence of all selves qua rational 
agents dominates and stifles any serious acknowledgement of the "concrete other".54 
The consequence is that there is no scope for human plurality behind the veil of 
ignorance. As a consequence, reversibility is incomplete as a necessary predicate of 
reversibility is a distinction between the self and the other.
Will Kymlicka has suggested that this argument cannot be sustained as an interpretation 
of Rawls's earlier work.55 Her mistake, like that of many other feminist and 
communitarian critics, is to misrepresent the original position as a formalistic and 
literalistic device rather than one which is heuristic and figurative. This is illustrated by 
her claim that the original position involves a total abstraction from one's identity. As 
Kymlicka states, however, the veil of ignorance is not meant to be a theory of personal 
identity. It is meant rather to be an intuitive test of the arguments we employ when we 
engage in moral reasoning. The original position is designed to represent “equality 
between human beings as moral persons”, and the concomitant principles of justice are 
those which people “would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged 
by social and natural contingencies”.56 The original position is thus an 'expository
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device' which 'sums up the meaning' of our notions of fairness and “helps us to extract 
the consequences”.57 Even Benhabib seems to concede this point when she says that the 
original position is an idealisation which makes vivid to us the ideal of impartiality.58
It can be argued that Benhabib's critique of Rawls is flawed because she misrepresents 
the role which the notion of abstraction plays in his work. Kymlicka hints at this when 
he states, in response to Benhabib's critique, that "the fact that people are asked to 
reason in abstraction from their own social position, natural talents and personal 
preferences when thinking about others does not mean that they must ignore the 
particular preferences, talents, and social position of others".59 In other words, any 
political theory which aims to establish or identify princples which are universalisable 
must abstract in some sense for otherwise it would be unable to transcend either 
individual self-interest or communitarian relativism. This is no less true of Benhabib's 
theory than of Rawls's, for like Rawls, she believes in the principles of universal moral 
respect and reciprocity. In order to reciprocate in the first place, one must be able to 
abstract from one's own particular interests in order to consider those of others. The key 
point for any universalisable theory is not whether to abstract but rather how to abstract.
I do not mean to suggest that Benhabib denies this when formulating her own 
normative position. Rather, she seems to deny it when critiquing Rawls by equating the 
original position and the veil of ignorance with the perspective of the generalised other. 
This is illustrated when she states "Okin is right that 'we who do know who we are, are 
to think as z/we were in the original position' and did not know who we were".60 This 
seems a clear example of misparaphrasing a quote, for Okin never said or implied that
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when we acted as if we were in the original position, we had to imagine that we did not 
know who we were. That clearly would represent a bizarre theory of personal identity 
for (and I take this to be Okin's point) if interpreted in this way, it begs the question, 
how can a person empathise with other selves if they do not know who they are? It 
seems much more sensible to follow Kymlicka and regard the original position as a 
metaphorical way of representing the shared values and beliefs of existing societies. A 
similar point is made by Schwarzenbach when she states that the original position while 
clearly a form of "methodological abstraction from concrete particularity is devised 
simply to explicate the principles of personhood underlying the specifically modem 
period, our "post-Reformational public culture" which embody shared liberal 
understandings" .61
The Relative Stability of Justice As Fairness
In the light of our exploration of Rawls’s account of moral development in A Theory o f 
Justice, it should now be clearer how the two parts of his theory conjoin together. In 
particular, Rawls makes clear that stability of the requisite sort is not guaranteed by the 
conditions of the original position. The third part of A Theory o f Justice is devoted to 
resolving the problem which other social contract theorists such as Hobbes also 
encounter: Why would people who would choose the principles of justice in an initial 
situation such as the original position act in a way required by these principles once the 
limitations of the original position have been removed? Rawls articulates this dilemma 
even more explicitly in one of his earliest articles, “The Sense of Justice”:
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The aim of the analytic construction is to derive the principles of justice which 
apply to institutions. How persons will act in the particular circumstances when, 
as the rules specify, it is their turn to do their part is a different question 
altogether. Those engaged in an institution will indeed normally do their part if 
they feel bound to act on the principles which they would acknowledge under the 
conditions of the analytic construction. But their feeling bound in this way is not 
itself accounted for by this construction, and it cannot be accounted for as long as 
the parties are described solely by the concept of rationality.62
This quotation illustrates how the two parts of Rawls’s theory are related to one 
another. The device of the original position is first introduced to determine the content 
of justice, the principles which define it. Only once this task has been completed does 
Rawls develop a psychological theory which is designed to show how men can acquire 
a sense of justice in real life. While, from the standpoint of the original position, the 
principles of justice are collectively rational in that every individual benefits if all 
comply with these principles, Rawls acknowledges that in everyday life an individual 
may attain even greater benefits for himself by taking advantage of other individuals' 
cooperative efforts. It is this dilemma which the psychological construction 
formulated in chapter eight of A Theory o f Justice aims to resolve. 63
It would be a serious mistake, however, to treat the two parts of the theory as entirely 
disjoint, for the problem of stability is very important for reasoning in the original 
position. Rawls regards any conception of justice as seriously deficient if its laws of 
moral psychology are such that it is unable to engender in human beings a 
corresponding sense of justice. Crucially, Rawls stipulates that this information is 
available to the parties in the original position, who will thus, other things being equal; 
adopt the more stable scheme of principles.64 In order to support this claim, Rawls
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convincingly argues that his theory of justice as fairness is more stable than its principal 
rival utilitarianism. This is so because the parties in the original position would reject a 
doctrine which required some citizens to accept lower life prospects for the sake of 
others. Yet, this is precisely what is required by the principle of utility as allegiance to 
the social system depends on individuals being prepared to forfeit potential advantages 
for the sake of the greater good of the whole. Rawls regards it as totally unrealistic to 
expect individuals to make such sacrifices involving as it were an appeal to 
unconditional altruism on the part of those whose life prospects have been diminished 
as a result of the adoption of utilitarian principles of justice. Instead, Rawls anticipates 
that the parties would design a social order reflecting the alternative principle of 
reciprocal advantage and would thus adopt something like Rawls’s conception of 
justice.65 Rawls believes that justice as fairness is a reasonably stable moral conception 
because it guarantees that in return for the unconditional concern displayed by other 
persons for our good, reflected in the granting of equal liberties for all, persons will 
develop stronger affiliations to the fellow members of their society. This is the point 
which he attempts to demonstrate through the pyschological construction which he 
outlines in chapter eight.
Arguably, the most important advantage in terms of stability which justice as fairness 
boasts over utilitarianism is that the mutuality implicit in the principles of justice 
ensures that each person will develop a secure sense of their own worth. This is 
important because, as Rawls argues, those who respect themselves are more likely to 
respect each other and conversely. “Self-respect is reciprocally self-supporting”.66 In
126
contrast, utilitarianism would appear to be destructive of the self-esteem of those who 
lose out in calculating the greatest sum of well-being. It would seem for example to be 
stretching credibility to expect individuals to experience a stronger sense of fellowship 
for those who participate in a scheme of cooperation designed to maximise overall 
utility rather than in one which respects each individual as a free and equal moral 
person. Why would those who lose out have friendly feelings towards the more 
fortunate? The likely consequence would be that certain persons would acquire little 
desire to act justly (as defined by utilitarian principles) thus greatly destabilising that 
particular society.67 The claim that Rawls’s two principles of justice support citizens’ 
self-respect by underlining society’s commitment to treating them as ends in 
themselves is decisive in the argument over average utility because Rawls states that
Aftself-respect is the most important of the primary goods. It is therefore impossible for a 
society to be stable if it does not cultivate a sense of self-respect amongst the vast 
majority of its citizens.
Thus, the above account has attempted to show that we are left with a much distorted 
understanding of Rawls’s theory if we overlook the important role which psychological 
stability plays in his thought. Alternative depictions of the parties in the original 
position as rational interest maximisers concerned to further their own ends or as 
Kantian noumenal selves abstracted from all particular circumstance, while not entirely 
inaccurate, neglects the importance which needs to be attached to the universal 
psychological truths which guides the parties deliberations and leads them to favour 
justice as fairness over utilitarianism.69 It also obscures one of the most original
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features of Rawls's contract theory, namely, the sense in which he has transformed and 
enriched the contract tradition, the discussion of which, I now turn to below.
Two Versions of the Social Contract
While Rawls presents his theory as a revival of one strand of the social contract 
tradition, this can be misleading unless one understands the extent to which it differs 
from alternative social contract theories, both traditional and contemporary. In order to 
explicate this point I want to contrast Rawls’s theory with that of Hobbes. Hobbes’s 
and Rawls’s theories can be regarded as exemplars of two very different types of social 
contract views, which following Samuel Freeman; I will call interest-based and right- 
based contract views.70 Both views attempt to address the question of how and why 
individuals should be motivated to accept the legitimacy of a social contract when they 
might obtain greater benefits by disobeying it in practice. Interest-based contract views 
attempt to resolve this dilemma by appealing to individual self interest. Proponents of 
this view posit a world consisting of isolated individuals abstracted from social 
relationships all striving to achieve their antecedent desires and ends. From this 
perspective the only way individuals will be prepared to consent to the principles which 
underpin their society is by invoking instrumental considerations about what promotes 
their antecedent ends. Thus, instrumental views involve no appeal to irreducible moral 
elements. The task is instead to fashion principles which it will be rational for all 
individuals to accept in order to realise their interests. A leading exemplar of an 
interest-based view is Thomas Hobbes.
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Right-based social contract views on the other hand approach the issue very differently. 
In contrast to Hobbesian views, they do not accept that reasons for adhering to social 
and political relations must always be couched in terms which refer to the antecedent 
ends of particular individuals. Rather, all proponents of right-based views assert that 
principles of justice cannot be accounted for without appealing to certain intrinsic 
moral ideals. The principles of right which are devised to constitute our social relations 
provide an independent common standard for assessing our ultimate ends and desires 
rather than simply acting as a means to promote them. As Freeman notes:
When some doubt arises as to the legitimacy of our ends or proposed actions, the 
question we normally confront is not whether abiding by these norms will 
effectively promote our purposes. It is, rather, whether our ends and proposed 
actions can be justified to others according to the system of norms generally 
accepted within the group.71
It can be argued that the major representatives of right-based views are Rousseau, Kant 
and Rawls. As a consequence, all three thinkers interpret the social contract very 
differently from Hobbes in the intrinsic importance which they attach to the notion of 
publicly justifying our ends to others. In the case of Rawls this can be evinced by 
recalling that his conception of social cooperation contains two elements: the rational 
and the reasonable. It is the existence of the latter component which makes Rawls’s 
theory ideal-regarding rather than want-regarding. By obligating individuals to cultivate 
feelings of mutuality and reciprocity towards others, it assumes that individuals can 
recognise the importance of devising fair terms of cooperation which limit the ends and 
desires they are able to pursue. Thus, in contrast to interest-based contract theories such 
as those of Hobbes, Rawls's theory is distinct in the key importance which it attaches to
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the notion of the reasonable which subordinates the rational.72 This is the natural result 
of Rawls acceding to a Kantian concept of autonomy in which the content of principles 
is determined by reference to individuals’ reasoning capacities rather than the ends 
which they wish to uphold.
For our purposes, the significant feature which ought to be distilled from the 
delineation of the differences between the two types of contract theory outlined above 
is that ideal-based theories are required to pay a much greater amount of attention to the 
issue of moral psychology than interest-based theories. From the perspective of the 
latter, individuals most fundamental psychological dispositions can be determined in 
advance through the device of the state of nature. For theorists such as Hobbes and 
Locke, nature acts as a fixed standard through which one can identify the reality of the 
human condition unhindered by the distorting lenses of social convention. According to 
these contract theorists, man is a being who is driven primarily by a desire for self- 
preservation and whose decision to enter into a social contract is motivated by a desire 
to protect himself against others who are driven by the same selfish passions. Thus, the 
state of nature describes the reality which underpins civil society. It posits a picture of 
isolated agents who all have in common a fear of death and therefore, despite their 
natural unsociability, are prepared to consent to society as the only means through 
which their well-being can be secured. Thus, contract theorists such as Hobbes resolve 
the potential conflict between private interest and public good by stipulating that civil 
society can protect individuals’ particular interests more satisfactorily than in the state 
of nature where each individual has a natural right to everything and thus is under no
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obligation to respect other individuals’ natural rights. Rational men concerned to 
preserve their lives would be prepared to forfeit their rights to everything in order to 
obtain effective rights against each other, which would be underwritten by sovereign 
power.
In contrast to Hobbes, nothing like the state of nature plays a significant role in Rawls’s 
theory. The original position which critics have often compared to the state of nature 
represents an abstraction from individuals’ particular ends rather than a scientific 
attempt to discover what they actually are. In contrast to the state of nature theorists, 
Rawls’s starting point is society in which the development of individuals’ natural 
sentiments is shaped by the social institutions in which we structure our lives. In this 
context, Rawls’s theory is the exact opposite of the traditional contract teachings in 
which men’s natural ends are assumed to be fixed before their entry into civil society. 
As Rawls himself states, “justice as fairness is not at the mercy, so to speak, of existing 
wants and desires”.73 Instead, “the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that 
its citizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they want to be as 
well as the sort of persons they are”.74 Thus, it is essential that social institutions are 
framed in such a way that they encourage a sense of justice amongst those who 
participate in them. In making this assertion, Rawls employs a view of moral 
psychology which can be traced back to Rousseau.
While Rousseau, like Hobbes also invokes the state of nature as an analytical device, he 
deduces from it very different conclusions than Hobbes does. Rousseau argued,
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contrary to Hobbes, that as an isolated being, man is a “stupid and shortsighted 
animal”,75 docile by nature and motivated purely by instinct. Being asocial he is 
deprived of language and therefore lacks any reasoning capacities. He is not driven by a 
desire to fulfill his future appetites, (Hobbes’s “power after power”), for without reason 
he does not possess any conception of himself or his life prospects. His reasoning 
capacities are only activated when he enters into cooperative circumstances. As 
Freeman notes:
Reason is the instrument of adaptation man acquires to deal with social 
environments, as instinct is his mode of adaptation to the state of nature. And as a 
socially adaptive capacity, its primary role is to enable him to understand, apply, 
act on, and, if necessary devise the norms of cooperation necessary for social life. 
It is in conjunction with the development and exercise of this social capacity and 
not prior to it, that man is able to apply his rational capacities.76
It seems clear that Rawls would concur with this account of how individuals acquire the 
capacity to reason. Indeed, in Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, he asserts that 
individuals’ moral powers of reflection and judgment are not permanently fixed but are 
shaped and developed within the context of a shared public culture.77
Rawls’s optimistic view of human nature in which he argues that individuals’ capacities 
for practical reasoning can be cultivated through the designing of appropriate social 
arrangements leads him to a very different perception of how power should be 
distributed in society once individuals have left the state of nature / original position 
than that which is upheld by Hobbes. Hobbes believes that the passions which 
motivated men in the state of nature remain with them when they enter civil society,
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thus necessitating the need for a powerful sovereign in order to compel men to obey the 
law. In contrast, Rawls's assumption that in a well-ordered society, individuals will be 
motivated by a shared sense of justice means that there is not the same concern as there 
is with Hobbesian theories that men may be prepared to depart from justice and pursue 
their own selfish passions. In direct contrast to the Hobbesian view, Rawls asserts that:
Men’s propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life; it is 
greater or less depending in large part on social institutions, and in particular on 
whether these are just or unjust. 8
Rather than simply transposing an institution such as a Hobbesian sovereign on to a 
system of cooperation in order to ensure stability, Rawls's argument suggests the 
possibility of forging social arrangements whose stabilizing effect comes through a 
transformation of our affective ties with one another. Rawls expresses this point most 
clearly in The Sense of Justice where he argues that relations of friendship and mutual 
trust can play an analogous role to the Hobbesian sovereign in reinforcing a scheme of 
cooperation. Whereby, Hobbes believed that stability could only be assured by belief in 
the sovereign’s efficacy; Rawls believes that mutual trust between citizens entwined 
with an effective sense of justice can bring about the same result. In a well-ordered 
society where these sentiments and inclinations are prevalent there is no reason for an 
individual to advance his interests at the expense of others or to believe that he must
• •  •  •  •  70violate the rules in order to ensure protection of his legitimate mterests.
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Conclusion
This chapter has critically explored the argument, which has been developed from a 
variety of ideological perspectives including in particular, feminist and communitarian 
thinkers, that Rawls's theory of justice is underpinned by an atomistic or egoistic 
individualism. These critics have argued that the individualistic assumptions can be 
located within Rawls's methodological apparatus (the original position and the veil of 
ignorance) which he utilises to formulate his conception of justice. It was argued above 
that two different senses in which Rawls's theory has been labelled individualistic ought 
to be differentiated from each other. The first is ethical or psychological individualism, 
which presupposes that the inhabitants of a Rawlsian society are motivated solely by 
individualistic values at the expense of communitarian ideals. On this interpretation, 
Rawls's original position seems to yield not a neutral theory but a substantive one in 
which individuals are understood as rational egoists. The second and more common 
sense in which Rawls's theory has been perceived as individualistic focuses not on the 
psychological attributes which are ascribed to individuals who inhabit the original 
position. Rather, this position, which can be termed metaphysical individualism, is 
concerned with the epistemic constraints, which govern their deliberations over what 
normative principles of justice should be chosen. The problems for critics as diverse as 
Sandel and Benhabib is not that individuals are encumbered by self-interested ends 
which precludes them choosing communal attachments but rather that they are 
unencumbered by any ends due to the weight of the epistemic constraints imposed upon 
them. As a consequence, many communitarian and feminist critics of Rawlsian 
liberalism have argued that the original position is populated by depersonalised ciphers
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from which all differences have been eviscerated thereby bearing little relation to actual 
human beings.
It has been contended in this chapter that it is a mistake to attribute either sense of 
individualism to Rawls. This mistake can be explained by he fact that critics of Rawls’s 
conception of liberty have misconstrued the role that the original position plays in his 
political theory. Its purpose is not to supply a theory of personal identity whether it is 
that of a Hobbesian rational egoist or a Kantian unencumbered self. Rather, it is to 
model the type of moral reasoning that actual individuals should employ when engaged 
in normative argument. In this context, it is important to note that Rawls is anxious to 
demonstrate that his principles of justice can receive the consent of citizens in a well- 
ordered society. Thus, even in the original position, while the deliberating parties are 
denied access to the particular characteristics that shape their personality, they are in 
possession of general information including knowledge as to which conceptions of 
justice are most conducive to empirical stability. It is for this reason that Rawls argues 
that the parties would reject utilitarianism, as it demands too much of individuals 
requiring even those whom are disadvantaged by the application of the utility principle 
to sacrifice their own ends in order to maximise the social good. As there is a strong 
likelihood that many individuals would defect from such arrangements, deliberators in 
the original position would conclude that utilitarianism could not engender in actual 
human beings the requisite sense of justice, which would render a society empirically 
stable. The strains of commitment are simply too great.
135
While Rawls argues that the adoption of a utilitarian schema would impose intolerable 
burdens on too many individuals for it to underpin a well-ordered society, it remains 
incumbent upon him to show how his own principles of justice can perform the 
requisite stabilising function. This is the purpose of the third part of A Theory o f Justice 
where he aims to demonstrate that under the right conditions, it is possible to attain 
congruence between the right and the good, in the sense that the virtue of justice is 
supremely regulative of one's good. This is an especially important task for Rawls to 
accomplish, as in contrast to Hobbes, Rawls's conception of practical reason does not 
function by establishing norms of social cooperation which conform to individuals 
antecedent desires and ends. Rather, it requires the construction of social institutions, 
which will shape and transform individuals final ends thereby ensuring the 
development of a sense of justice that will guarantee their full compliance with the 
normative arrangements proposed. It is for this reason that Rawls offers a rich moral 
psychology that focuses on the role of social institutions such as the family in 
transmitting just conduct across generations. Therefore, Rawls's conception of practical 
reason should not only be differentiated from Hobbes's but also from Kant's. Rawls 
does not argue as Kant does, that the principle of autonomy is implicit in an individual's 
moral consciousness. His holistic ontology presupposes that children develop 
attachment bonds within the family, which is a prerequisite for their psychological and 
moral development. Whereas Kant argues that feelings have no place in the 
establishment of morality, Rawls argues that our sense of justice can only arise from 
our primitive natural attitudes. Therefore, it can be concluded that in contrast to the 
assertions of feminist and communitarian critics, Rawls does in fact accept their claim
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that humans are situated encumbered selves. Furthermore, he endorses a version of 
what Sandel calls a formative project that is predicated on the importance of social 
institutions in shaping individuals qualities of character so that they willingly comply 
with liberal normative ideals.
Rawls's defence of a well-ordered society constituted by liberal principles of justice as 
set out in A Theory o f Justice can be regarded as a paradigmatic instance of the 
Enlightenment project. It presupposes the possibility of fostering a normative 
consensus on the legitimacy of a liberal political order that can command the assent of 
all citizens. Underpinning this normative consensus is the belief that one can discern a 
universal conception of human nature that will supply Rawlsian liberalism with both 
philosophical foundations such as a Kantian conception of autonomy and a robust 
moral psychology to complement it. In this way, one can attain a convergence between 
the right and the good, justice and empirical stability without resort to the methods of 
state coercion, which are assumed by non-liberal political theories. As the next chapter 
will show, this optimistic or utopian belief in the Enlightenment ideal does not survive 
Rawls's redefining of his conception of justice as a political rather than a 
comprehensive doctrine. Rawls no longer believes that it is possible to reconcile justice 
with the good in the manner presented in A Theory o f Justice because liberal societies 
will always contain a multiplicity of non-liberal conceptions of the good whose 
substantive content will be incompatible with that of Kantian liberalism. As Rawls now 
stresses in his later work that such pluralism is compatible with human reason, he no 
longer believes that it is possible to justify political liberalism with reference to a
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Kantian conception of human nature. Consequently, the account of empirical stability 
outlined in part three of A Theory o f Justice is also jettisoned for Rawls no longer 
believes that in conditions of reasonable pluralism it is possible to construct a 
harmonious link between liberal ideals and all reasonable individuals deepest personal 
beliefs.
At the same time, however, while Rawls wishes to revise the philosophical justification 
for his liberal principles of justice so that they are cognisant of the epistemic fact of 
reasonable pluralism, he has no desire to revise the actual substance of these principles. 
He therefore proposes that one can construct an overlapping consensus of reasonable, 
comprehensive doctrines that will converge on his political conception of justice as 
constitutive of a well-ordered liberal society. Therefore, while Rawls now argues that 
one has to jettison the universalist and foundationalist aspirations of the Enlightenment 
project, he still supports its ideal of normative consensus as applicable to modem 
liberal democracies. However, I will argue in the next chapter that Rawls’s retention of 
the consensus aspiration while rejecting the other components of the Enlightenment 
project produces insuperable problems for both the philosophical and psychological 
coherence of his theory. In particular, Rawls's rejection of his theory of justice as a 
comprehensive doctrine results in a sharp disjunction between the right and the good 
and the public and private spheres which part III of A Theory o f Justice endeavoured to 
avoid. It is not clear why an individual brought up with an illiberal conception of the 
good would be prepared to suspend their psychological history when engaging in the 
public sphere. Furthermore, it is not apparent how Rawls can supply a philosophical
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argument as to why they should do so without invoking a comprehensive philosophical 
doctrine that prioritises the political over the non-political domain. Therefore, it will be 
claimed in the next chapter that Rawls exacerbates rather than solves the problem of 
stability pertaining to his theory of justice.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BETWEEN KANT AND HEGEL: RAWLS’S POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM
Introduction
The previous chapter addressed objections placed against Rawls from a variety of 
sources alleging that the reliance in his seminal work, A Theory o f Justice on Kantian 
versions of modernist political theory vitiated his attempt to provide a political 
philosophy that was both coherent and morally attractive. Both these faults were 
attributed to the conceptual apparatus employed by Rawls in which, by stripping the 
parties to the original position of their particular characteristics, presupposed an 
untenable atomistic ontology. It was argued, however, that such a position could only 
be sustained by neglecting the account of moral development which Rawls provided in 
the third part of A Theory o f Justice, which attempted to explicate a theory of moral 
development that aimed to show that the principles of justice formulated in the original 
position could be rendered congruent with individuals’ particular conceptions of the 
good. As a consequence, it could be argued that Rawls, through his extensive 
discussion of moral psychology, does in fact understand the importance of people 
possessing a sense of justice in order for a well-ordered society to be sustainable. 
However, this attempt to show the extent to which Rawls does in fact provide the 
motivational resources to animate a liberal political culture fails to address two other 
intertwined objections which have been levelled against the book. Firstly, that his 
account of justice presupposed an Enlightenment philosophy of history which 
illegitimately assumed the universality of liberal moral ideals and secondly, that it
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resulted in a truncated view of the political sphere due to his normative commitment to 
a Kantian conception of moral autonomy which resulted in an ethical monism through 
the privileging of justice over all other virtues.1
During the last couple of decades, a large number of contemporary critics embodied 
within the pragmatist tradition, encompassing thinkers as diverse as Benjamin Barber, 
John Gray and Jurgen Habermas, have implicitly cast doubt on whether A Theory o f 
Justice, for all its undoubted merits should be regarded as a work of political 
philosophy.2 A fundamental feature of liberal political theorists working in the 1970s, 
irrespective of their ideological divergences was their belief in what Benjamin Barber 
has described in a similar vein to John Dewey, one of the progenitors of pragmatist 
thinking, as the ‘seductions of foundationalism’.3 Thus, irrespective of their contrasting 
views over the meaning of justice, both Rawls and Nozick adumbrated the view that it 
must stem from a notion of right prior to politics. Thus, as Barber states, “for both men, 
philosophically constructed notions of liberty and justice are made to produce a 
politics; neither understands these notions to be produced by a politics”.4
In this context, by attempting to illuminate the political world by assimilating politics to 
prior philosophical categories, theorists such as Rawls, far from representing a break 
from the philosophical scepticism articulated by Bertrand Russell, merely embodied its 
continuation in a new form. Rawls’s work came to be perceived as the paradigmatic 
example of the desire by the foundationalist to describe the political universe through 
the lens of an unimpeachable epistemology. Unlike the charge of atomism, this concern
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cannot be alleviated through claiming, as I did in the last chapter, that Rawls’s 
ontology, far from being based on atomistic assumptions accepts the fact that human 
identity is established through a dialogical encounter with others. While this is true, it 
does not alter the fact that the holistic account of human identity outlined by Rawls is 
both universalistic and foundationalist. It depended on assumptions about human 
beings derived from evolutionary psychology that were held to be universally valid for 
all people in all contexts. In this sense, Rawls evades the objection that citizens are 
autonomous ciphers (a charge emanating from the way he designs the original 
position), only to risk succumbing to another. Namely, that he has repeated the 
mistakes of classical liberal theorists, such as Locke, by according liberal beliefs a 
metaphysical and anthropological priority, which presupposes that liberal ideals are the 
natural and essential standpoint rather than contingent products of history. In this 
respect, for all the differences between Rawls’s epistemology and the substantive 
content of his theory outlined in the previous chapter, they both converge in the 
assumption that political theory can be judged by the cognitive standard of truth and 
falsity. In Rawls’s case, this can be summed up in the view that at the foundation of 
humanity is our capacity for justice.
Rawls’s writings subsequent to A Theory of Justice, which culminated in the 
publication of Political Liberalism, can be viewed largely as a response to the severe 
criticism which the view of political philosophy as the search for universal foundations 
received at the hands of his detractors. They disputed his belief that the task of 
philosophy was to establish an abstract political theory free from contamination by
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particularism and subjectivism. Rawls now eschews modernist liberal philosophy’s 
traditional claims to cognitive essentialism and universalism and aims instead to 
retrieve his theory of justice by recasting it in post-metaphysical terms. Rawls’s 
theoretical system does not receive its justification by appealing to rational choice 
theory nor is the stability of his paradigm secured by psychological laws, which are 
presumed to be true as was the case with his earlier work. Instead, Rawls proceeds in a 
hermeneutic fashion by dissociating his conception of justice from comprehensive 
philosophical doctrines and locating them instead in “intuitive ideas” embedded within 
the political culture of democratic societies. Through the adoption of this method, 
whereby Rawls aims to avoid the metaphysical disputes that constitute plural societies, 
he aims to circumvent the claims of anti-foundationalists that his theory is based on 
untenable metaphysical presuppositions.5
Despite these reformulations of his theory, Rawls’s paradigm has been assailed from all 
sides. These criticisms largely centre on both the coherence and desirability of Rawls’s 
continuing attempts to defend the priority of the right, while claiming to avoid 
metaphysical questions. In particular, Rawls has been accused of making an 
implausible attempt to separate the political sphere from the background culture of civil 
society by assessing questions of political morality in isolation from the comprehensive 
moral views of citizens.6 It has also been argued that this attempt to isolate the political 
sphere from comprehensive conceptions of the good has resulted in an unwarranted 
restriction of political discourse. For example, anti-foundationalists such as John Gray 
allege that Rawls remains wedded to the Enlightenment project of formulating
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determinate principles and entrenching them so that they are immune from the 
contingencies of political life. In this context, political liberalism as articulated by 
Rawls, far from representing a rupture from the Enlightenment tradition, as Rawls 
himself imagined, has instead been perceived as its continuation in another guise in 
which the public sphere is de-politicised at the outset.7 On the other side of the 
philosophical spectrum, comprehensive liberals have attacked what they consider to be 
unwarranted concessions to fashionable intellectual currents such as post-modern 
relativism which allege that universal human rights represent an imposition of 
Enlightenment notions of freedom and selfhood on a plethora of world cultures which 
do not subscribe to these notions. In contrast, they argue that the Enlightenment 
heritage should be extended to encompass non-Western vocabularies which have been
o
traditionally regarded as inimical to the spread of human rights doctrines.
This chapter will argue that critics of the Rawlsian enterprise are justified in their claim 
that Rawls fails to provide an adequate account of the concept of the political. The key 
problem is that Rawls’s identification of his theory as a description of ideas latent 
within the culture of democratic societies remains reliant on the notion of these 
societies as ideal realms in which liberalism is the dominant political culture. This 
ahistorical reading fails to consider the extent to which liberal political ideals have 
intersected with illiberal ideological commitments in a way which greatly complicates 
Rawls’s attempt to maintain the conceptual independence of the political sphere by 
confining alternative illiberal traditions to citizens’ private views of morality. If this 
argument is correct then it would seem that Rawls cannot base the meaning of
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liberalism on a study of citizens’ reasonable intuitions. Rather, liberals must pay much 
more attention to the need to foster civic virtues or at least modes of socialisation which 
will challenge illiberal notions embedded within the heart of democratic societies that 
cannot simply be banished to the private sphere. Furthermore, the empirical and 
normative value of Rawlsian liberalism is reduced by its continual insistence on 
theorising society as a closed system whose internal principles of justice have to be 
divined before being applied universally. This is normatively undesirable for it tends to 
foster the implicit assumption that the political community has a special moral 
significance rather than being one association among many. Thus, as Kukathas puts it, 
it ignores the extent to which the terms of the free society ought to be “an account of 
the terms by which different ways of life coexist rather than an account of the terms by 
which they cohere”? At an empirical level Rawls’s theory ignores the extent to which 
as David Held aptly puts it, we no longer live in a world of discrete national 
communities but rather ‘overlapping communities of fate’ where the trajectories of 
nations are enmeshed with each other.10 This in turn results in a much more complex 
and fluid understanding of the public sphere than the one theorised by Rawls and 
renders his rejection of universalism redundant.
Rawls’s Account of Stability in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism
In the Introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls asserted that the differences between 
his earlier and later work can be attributed to what he now regards as the inadequate 
account of political stability which he provided in Part III of A Theory o f Justice}1 He 
argues that as used in A Theory o f Justice, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice 
as fairness is unrealistic, because it was dependent on citizens adopting this conception
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on the basis of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. This is problematic because a 
modem democratic society consists of a pluralism of incompatible but reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Thus, the key question which Rawls sets himself in Political 
Liberalism is how one ensures the existence over time of a well-ordered just society in 
the midst of social and ideological pluralism. In order to resolve this dilemma, Rawls 
proposes recasting his theory as a political conception of justice rather than as a 
comprehensive moral doctrine. With this response Rawls makes a sharp break from the 
leading political philosophers in the Western tradition, who from Plato to Mill argued 
that it was impossible to separate the virtue of justice from a comprehensive theory of 
the good life to which all humans should aspire. In contrast, Rawls argues that the 
foundations of political justice are to be found in “intuitive ideas” which are detached 
from comprehensive religious, moral or philosophical doctrines and are located instead 
in the public political culture of democratic societies.12
It is not always recognised, either by Rawlsian sympathisers or his critics that the 
meaning of stability in Rawls’s work appears to change between A Theory o f Justice 
and Political Liberalism. This is partly due to the fact that in both works justice as 
fairness consists of two stages. The first stage is to work out a conception of justice for 
the basic structure of society. The second is to show that this conception of justice is 
stable. As was argued in the previous chapter, in the case of A Theory o f Justice the first 
stage can be described as the justificatory stage as it was concerned with identifying 
and then justifying the principles of justice. The second stage on the other hand 
represented the motivational stage as it was concerned with showing how a Rawlsian
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just society would be self-sustaining. Through the adoption of the principles of moral 
psychology outlined in the final part of A Theory o f Justice, individuals would naturally 
develop a sense of justice, which would be congruent with their various conceptions of 
the good life. Thus, Part III of A Theory o f Justice showed how stability could be 
secured by the willing consent of citizens rather than through Hobbesian methods. The 
problem which Rawls came to believe existed with this solution to the problem of 
stability is that it took for granted not only that competing conceptions of justice had 
been repudiated, but also that citizens did not hold substantive religious or 
philosophical beliefs which conflicted with their allegiance to the doctrine of justice as 
fairness. Rawls now regards this assumption as morally illegitimate, for in any free 
society there is likely to be a multiplicity of religious and other metaphysical 
worldviews, which will be affirmed by reasonable citizens, not all of which endorse 
justice as fairness as it was presented in A Theory o f Justice. Thus, Rawls now asserts 
that:
“Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of 
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the 
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a
• 13constitutional democratic regime”.
Thus, as Susan Mendus notes, while Rawls’s main priority in the final section of A 
Theory o f Justice was to show that those who have endorsed the principles of justice 
will be motivated to act on them, this is no longer what Rawls means primarily when 
discussing stability in Political Liberalism.u  The central question which animates the 
book is not “why should people who accept the two principles be motivated to act on 
them?” Rather, it is, “How can we justify the two principles to people who have 
comprehensive conceptions of the good which conflict with them? Rawls states, for
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example, that “justice as fairness is not reasonable unless in a suitable way it can win its 
support by addressing each citizen’s reason, as explained within its own framework”.16 
Therefore, the problem of stability becomes one of justification and not simply 
motivation. This can be adduced to his belief that the account of motivation provided 
in the last section of A Theory o f Justice was illegitimate in that it was underpinned by 
a comprehensive conception of the good that was universally applicable.
Thus, critics who regarded Rawls’ concern in Political Liberalism as one of empirical 
stability are not entirely accurate. Rawls’s principal theme in this book is not 
psychological stability, but rather philosophical stability. Initially, critics assumed that 
the decision to recast his theory of justice as a political conception was a strategic one 
designed to make it easier for citizens animated by illiberal conceptions of the good to 
accept liberalism as legitimate within the public sphere. As it would now be interpreted 
as a political conception it need not challenge the truth claims of comprehensive 
doctrines. However, as Thomas Hill has stated, if stability as a practical concern did lie 
at the heart of Rawls’s revisions, then it would not be simply sufficient to show that 
what Rawls calls an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
converging in their acquiescence of a political conception of justice is remotely 
‘possible’. As Hill states, if the overlapping consensus has replaced the principles of 
moral psychology as the stabilizing force of a just society, one would want some 
reassurance that such a consensus would be likely to develop and endure. As he does 
not provide this reassurance it is appropriate to conclude that practical stability is not 
the principal aim of his book.17
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This interpretation of Rawls’s political project has gained increasing ground in the 
scholarly literature and has been most eloquently outlined by Robert Talisse.18 As 
Talisse states, comprehensive liberal theories aspire to identity specific philosophical 
premises from which a liberal political order may be justified. However, the ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ renders such an attempt inadmissible for there are no 
philosophical premises which can command the assent of all reasonable persons. 
Insofar as comprehensive liberal theories are underpinned by controversial 
philosophical foundations, they are self-refuting. As Rawls states, “the question the 
dominant tradition has tried to answer has no answer”.19 That is, the existence of 
reasonable pluralism vitiates any effort to vindicate liberal political commitments by 
reference to substantive philosophical claims. As Talisse puts it in his paraphrasing of 
Rawls’s argument; “a consistent liberalism.. .must be thoroughly liberal. It must be 
liberal not only in its conception of justice, but also in its conception of political 
justification”.20 In this context, Rawls’s concern with stability is intrinsic to reason and 
therefore internal to the process of normative theorizing rather than extrinsic which is 
the assumption of those who hold Rawls’s account of stability to be empirical rather 
than theoretical.
If this reinterpretation of Rawls’s theory is correct then it would appear to recast the 
role that the notion of the overlapping consensus plays within Rawls’s framework. Its 
purpose would not be to serve as an index of the utility of a political conception of 
justice but rather as a means to legitimize it in the context of irreducible pluralism
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which is the natural result of the exercise of human reason in conditions of liberty. 
However, this argument needs to be qualified. After all, Rawls himself is keenly aware 
of the need for a liberal democratic regime to command the support of the vast majority 
of the population.21 It is unlikely that he would consider the revisions he makes in 
Political Liberalism worth the effort, if he did not think that one of its attractive 
features was the greater prospects which it presents of gaining the consent of actual 
citizens in societies characterized by perpetual social and ideological diversity.
The ambiguity in Rawls’ work over the precise meaning of stability and his 
concomitant elision between acceptability and acceptance reflects a deeper problem 
which plagues all neutralist theories whose appeal seems to be based on their dual 
ability to transcend difference while simultaneously appearing to leave difference 
intact. On the one hand, the modus vivendi appearance of neutrality gives the 
impression at first sight that its main function is to mediate between conflicting 
conceptions of the good. However, this appearance is deceptive for only those forms of 
life which can be accommodated within a liberal state will be salvaged 22 Thus, as Glen 
Newey aptly puts it, neutralist theories claim to profess moral abstinence, only to 
smuggle in moral ideals, which determine how much diversity can be tolerated within a 
liberal regime. Thus, paradoxically, neutralist theories, of which political liberalism is 
only the most popular variant, defend moral abstinence by invoking moral ideals to 
justify that abstinence. This leaves them vulnerable to the charge that their reasoning is 
circular. “The neutral state’s justification depends on moral ideals whose 
reasonableness stems from the fact that reasonable people (read: liberals) are disposed
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to accept them”.23 This is what Newey calls ‘liberalism in, liberalism out’, (lilo). “The 
lilo is a more congenial craft, to be sure, than the raft of the Medusa offered by many 
actual states. But it is also buffeted by...ambiguity...It aims for the cachet of meta­
ideology while never getting above sea level” 24
Rawlsian liberalism may appear particularly vulnerable to this charge due to the 
substantive notion of reasonableness which it employs. In order for a Rawlsian society 
to be both legitimate and stable, it is necessary that it is populated by both reasonable 
citizens and reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In Political Liberalism, Rawls 
distinguishes two aspects of reasonableness as a virtue of persons. The first aspect 
functions in a similar manner to the way Rawls employed the notion in A Theory o f  
Justice. Persons are reasonable when “they are ready to propose principles and 
standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the 
assurance that others will likewise do so” 25 The second aspect refers to the ‘burdens of 
judgement’, which entails the recognition by citizens that even reasonable people arrive 
at different and conflicting opinions. Thus, citizens cognisant of the burdens of 
judgment will refrain from imposing their comprehensive doctrine upon others.26 Rawls 
also attaches reasonableness to comprehensive doctrines. Doctrines are reasonable 
when they accept liberal principles as requisite for the constitution of the public sphere 
even when animated by truth claims that do not accord ultimate value to liberal beliefs.
Taken together, the two aspects of the reasonable elucidated by Rawls illustrate the 
extent to which political justice is a moral conception and not simply a modus vivendi
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between tired combatants, whose concurrence with liberal values is based on purely 
prudential reasons. Political justice aspires to a more ambitious goal of a stable 
agreement between people committed to being fully cooperating members of a just 
society in which liberal principles are regarded as intrinsic goods. This however, raises 
in a stark form the issues which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter: 
Namely, the nature of the relationship between liberal ideals and non-liberal 
conceptions of the good. Is it really possible for adherents to non-liberal beliefs to 
maintain loyalty to a liberal regime, without compromising their convictions? And 
conversely; how does Rawls propose to cultivate the political virtues needed to ensure 
the sustainability of a liberal regime as he conceives it when he restricts the forums 
where individuals construct their identities to the non-public sphere? It is these 
questions which I turn to below.
The Problem of Congruence in Political Liberalism
The most significant repercussion occasioned by Rawls’s decision to extricate his 
political conception of justice from comprehensive truth claims is the sharp dichotomy 
between the public and non-public spheres, which is produced as a result. The political 
conception of the person embodied in the original position remains largely Kantian in 
outlook. Thus, citizens’ public identity is not defined by the ends we regard as 
constitutive of our selves outwith the political realm. As free persons, citizens are 
“independent from and not identified with any particular such conception with its 
scheme of final ends”.27 Our public identity therefore is undisturbed by changes over 
time in our conceptions of the good. The major difference from Rawls’s earlier work is
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that he no longer holds this to be true in the non-public realm. While in our role as 
public selves we remain committed to justice as the fundamental virtue, as private 
selves this is not necessarily the case. Instead, we may choose to see ourselves through 
the prism of our deepest beliefs, which may actually conflict with liberal ideals.28
While I do not think Rawls' argument works, it is important to explore it in some detail, 
for on the surface it would seem to offer a major advance over comprehensive 
liberalism in being more inclusive of social and ideological diversity. By confining 
liberalism to the public sphere, Rawls's political conception of justice is predicated on 
the view that it will prove a more acceptable basis for government in a pluralistic 
society, which consists of illiberal groups which do not value autonomy as a general 
value and thus regard comprehensive liberalism as inherently oppressive. It is important 
to note that Rawls's project does not, as some critics have implied, reject the idea of 
autonomy altogether but rather wishes to restrict its scope. In his latest work, Rawls 
makes clear that he still conceives of citizens as fully autonomous in the sense that they 
are reasonable as well as rational. In particular, he restates his view that citizens only 
realize their full autonomy when they act from (and not simply comply with) the 
principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation appropriate for persons 
regarded as free and equal. In this respect, Political Liberalism is continuous with 
Rawls's earlier work. The main difference is that he now stresses that autonomy is a 
political and not an ethical value. He wishes to continue appealing to it in political 
contexts while avoiding it in other contexts. Rawls states that:
This full autonomy of political life must be distinguished from the ethical values
of autonomy and individuality, which may apply to the whole of life...as
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expressed by the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill.29 
Rawls regards Mill's liberalism as comprehensive, in that it encouraged for example, 
the critical questioning of the value of social customs and traditions by persons in all 
areas of life, not just political life. Indeed, Mill's primary concern was with the way 
people blindly followed social conventions in their everyday personal lives. Thus, 
Mill's liberalism is underpinned by an ideal of rational reflection that applies to all 
aspects of human life and that is intended to inform “our thought and conduct as a 
whole”. 30
Political liberalism, by contrast, accepts that in their private lives some persons are so 
deeply constituted by certain ends and commitments that they are incapable of 
subjecting them to critical reflection. This is in marked contrast to the view of classical 
liberals such as Mill and Kant, (and indeed the Rawls of A Theory o f Justice), all of 
whom believed that the dignity and worth of human beings was only secured when they 
were regarded as autonomous choosers of their own ends. Rawls now acknowledges the 
communitarian objection that this may not be an accurate portrayal of our deepest self- 
understandings. Indeed, in Political Liberalism, Rawls concedes the Sandelian claim 
that many individuals will regard certain ends as constitutive of their moral identity 
when he states that:
It can happen that in their personal affairs, or in the internal life of associations, 
citizens may regard their final ends and attachments very differently from the 
way the political conception supposes. They may have, and often do have, at 
any given time, affections, devotions and loyalties that they believe they would 
not, indeed should and could not, stand apart from and evaluate objectively. 
They may regard it as simply unthinkable to view themselves apart from certain 
religious, philosophical and moral convictions, or from certain enduring 
attachments and loyalties 31
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Thus, Rawls now accepts the communitarian claim that peoples' ends and attachments 
are not necessarily a matter of autonomous choice. The value of certain ways of life can 
only be appreciated if our allegiance to them is regarded as integral to our sense of who 
we are. However, Rawls argues that in a well-ordered society, Sandelian modes of self- 
understanding must be confined to the non-public sphere. In the political domain, by 
contrast, we ignore the fact that our personal identity may be bound to particular ends 
in such a way as to preclude critical reflection. In other words, Rawls continues to 
believe that as citizens, we still see ourselves as fully autonomous with a capacity for 
the two moral powers and indeed, a highest order interest in exercising them, while we 
may reject the value of autonomy as private individuals. One way to understand his 
project is to say that people can be liberals in public life and communitarians in private 
life. It is in this distinction between individuals’ public and private identities that 
political liberalism marks a sharp break from the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant or
32Mill in which citoyen and homme converge.
There are serious concerns, which need to be addressed over Rawls’s sharp distinction 
between the political and the personal in the life of every individual. These concerns 
focus on both the coherence and desirability of this political conception. In particular, it 
appears to imply a vicious dualism of the self in which for political purposes, we have 
to abstract from the ends and attachments which inform our identity in our private lives. 
Political liberalism requires individuals to bracket their fundamental beliefs in the 
political domain. It can be objected that real human beings cannot regard themselves as 
being split in this way. In Political Liberalism, Rawls fails to allay these concerns,
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noting rather lamely that citizens must adjust and reconcile these two aspects of their
moral identity. In Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory where Rawls first
formulated the distinction between the political and the personal, he claims that this
dualism is in no way vicious.
Within different contexts we can assume diverse points of view toward our 
person without contradiction so long as these points of view cohere together 
when circumstances require.33
The problem is that Rawls has not shown that these points of view do cohere. In 
particular, Rawls has not explained why anyone would accept the ideal of autonomy in 
political contexts unless they also accepted it as a more general value. Rawls makes it 
clear that in a well-ordered society, citizens will regard themselves as fully autonomous 
in the sense that they are viewed as free and equal persons. By contrast, in the non­
political aspects of their lives, they may believe in a social hierarchy legitimised by 
aristocratic or religious values. As a number of commentators have noted, these two 
notions are very difficult to reconcile.34 Imagine, for example, a child who has been 
brought up in a fundamentalist religious household and educated entirely at a religious 
school and within a religious institution such as a church. These non-political settings 
may well have indoctrinated the child into believing that gender inequalities are 
divinely ordained, homosexuals are not worthy of respect and more generally, that 
families and churches can, and should be organized hierarchically. How precisely are 
children who have been socialised in institutions such as these going to regard 
themselves as free and equal citizens in the political sphere as Rawls requires?
Indeed, Rawls appears to address this question by not consistently adhering to the 
public-non-public dichotomy which underpins his distinction between political and
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comprehensive liberalism. For example, Rawls’s attempt to illustrate the difference
between political and comprehensive liberalism through reference to the duties of a
religious community that inhabits a liberal society, but repudiates its values raises more
questions than answers. While the state should not impose its conception of the good
over the adherents of that religious community, its children, claims Rawls, should be
educated “to be fully cooperating members of society and... to be self-supporting”.35
Furthermore, after stating that justice as fairness does not cultivate the values of
autonomy and individuality, he goes on to argue:
Justice as fairness honours, as far as it can, the claims of those who wish to 
withdraw from the modem world in accordance with the injunctions of their 
religion, provided only that they acknowledge the principles of the political 
conception of justice and appreciate its political ideals of persons and society.36
There are numerous problems with this passage. In particular, it appears to be both
ambiguous and self-contradictory. It is ambiguous in the sense that it is not clear what
Rawls means by the word appreciate. It is possible that Rawls is suggesting that there is
a difference between cultivating values and acknowledging them. However, it is not
clear what this distinction means in practice. To the extent that children are required to
be socialized into acceptance of liberal ideals at least in political contexts and indeed to
actively promote them, the option of withdrawal is not available to those children
despite Rawls’s claims to the contrary.
The doubts over how much cultural diversity Rawlsian liberalism, even in its 
minimalist form, can accommodate are strengthened if one considers briefly the 
dilemmas posed by the Amish community due to their rejection of liberal ideals such as 
autonomy and individuality. Controversy was ignited when the state of Wisconsin
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attempted to compel children of the Old Order Amish Community to attend school until 
their sixteenth birthday. The Amish argued that schooling for their children beyond the 
eighth grade would represent a threat to their way of life and to the salvation of 
themselves and their children. Wisconsin state objected arguing that some degree of 
education is necessary, both for political participation and in order to ensure that 
individuals are adequately equipped to be self-reliant members of society. Despite the 
seeming strength of these arguments, The Supreme Court decided that the Amish claim 
to religious freedom superseded the state’s insistence on the overriding priority of a 
public education.37
Most perfectionist liberals such as Amy Gutmann or Richard Dagger would dispute this 
verdict.38 They would argue that the important mission which schools have in 
cultivating qualities of character such as autonomy and a sense of justice has overriding 
importance. As the above discussion suggests, it is not clear that Rawlsian liberalism 
despite its claims to be more sensitive to the demands of cultural diversity than 
perfectionist liberalism would represent any great difference in practice. To the extent 
that education in a Rawlsian polity aims to cultivate the political virtues and to equip 
citizens to be fully cooperating members of society, its aspirations appear to dovetail 
with the arguments employed by Wisconsin state against the Amish community’s 
desire to withdraw from that society. Indeed, Rawls himself seems to implicitly accept 
the degree of practical convergence that may occur between political and 
comprehensive liberalism when he writes:
It may be objected that requiring children to understand the political conception
in these ways is in effect, though not in intention, to educate them to a
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comprehensive liberal doctrine...And certainly there is some resemblance 
between.. .political liberalism and... comprehensive liberalisms... The
unavoidable consequences of reasonable requirements for children’s education 
may have to be accepted, often with regret.39
It is important to note at this point that Rawls’s theory, while aspiring to be less
‘sectarian’ than comprehensive liberalisms such as those of Kant and Mill, does not
require for its justification a social world which is maximally accommodative of social
and cultural diversity. In order to emphasise this point, Rawls draws a distinction
between neutrality of aim and neutrality of effect, which parallels the division between
theoretical and empirical stability outlined above. Liberalism is not premised on
neutrality of effects but rather on neutrality of aim.40 As David A. Reidy notes, this
means that a liberal political regime should remain neutral with respect to
comprehensive doctrines that are not radically inconsistent with liberal political justice.
It emphatically does not mean that in practice, a liberal political regime will not have
radically non-neutral and potentially devastating repercussions for certain
comprehensive doctrines. Instead, this is a price, which according to Rawls, must
simply be accepted with regret.41
The utility of Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism is 
suspect enough when it appears unable to accommodate comprehensive doctrines 
which Rawls defines as unreasonable, such as those which aspire to transform the 
political world so that it corresponds with their own belief system. It is rendered 
particularly problematic, however, when it appears also to discriminate against 
religious communities which enter into the discourse of the larger society as a means of 
protecting their cultural autonomy, rather than to transform the political realm so that it
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corresponds with their ethical values. It might have been thought that religious 
communities such as these would be the paradigmatic examples of the ability for 
political liberalism to accommodate cultural diversity in a way not open to 
comprehensive liberalism. However, if the above discussion is correct, this appears not 
to be the case. An overriding key factor can be adduced which explains why the 
political liberalism of Rawls is no more able to accommodate cultural communities 
antithetical to liberal ideals of individual autonomy than comprehensive liberal 
doctrines. This is the fact that Rawls, in a similar fashion to comprehensive liberals and 
many communitarians, assumes the centrality of the political community as the basis 
for philosophical reflection.
Rawls attempts to differentiate political liberalism from comprehensive moral doctrines 
including his own A Theory o f Justice by arguing that a political community 
underpinned by a comprehensive moral doctrine would, by its very nature require the 
oppressive use of state power.42 However, while refusing to consider political society as 
a community, a red thread which runs through his work from A Theory o f Justice to 
Political Liberalism (and the Law o f Peoples) is the belief that political society is not 
just one community among many, but an order which subsumes all other communities. 
As Chandran Kukathas notes, “pluralism is recognized; but the quality of that pluralism 
is circumscribed by its subordination to the moral standards of a political 
community” 43 The imperatives of securing the social unity and stability of the political 
order relegate cultural pluralism to a secondary status.
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The normative value of political society for Rawls is already evident in A Theory o f  
Justice where he conjures up the image of a well-ordered society as a ‘social union of 
social unions’ and adds; “Everyone’s more private life is so to speak a plan within a 
plan, this superordinate plan being realized in the public institutions of society”.44 Even 
here Rawls is careful to claim that this larger plan does not appeal to a totalistic 
doctrine such as religious unity, but is rather a constitutional order in which the 
principles of justice are achieved. Rawls remains consistent in his conviction of the 
overriding normative value of political society in Political Liberalism stating, for 
example, “The values that conflict with the political conception of justice and its 
sustaining virtues may be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with 
the very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a basis of mutual 
respect” 45 Thus, when the values of political justice conflict with those of a particular 
comprehensive scheme; the former “have sufficient weight to override all other values 
that may come into conflict with them”.46 It is in this context that we can understand 
the difficulties which Rawlsian liberalism has in accommodating cultural minorities 
which do not adhere to liberal values. Indeed, in Political Liberalism, Rawls goes so far 
as to argue that there is no philosophical incompatibility between political liberalism 
and classical republicanism. On the face of it, this seems extraordinary. After all, 
republicanism, as defined in the writings of JGA Pocock and Quentin Skinner is a 
school of thought which seems to bear little resemblance to the liberal contractarian 
tradition.47 However, Rawls argues that one can differentiate between classical 
republicanism and civic humanism. Whereas civic humanism is a comprehensive 
doctrine which regards politics as a privileged form of the good life, classical
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republicanism affirms political virtues as of only instrumental importance to the 
preservation of negative liberty. Therefore, classical republicanism eschews a 
comprehensive conception of the good in a similar manner to political liberalism. If 
Rawls is correct that there is no ‘fundamental opposition’ between classical 
republicanism and political liberalism then political liberalism can utilize the 
motivational resources of republican arguments.48 As Dagger states in his commentary 
on this argument;
Political Liberalism seems to enjoy the best of both worlds. It is a neutral doctrine 
{in that its adoption of impartiality carries justificatory force} but it also contains 
a conception of moral and political virtues robust enough to provide motivational 
force as well. In this way political liberalism appears to be self-sustaining rather 
than self-defeating 49
Even if one grants for the sake of argument Rawls’s tendentious distinction between 
classical republicanism and civic humanism there are still many problems with trying to 
align the former with political liberalism. While appealing to the political virtues 
implicit in classical republicanism renders redundant communitarian charges that 
political liberalism is too individualistic a theory to inspire people to place the common 
good above their own, it does so at the expense of discriminating against conceptions of 
the good which have no interest in participating in the wider political sphere. 
Furthermore, Rawls glides over a paradox implicit in classical republicanism as defined 
by theorists such as Skinner.
Skinner makes two central claims about classical republicanism. Firstly, that it upholds 
the same negative concept of liberty as liberalism i.e. that individual agents are only 
free when they pursue their own ends. However, classical liberals are also committed to
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a second proposition which would seem to directly contradict this definition of negative 
liberty. Namely, that to assure our own individual liberty we must engage 
enthusiastically in a life of public service. Furthermore, as citizens often do not 
recognize that the maintenance of their own liberty depends on the distillation of public 
duties, individuals may sometimes have to be forced to be free. In other words, humans 
often act irrationally and hence it is sometimes necessary for public institutions to 
exercise coercion in order to safeguard individual liberty.50 From a liberal perspective, 
this seeming equation of freedom with reason and coercion will look just like any other 
positive theory of freedom, simply paradoxical and incoherent. Thus, Rawls in his 
eagerness to boost the motivational resources of liberalism by forging a republican- 
liberal hybrid is in danger of subverting what is surely liberalism’s most distinctive 
feature; namely its commitment to an autonomous private sphere insulated from state 
coercion. As William Galston argues;
the liberal citizen is not the same as the civic-republican citizen. In a liberal 
polity there is no duty to participate actively in politics, no requirement to 
place the public above the private and to subordinate personal interest to the 
common good systematically, and no commitment to accept collective 
determination of personal choices.51
Rawls's Kantian Moral Psychology
If the argument above is correct then it would seem that Rawls’s republican-liberal 
hybrid makes his theory less rather more tolerant of cultural difference. In order to 
evade this charge Rawls needs to show that his theory allows for a more expansive 
notion of the private sphere than appears to be suggested by his prioritization of the 
public realm. Will Kymlicka has suggested one possible route, which is articulable
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within the parameters of political liberalism which would provide a greater deal of 
scope for accommodation of cultural minorities than Rawls offers. Kymlicka has 
argued that the moral powers which inform the citizens of a Rawlsian polity (a capacity 
for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good) require for their 
attainment a horizon of stable socio-cultural identifications. To decenter those 
identifications, by for example, educating children in a manner contrary to their 
parents’ values and beliefs would entail psychological violence by alienating children 
from their parents, thus potentially threatening the stability of the liberal polity. A 
liberal society ought not to institute policies which dismember the socio-cultural beliefs 
of significant elements of the population, unless there is clear evidence that they pose a 
threat to the stability of the political system.52 Unfortunately, the public-non-public 
dichotomy initiated by Rawlsian liberalism renders this attempt to provide a foothold 
for accommodationist intuitions impossible.
It will be recalled that in the last chapter, it was argued that one of the attractive 
features of Rawls’s thought was the holistic ontology outlined in the final part of A 
Theory o f Justice. In contrast to the psychological individualism of many liberal 
theories, Rawls, in his rich theory of moral psychology, acknowledges that children’s 
psychosocial development is a product of their social history and cultural practices. 
Thus, to psychologically disembed people from their relationship environment is 
counter-productive and even incoherent. Within this perspective, the individual is not, 
as was commonly perceived to be the case with classical liberal models, seen as 
someone who enters the world as an a priori psychologically discrete entity. Rather, the
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individual develops as it internalises many of the properties of the social environment 
in which it was formed. This conception of the self refutes the Cartesian notion of the 
mind as a ‘self-contained world of thoughts and experiences’, essentially independent 
of the external world’. On this understanding, our consciousness and capacity for self- 
reflection are not natural pre-givens. Their emergence results from the individual’s 
engagement with society. Thus, in contexts where the social body becomes fragmented, 
the psychological coherence of the self dissolves and the possibility of social 
reciprocity diminishes as a result. This argument clearly has serious normative 
implications for the possibility of a well-ordered stable polity, liberal or otherwise. 
Rawls appreciated this in A Theory o f Justice, with the result that he espoused a social 
ontology which provided the possibility for integrating an ethic of care into a 
deontological theory of justice.
His revised theory of justice, by contrast, results in the segregation of the two ethics 
with the care ethic confined to the private sphere where we formulate our conceptions 
of the good and the ethic of justice, from which the political virtues are delineated, 
restricted to the public realm. As many feminist theorists, including those broadly 
sympathetic to the Rawlsian project, such as Susan Moller Okin, have noted, however, 
the adoption of this position results in an impoverished moral psychology which fails to 
adequately account for the importance of social institutions such as the family as the 
first school of moral development in which a sense of justice is nurtured. Indeed, the 
problems which Rawls has in locating the family within his public-non-public 
dichotomy are salutary. In A Theory o f Justice, Rawls stated that the family was part of
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the basic structure of society and therefore subject to the principles of justice.55 He
reaffirms this in Political Liberalism. However, in other parts of the book, he
contradicts this commenting that “the grief, the personal and the familial are...three
examples of the non-political”.56 There is thus, an internal inconsistency within
Political Liberalism and between it and A Theory o f Justice. Okin offers a convincing
reason for this conceptual confusion;
The problem we face is that the family is an institution that defies the political / 
non-political dichotomy that Rawls has clearly emphasized in recent years. For 
families do clearly fall within the basic structure as defined, yet they are for the 
most part comparatively private relationships, where things both good and bad 
are frequently hidden from public view.57
Rawls’s ambivalence over the conceptual status of families is indicative of two wider 
difficulties within his theory. Firstly, the moral psychology provided is much more 
attenuated than in A Theory o f Justice. While Rawls pays considerable attention to the 
importance of inculcating political virtues in citizens in order to ensure the stability of a 
well-ordered society, his account of how this happens is as Okin notes, much “more 
Kantian - more autonomous and intellectualized, less relational and concerned with 
moral feelings in Political Liberalism than is the much fuller account of moral 
development in Theory”, (i .eA Theory o f Justice).5* It is much less plausible because it 
says nothing about the importance of trust and love in the early phase of a child’s life 
for their possibilities of nurturance and growth. Rawls now seems to assume that the 
sense of justice which requires the exercise of empathy and compassion for its 
operation can be attained solely from citizens’ experiences in political life.
The second major difficulty which needs to be mentioned is that in the same way that
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the public / non-public dichotomy fails in the case of the family, one can imagine it also 
failing in other contexts. Indeed, it will be argued in the second part of the chapter that 
it does. Rawls’s attempt to establish the freestanding character of liberal principles by 
insulating them from the comprehensive schemes, which constitute the background 
culture of civil society, cannot be sustained. Many important areas of public discord 
within constitutional democracies emanate from or encompass the institutions which 
shape the non-public sphere. The Unitarian and harmonious thread which underpins 
Rawls’s attempt to privatize difference by the establishment of social unity in the public 
sphere is coupled with a restrictive moral psychology. Both these themes emanate from 
Rawls’s conviction that the moral resources needed to sustain a liberal sense of justice 
will have worked themselves into the culture of liberal democratic regimes as a “normal 
result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime”.59 It will be argued in the next section that this 
confidence is misplaced. The public political sphere consists of both reasonable and 
unreasonable pluralism, (by Rawls’s definitions) which renders Rawls’s distinction 
between the political conception of justice and comprehensive moral doctrines 
untenable.
The Illiberalism of Western Constitutional Democracies
A fundamental problem with Rawls’s version of liberalism to which he accords 
inadequate attention is the extent to which his attempt to ground liberal beliefs on the 
basis of their widespread acceptance within Western constitutional democracies is 
vitiated by his failure to acknowledge the extent to which these societies are permeated
171
by illiberal ideals. The existence of these ideals challenges the teleological account of 
history which underpins his political liberalism. By locating the foundations of 
political justice within the public political culture of democratic societies, he attempts 
to circumvent the problem of grounding his theory of liberalism within a 
comprehensive belief system. Instead, by engaging in a hermeneutic or interpretive 
enterprise, Rawls hopes that his version of political liberalism can be rescued from the 
charge of abstract metaphysics. Unfortunately, however, as noted by Eric Brown, the 
criteria which Rawls has adopted to give priority to liberal ideas within the cultural 
contexts of Western societies at the expense of alternative interpretations of these 
societies’ political, social and ideological development is not clearly delineated. As 
Brown notes:
Rawls’s hermeneutic has led him to select as fundamental ideas of democratic 
societies and public cultures variations on the doctrines of Immanuel Kant, an 
author hardly read, understood or appreciated in American public 
culture...Basing one’s political theory on Kant’s moral psychology is a 
defensive enterprise, but holding that Kant’s moral psychology is ...the 
fundamental idea of democratic culture requires a much more elaborate 
hermeneutic exposition and justification.60
Rawls’s failure to provide such an exposition can be attributed to the liberal use of
idealisation which permeates his work despite the seeming ‘pragmatic turn’ in his
recent thought. Onora O’Neill argues that through the historicist turn in his work,
Rawls believes he has avoided the problem of idealisation.61 However, as Eric Brown
argues, he has in fact merely compounded the problem for the criteria employed by
Rawls in selecting certain ideas as the fundamental components of democratic societies
in contrast to other interpretive possibilities is not elucidated sufficiently clearly.
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As Marc Stears has argued, Rawls’s Political Liberalism represents the most famous 
example of a widespread tendency evident amongst normative political theorists to 
portray liberalism as the dominant ideological belief system within modem society.63 
The most significant feature (and I will argue weakness) of Political Liberalism is its 
ideal-type historical account of how liberalism came to be the hegemonic belief-system 
in societies such as the United States. The employment of this strategy lies at the centre 
of Rawls’s attempts to reconcile the prescriptive determinacy of the liberal ideals which 
he advocates with his hermeneutic methodology. By synchronising the two together, 
Rawls attempts to show that a justification for liberal beliefs can be divined through an 
analysis of the historical evolution of Western societies. Rawls first of all argues that a 
liberal constitutional order was initially accepted as a modus vivendi between 
competing factions exhausted by conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It 
was only after a period of time observing the advantages garnered by the acceptance of 
this constitutional order that liberal ideals became internalised within particular 
societies to such an extent that they were perceived as intrinsically valuable in 
themselves and not simply a temporary device to be ended when one side in a conflict 
became stronger than the other.64 As a consequence, most citizens came to understand 
that in order for polities to be legitimate it was essential for them to be governed by 
liberal political principles which abstained from adjudicating between competing 
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines even if they regarded them to be true. 
Thus, liberal notions of justice which were initially accepted as of only instrumental 
value became an intrinsic part of citizens’ shared social understandings. Rawls clearly 
believes that this process of liberal socialisation was so successful that by the end of the
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twentieth century, the articulation of liberal principles became in effect a description of 
the intuitions held by reasonable citizens in liberal democracies.65
Through the adoption of this strategy, Rawls attempts to argue that within 
contemporary liberal democracies one can retrieve the Enlightenment aspiration for a 
convergence on liberal normative ideals. It is possible to transcend particularity and 
contingency through the paradoxical adoption of a method which is particularist and 
contingent. In this manner, Rawls, very much like Rorty, aims to eschew the 
metaphysical foundationalism of the Enlightenment tradition, while continuing to assert 
the validity of its philosophy of history. Another way of understanding this is to recall 
that Enlightenment liberalism was constituted by three main components. Firstly, its 
legitimacy depended on its derivation from foundational philosophical premises such as 
Locke’s doctrine of natural rights. Secondly, and following on from the first, it asserted 
its belief in a universal human nature which underpinned liberal tenets such as the 
importance of civic equality. Finally, it invoked the possibility of achieving a consensus 
on the validity of these principles. Rawls’s version of political liberalism departs from 
Enlightenment liberalism in its eschewal of the first two components, while remaining 
wedded to the consensus criterion. His conviction that Western societies are constituted 
by an acceptance of a liberal belief system as a hegemonic public philosophy enables 
Rawls to relegate theories of the good to the private sphere. The fundamental difference 
between Rawls and value pluralists such as John Gray is that the latter maintains that 
the traditional aspirations of liberal theory cannot be sustained in the light of pluralism 
due to the fact that there are no philosophical premises which all humans can share.
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Rawls argues on the other hand that, while modem societies are constituted by 
incompatible philosophical doctrines, they can be reconciled with the full exercise of 
common human reason. Thus, Rawls’s commitment to pluralism at the epistemological 
level does not in his opinion preclude the possibility of a normative consensus on 
liberal principles in the public sphere.67
It is this view that it is possible to retrieve a consensus on liberal beliefs in Western 
societies, while jettisoning the universalist and philosophical aspirations which 
previously animated the Enlightenment project, which I want to consider in the 
remainder of this section. As stated above, his refutation of comprehensive liberalism 
forces him to locate the foundations of political liberalism not in any metaphysical 
system of thought, such as natural law theory, but rather in the discernment of historical 
patterns of evolution which culminate in the embedding of liberal principles in societies 
that have been subject to the influence of the Enlightenment legacy. The empirical 
claims which underpin this belief in the liberal nature of the public political culture of 
Western societies are suspect. As theorists such as George Klosko pointed out a decade 
ago, Rawls provides no empirical evidence to sustain these claims and appears to take
for granted the existence of shared assumptions that provide a non-controversial
• •  68background against which liberal principles of justice can be delineated. As a
consequence Rawls fails to adequately situate modem liberalism within its historical, 
political and ideational context. This accounts for the analytical abstraction that 
pervades Political Liberalism and its failure to bridge the gulf between the theoretical
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ideals which animate his version of political liberalism and the contingencies of 
practical politics.
This neglect disables the Rawlsian paradigm in three significant ways. Firstly, it fails to 
acknowledge the extent to which liberalism, rather than gradually emerging as the 
dominant political discourse in Western societies, has instead been forced to engage in 
constant competition with alternative, illiberal ideological traditions which precludes 
any possibility of fashioning a popular consensus on liberal values. Thus, for example, 
Rogers Smith contends that the ideology which he terms ‘ascriptive inegalitarianism ’ 
has been a powerful opponent of liberalism throughout the history of the United 
States.69 This ideology which he defines as the assignation of the benefits and burdens 
of citizenship on the basis of ‘ascribed characteristics’ such as race, gender, nation or 
religion is the very antithesis of Rawlsian liberalism (which regards these human 
characteristics as morally arbitrary) and receives its most powerful expression in the 
nativist, anti-immigration discourses which continue to inform much of political debate. 
As political scientists such as Rogers Smith have illustrated, the pervasiveness of these 
ideological traditions is not a by-product of the failure on the part of citizens to attain 
‘reflective equilibrium’, i.e. the harmonisation of liberal principles with each other as 
stipulated in the Rawlsian paradigm, but rather because of the embeddedness of illiberal 
beliefs within Western populations.79 One important feature of this conclusion is the 
extent to which it renders Rawls’ public-non-public dichotomy untenable. As Stears 
notes, the influence exacted by these alternative illiberal traditions is not confined to 
citizens private beliefs, their ‘comprehensive doctrines’ as political liberalism requires
176
but rather animates their ‘conceptions of the political’ as well.71 Thus, in their role of 
public selves, citizens often exhibit illiberal commitments in their political 
deliberations.
A second theoretical consideration which Rawls fails to pay adequate attention to is the 
extent to which the very way liberal principles are interpreted is partly dependent on the 
historical context in which they are shaped. There are two ways to understand this 
argument. The first is to claim that the very content of liberalism has changed over time 
so that positions that were considered illiberal at one time are no longer regarded as 
such in a different period. The second is to suggest that while the conceptual values 
implicit within liberal thought are stable, the application of these principles is 
contingent. Neither position is entirely satisfactory for a deontological liberal such as 
Rawls. The first lends itself to an empty relativism while the second risks giving too 
much scope to political contingency in shaping how liberal principles are to be 
employed. In both cases, liberal principles can mean whatever a particular ideologist 
wants them to mean. The language of individual rights is employed strategically to 
buttress illiberal ideological commitments. Rawls fails to account for this ambiguity 
because his ahistorical conceptualisation of liberal ideals is abstracted from the political 
context in which they take concrete form.
These theoretical deficiencies in Rawlsian thought are compounded by his static 
conception of the public sphere which fails to account for social and economic trends 
such as those wrought by globalisation and paradigm shifts resulting from seismic
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geopolitical events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Both these factors have had a 
major impact in challenging the legitimacy of liberal principles even in Western 
societies as I will explain in more detail below. As Benhabib notes, Rawls’s failure to 
attend to the sociological and institutional realities of citizenship in the modem world 
can be partly attributed to his reliance on the fiction of a closed society with non-porous 
borders which assumes “that a democratic society, like any political society, is to be 
viewed as a complete and closed social system...entry into it is only by birth and exit 
from it is only by death”.72 In the light of global trends such as immigration and 
ecological interdependence, this premise is implausible. The empirical reality of 
globalisation means that it is impossible to formulate theories of domestic justice 
without taking into account the international dimension. The majority of political 
theories including that of Rawls’s from its earliest incarnation in A Theory o f Justice 
through to its final crystallisation in The Law o f Peoples are hamstrung by their 
increasingly obsolescent views of geographical space. As a consequence, the 
significance of trends such as the globalisation of informal violence manifested in the 
exploitation of modem technologies by non-state actors for violent ends is 
eviscerated.73 Even more fundamentally, these external challenges resulting from 
globalisation intersect with the theoretical difficulties confronting modem liberalisrp 
outlined above to create a much more volatile political culture than Rawls appears to 
appreciate.
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Pluralizing Public Reason: A Contradiction in Terms?
Rawls’s revisions of his theory of justice did not stop with the publication of Political 
Liberalism. In particular, he was anxious in his later writings to address the charge 
outlined above that his notion of the public sphere was one in which social unity and 
social harmony were prioritised over divisiveness and instability. In particular, critics 
asked why it was not possible that the reasonable pluralism which Rawls argued existed 
between competing conceptions of the good could not apply also to principles of 
justice.74 In addition, it was also asked whether Rawls’s exclusion of comprehensive 
doctrines from the public sphere was not an arbitrary restriction of political discourse. 
Rawls attempts to answer these criticisms in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited by 
developing and clarifying the nature of public reason.75 Public reason as Rawls 
conceives it governs political discourse at least pertaining to matters of basic justice. In 
order for the exercise of political power to be legitimate citizens must offer reasons 
which are accessible to all irrespective of whatever comprehensive doctrine they may 
affirm in their private lives. Thus, as Bruce Ackerman notes, the ideal of public reason 
presumes an idealised form of political discourse which actually marks a sharp break 
with how democratic discussions are normally conducted in liberal democracies.76 It 
also serves once again to demonstrate the republican themes embedded in Rawls’s 
political liberalism. Two common views of how public discourse should proceed in 
liberal democracies are either, that citizens can vote on the basis of whatever 
comprehensive doctrine they consider true or that they can make decisions based on 
their subjective personal preference. Rawls’s rejects both these views in that they both 
violate the duty of civility which mandates that citizens make decisions on the basis of
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reasons that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. In this context, he 
explicitly compares public reason and its duty of civility with Rousseau’s Social
77Contract.
Rawls’s restriction on the type of reasons which are admissible in public discourse has 
been criticised for displaying insensitivity to the political nature of political theory. 
This criticism has been advanced by many critics. Value pluralists such as John Gray 
have argued that the removal of contingency and indeterminacy which characterise any 
genuine conception of politics means that Rawls’s liberalism has been politically 
emasculated.78 His efforts to attain a consensus on liberal principles of justice by 
conceiving their content in terms of determinate, prescriptive principles effectively 
results in the abolition of politics by transposing political life into legal contexts. Gray 
argues that a genuinely ‘political liberalism’ requires the adoption of a modus vivendi 
which acknowledges the contingency of any consensus on liberal principles rather than 
trying to render them immune from revision.79 This is precisely the understanding of 
politics which Rawls repudiates for it would make liberalism ‘political in the wrong 
way’ by failing to guarantee stability which can only be attained when individuals have 
an intrinsic and not merely instrumental commitment to liberal principles of justice.80 
Rawls’s rejection of politics as an arena of conflicting claims in which principles of
justice are constantly renegotiated is seen by critics such as Gray and Mouffe as a
81debasement of the notion of politics altogether.
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It is important to note that this criticism of Rawls differs from the ones discussed earlier 
in the chapter which were concerned primarily with the scope of the political sphere 
and the extent to which it encroached on the private sphere. These criticisms largely 
emanated from liberal diversity theorists such as Kukathas and Galston. The principal 
objection of theorists such as Gray and Mouffe by contrast is not with the scope of 
politics but rather with the particular conceptualisation of it underpinning Rawls’s 
liberalism. In effect, while the former set of critics feared that liberalism as Rawls 
conceived it was too political, the latter set worried that it was not political enough. It is 
the second set of objections which Rawls aims to combat in The Idea o f Public Reason 
Revisited. In that work Rawls argues that it is a misconstrual of his theory to argue that 
political liberalism expels diversity from the public sphere. In particular, he now 
emphasises that political liberalism should not be conflated with justice as fairness. As 
a result, there are according to Rawls many forms of public reason and a family of 
political conceptions of justice rather than just one. At the same time this family of 
political liberalisms is united by its continuing adherence to the criterion of reciprocity 
to be applied between free and equal citizens all of whom are considered reasonable 
and rational. Rawls thus claims in contrast to previous impressions which he may have 
fostered that political liberalism does not aspire to give a definitive account of the 
nature of public reason.82
Rawls appears anxious to recast his political theory in terms of deliberative democracy 
rather than in a Kantian garb.83 Thus, he even argues that political liberalism can 
encompass Habermas’s discourse theory of legitimacy with which Rawls s political
181
liberalism is often juxtaposed.84 This is a particularly striking assertion. After all, it has
generally been assumed both by Rawlsians and their critics that one key difference
between Rawls and Habermas is that whereas Rawls’s theory is essentially
monological, Habermas’s is dialogical. Whereas Rawls believes that principles of
justice are justified separately from within each comprehensive worldview, Habermas
affirms both the possibility and the moral necessity of basing normative justification on
the attempt to find shared reasons for adopting principles of justice. It is on this basis
that Habermas explicitly criticised Rawls for endeavouring to find a convergence on
various norm-contents from within diverging and therefore not discursively interrelated
comprehensive doctrines.85 However, Rawls now makes clear that comprehensive
doctrines can be introduced into public discourse subject to certain conditions. This is
what he calls the proviso;
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.. .may be introduced in public political 
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons - 
and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines - are presented that 
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are 
said to support.86
Once again we can see that Rawls is engaged in a delicate balancing act. After all, there 
is a danger that if he gives comprehensive doctrines too large a role in the public sphere 
then as John Horton notes, the problems presented by conflicting comprehensive 
doctrines which persuaded Rawls to adopt a method of abstraction in the first place will 
be replicated within public reason itself.87 Rawls is aware of this when he states that 
political values “are not puppets manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive 
doctrines”.88 However, it will be argued below that Rawls s attempt to sidestep the 
charges of critics who regard his notion of public reason as an expression of a Kantian
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conception of morality and therefore of a sectarian comprehensive doctrine can only be 
purchased at the expense of making public reason indeterminate.
It is of course true that there are certain political fundamentals on which at least in 
constitutional democracies there is unlikely to be reasonable disagreement. For 
example, as Rawls acknowledges, advocates of theocracy or other forms of autocracy 
and dictatorship are not going to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and a commitment 
to the basic liberties which underpins political liberalism. However, the real test of the 
utility of public reason, as Horton points out, comes not in differentiating between 
those who affirm and those who reject the values implicit within constitutional 
democracy, who most commentators would agree with Rawls can be considered 
unreasonable. Rather, it lies in whether public reason can assist in resolving disputes
o n  # #
over political fundamentals between reasonable citizens. This seems unlikely for 
reasons which are not exclusive to Rawls’s conception of public reason but rather are 
due to the incoherence of liberal projects of public justification more generally. This 
can be illustrated by a number of examples.
The first example is supplied by Horton which is the controversy surrounding the 
publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Versus and specifically whether the book 
ought to be prohibited on the grounds that it could be deemed highly offensive to deep- 
rooted religious beliefs. At first sight this might appear to be a conflict which can be 
easily adjudicated within the bounds of public reason. Many liberals would affirm that 
the right to freedom of expression is absolute (at least where there is no direct threat of
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physical harm to any individual or group) and declare those calling for the ban of the
work apologists for religious tyranny. We thus have a clear example of how public
reason can prescribe a determinate resolution to the issue at least if we accept for
argument’s sake Rawls's reasonable/unreasonable distinction. However, matters are not
so simple. After all, as Horton points out, almost all the reasons proffered by Muslim
leaders for the banning of this publication are articulable within the terms of public
reason. They did not argue for example that the book should be banned on the basis that
it violated the truth of Islam. Rather, they argued on the basis of reasons that are
reasonably accessible to all citizens irrespective of their religion. These reasons
included the importance of mutual respect, religious tolerance and respecting
individuals’ constitutive identities, all of which, it could be argued were undermined by
The Satanic Versus. As Horton argues;
What they mostly objected to, as they saw it, was a deliberately offensive and 
abusive ridiculing of their deepest convictions and the way of life of their 
community which represented an attack on their self-respect and an 
encouragement of religious hatred and intolerance towards an already 
disadvantaged minority. Whatever the merits of these arguments, there was 
no direct appeal to the truth of Islam”.90
Thus, while it is true that questions about the status of free speech can be translated into 
the discourse of public reason, thereby satisfying Rawls’s claim that its idealising 
preconditions do not lead a priori to the application of prescriptive conclusions, this is a 
hollow victory. It is attained only at the cost of making public reason indeterminate. 
After all, surely in this case public reason is being manipulated by comprehensive 
doctrines in just the way Rawls feared. On the one side, there is a Millian commitment 
to absolute free speech. On the other, there is an appeal for the respect which ought to
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be accorded individuals’ constitutive identities. Public reason is merely the vessel in 
which this dispute is played out in order for both sides to appear more reasonable than 
the other and indeed, to argue that they better satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.
The apparent indeterminacy of public reason in resolving disputes concerning the 
legitimacy of free speech is also applicable to many other issues. For example, in 
disputes as disparate as the nature of the relationship between civil liberties and 
national security or the merits of the precautionary principle, while both sides can 
formulate arguments in terms of public reason, it is the competing philosophical and 
metaphysical visions which underpin the stances taken by the competing sides which 
are of most relevance. Thus, to take the first example, individuals who wish to assign 
absolute primacy to civil liberties may well be motivated by a Kantian belief in the 
priority of individual liberty over all other considerations. By contrast, those who insist 
that civil liberties must sometimes be circumscribed in order to protect the public good 
may well be motivated by utilitarian considerations. If public reason is formulated in a 
loose way there is no reason why it cannot accommodate both arguments as both sides 
share a commitment to the fundamental principles of liberal democracy and are arguing 
in good faith from reasons which are universalisable. On the other hand, if public 
reason is formulated in a way which excludes one of the two competing sides then its 
pluralistic character is undermined. The same is true in relation to the precautionary 
principle. It is perfectly plausible to make reasonable arguments for and against the 
precautionary principle or to advocate it in some contexts but not in others depending 
on how one chooses to interpret risk and how much weight one places on scientific
185
uncertainty in relation to issues such as global warming. These arguments are made 
more intractable by the fact that underpinning these disagreements are metaphysical 
differences over the relationship between humans and nature. Thus, proponents of the 
free market who place great faith in scientific and technological progress will perceive 
the precautionary principle as an unnecessary restriction on activities which could bring 
incalculable benefits. Supporters of the precautionary principle by contrast will argue 
that economic and scientific progress needs to be at least regulated as advances in 
technology are often accompanied by new risks to the health and integrity of the 
biosphere; risks which opponents of the precautionary principle will argue are 
outweighed by the potential benefits that stem from the exploitation of nature. Not only 
can arguments such as these not be decisively resolved by appeals to public reason, 
there is no obvious reason why interlocutors on either side of the debate should regard 
laws which do not reflect their views as more legitimate simply because they can be 
shown to be the result of processes of political deliberation which are consistent with 
public reason. In this context, Rawls’s conception of public reason will not be any more 
stable than a modus vivendi as those who are not in the majority may still feel that their 
views are a better reflection of what public reason commands in any one instance.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to show that it is a serious error to regard Rawls’s political 
liberalism as primarily a hermeneutic project designed to beat communitarians at their 
own game by demonstrating that liberal political ideals are a better representation of the 
shared understandings which constitute modem liberal democracies as some
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contextualists such as Rorty have argued. In particular, such a view represents a serious 
misunderstanding of the meaning which Rawls attaches to stability which is primarily 
theoretical rather than empirical. Rawls’s project remains a justificatory one. The fact 
of reasonable pluralism is not for Rawls a contingent feature of late modem society, but 
rather a reflection of the exercise of human reason which is unlikely to be superseded at 
any point in the future. Rawls’s belief that his political conception of justice needed to 
be revised so that it no longer reflected any particular comprehensive moral doctrine 
was not based on the fact that no comprehensive doctrine could achieve empirical 
stability, but rather that any comprehensive doctrine including a liberal comprehensive 
doctrine was theoretically deficient in that it could not be justified to people who were 
both reasonable and rational. In order for liberalism to be truly liberal, it must not only 
be liberal in its substantive content, but also in the way in which it justifies itself. Any 
political theory including a liberal political theory, which attempted to identify 
philosophical premises from which normative beliefs could be derived, will be ipso 
facto illiberal in that these foundations will not be shared by all reasonable people.
It is striking to note that while the methods by which political liberalism is justified 
have undergone substantial change the normative content of the theory has not. In this 
sense there is a much greater degree of philosophical continuity between A Theory o f 
Justice and Political Liberalism than many critics have imagined. In particular, Rawls 
continues to subordinate diversity to social unity in a way similar to A Theory o f 
Justice. As Kukathas notes, while Rawls’s theory may be distinctive in the way in 
which it presents itself the metaphors which symbolise its substance such as the notion
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of the well-ordered society are symptomatic of traditional political theory in that it 
understands the existence of social life as parasitical on a unified political order which 
regularises human conduct and insists on the importance of congruence between the 
private and public spheres at least when specifying principles of justice. In Kukathas’s 
words;
such a political order ...is a bounded, self-sufficient, self-directing and self­
ordering whole. Like the human body, the body politic is not the site of 
conflict, or of unstable or divergent tendencies. It may contain different 
elements; but all must be standardised or detoxified and incorporated into the 
bodily whole.91
While this may seem a harsh criticism to direct against Rawls it can be argued that it is 
supported by the extent to which he privileges the political over the non-political sphere 
and even argues that classical republicanism can be made consistent with political 
liberalism. His neo-republican conception of political virtue means that the state will be 
required to intrude to a much greater extent into the private sphere in order to ensure 
the requisite socialisation of citizens than one might assume would be the case with a 
political theory that aimed to be inclusive of diversity. A key conceptual problem with 
Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism is that it 
presupposes that all liberal theories must retain at their core a commitment to 
autonomy. Thus, the two examples which Rawls cites as exemplars of comprehensive 
liberalism, Kant’s conception of moral autonomy and Mill’s notion of individuality, are 
contrasted with Rawls’s political liberalism which confines autonomy to political 
contexts. As a consequence, Rawls’s schema fails to take into consideration the 
existence of comprehensive liberal doctrines which are much more sympathetic to
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diversity than Rawls’s theory and which do not accord a privileged place to autonomy 
as a moral ideal in either the political or comprehensive sense.
In his very latest writings Rawls has tried to combat the objection that the emphasis 
which he places on social unity in the public realm stifles diversity. In response to 
critics such as Mouffe and Gray who argue that Rawls’s political liberalism is 
evacuated of all political content, he has responded by trying to carve out a more 
capacious conception of the political sphere. The problem with this argument is that to 
introduce comprehensive doctrines into the public realm risks undermining the 
idealising presuppositions of public reason and thereby render the theory no more 
stable than a modus vivendi understanding of politics. While Rawls does not say so, it 
seems that he has been forced into this concession by an acknowledgement that 
reasonable pluralism can pertain to the political sphere as well as the non-political 
sphere. Initially, Rawls had argued that modem liberal democracies had been 
characterised by an evolutionary progression from a modus vivendi in which liberal 
principles were of only instrumental value to one where they possessed intrinsic worth. 
Therefore, Rawls believed that while it was necessary to jettison the philosophical and 
universalist aims of the Enlightenment project it was still possible to retrieve its 
aspiration to a normative consensus on liberal political ideals by locating them within 
the shared intuitions possessed by reasonable citizens of liberal democracies. However, 
this argument is undermined by the plethora of ideological belief systems which 
comprise modem societies many of which reject Rawls s public/private dichotomy. 
Therefore, Rawls is confronted with a dilemma. Irrespective of whether he formulates
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political liberalism as a justificatory project in which political liberalism is legitimated 
by its sensitivity to the existence of reasonable pluralism or as a motivational project 
designed to appeal to existing comprehensive doctrines his project lacks foundations. 
His theory effectively says that reasonable persons are those who endorse political 
liberalism, with those who reject it being declared unreasonable. However, in order for 
this stance not to be entirely arbitrary he must invoke a philosophical theory in which 
the normative value of reasonable pluralism is given greater epistemic weight. This is 
precisely the argument developed by Habermas whose theory I will explore in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MODERNISING MODERNITY: HABERMAS’S 
DISCOURSE ETHICS
Introduction
One of the most striking features of recent political thought has been the emergence 
of deliberative democracy as an alternative response to the perceived failings of 
both Kantian liberalism and communitarianism/ civic republicanism to adequately 
conceptualise political and moral norms to govern complex modem societies. The 
central charge which has often been levelled against both of these opposing 
traditions is that they lack the resources to respond to the challenges of moral and 
social diversity characteristic of postmodern societies. On the one hand, as was 
shown in the last chapter, Kantian liberals such as Rawls have been justifiably 
accused of formulating substantive principles of justice which relegate difference to 
the private sphere and consequently end up with a public realm which has been 
depoliticised from the outset. On the other hand, communitarian thinking, 
particularly in its civic republican guise, has frequently been faulted for either 
promoting a unitary vision of community which is unrealistic in its inability to take 
seriously the divergent shared understandings which constitute all polities or 
alternatively promoting a ‘thick’ multiculturalism in which communities are 
assumed to be hermetically sealed entities immune from inquiry or critique. As we 
saw in chapter two, Sandel oscillates between both civic republicanism and radical 
multiculturalism. In the eyes of many theorists, the common error of both these 
traditions is their ‘displacement’ of the political by subordinating the political to an 
anti-political concept of virtue whether that be conceived of in terms of substantive 
principles of justice or thickly shared social understandings.
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Both political and comprehensive liberals, such as Macedo and Gutmann aim to 
derive political norms from substantive first principles which transcend our 
particular differences, as was illustrated in chapter four.1 Proponents of deliberative 
democracy, on the other hand, offer as their model a vision of community which is 
defined by engagement between a diversity of situated perspectives, while 
simultaneously retaining a normative view of moral justification.
The most theoretically sophisticated version of deliberative democracy is Jurgen 
Habermas’s discourse theory of legitimacy and it will thus form the main focus of 
discussion during the course of this chapter. The most distinctive virtue of discourse 
theory according to its proponents is its dissolution of normative hierarchies which 
have plagued all metaphysical systems of thought in which politics conceived as a 
participatory activity between citizens is subordinated to substantive principles 
which have been determined a priori, as for example, is the case with traditional 
natural law doctrines in both their religious and secular varieties. Instead, 
deliberative theory, in keeping with its claim to be postmetaphysical, aspires to shift 
the focus of deontology away from the metaphysical and religious justification of 
norms to the processes which communities ought to employ in validating moral 
judgements. Thus, according to Habermasians, it is wrong for political theorists to 
attempt to preempt the results of a free and equal democratic discussion about 
justice. Such a discussion can only be conducted amongst actual citizens. Habermas 
claims that such a postmetaphysical theory is protected from the pitfalls of 
subjectivism and conventionalism due to its adoption of a communicative rationality 
which guarantees the legitimacy of the outcomes generated by inserting procedural
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considerations of fairness into the public debate. Habermas’s insistence that 
democracy should be regarded as an emphatically procedural ideal appears at least 
on the surface to allow for a more capacious view of public reason than that found 
in traditional liberal models and is therefore potentially more accommodative of 
social diversity.
Nonetheless, Habermas’s theory has come under sustained attack from many 
theorists who have argued that his identification of politics with communicative 
rationality means that he cannot succeed in reconciling the claims of moral 
legitimacy with those of diversity. Postmodernists in particular have asserted that 
his equation of the political with the rational leaves him unable to take radical 
diversity seriously and instead represents a flight into a rationalist version of 
utopia.2 On the basis of this argument at least at its most severe, Habermas’s 
discourse theory, despite its insistence on the intersubjective nature of rationality, 
becomes just one more example of a theory which conflates the political with a 
substantive metaphysical worldview that is insensitive to radical difference. More 
precisely, in the case of discourse theory, the validation of differences is dependent 
on their compliance with the norms of communicative rationality. This chapter will 
express some sympathy for this criticism of discourse ethics, at least as it is 
formulated by Habermas. Underpinning the Habermasian worldview is an emphasis 
on evolutionary models of individual and social development which ultimately 
culminate in a celebration of the transcendence of conventional moralities. They are 
replaced by a post-conventional morality in which the normative authority of 
practical reason is no longer predicated on any metaphysical belief system, but 
instead derives its support from the pragmatic presuppositions which are built into
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the very structure of communicative reason.3 It is this attempt by Habermas to 
salvage the legacy of the Enlightenment by arguing that its principal object, the 
grounding of a moral and political umversalism, can be retrieved from 
contemporary skepticism over the possibility of establishing such norms that has led 
to the negative critiques of his theory from postmodernists, communitarians and 
even Marxists. Underpinning their objections is the belief that Habermas’s faith in 
the consensual powers of human reason to supersede conventional moralities as a 
basis for legitimating moral norms in effect does little more than reiterate the prior 
Enlightenment bias for excluding difference and particularity from the public 
sphere. This view is supported by the (typically Kantian) binary oppositions which 
Habermas establishes between morality and ethics and justice and evaluative 
conceptions of the good which he continues to adhere to.
While this chapter will express some sympathy for these critiques, it will be argued 
that it does not justify the conclusions which often emanate from them, such as that 
an attempt to salvage the Enlightenment project by developing a more context- 
sensitive version of impartiality should be discarded. Instead, discourse theory 
should (and has to) be reformulated in a more inclusive fashion which is marked by 
a dialectical interplay between universal principles of right and concrete 
conceptions of the good rather than the superseding of the latter by the former. Such 
a reconceptualisation of discourse ethics would not only represent a more desirable 
normative ideal to the common construal of communicative ethics as a secular 
metanarrative. It would also blunt criticisms that as an empirical thesis it is 
hamstrung by its individualist foundations which occlude the communal nature of
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personal identity and in particular, the importance of religion as a cultural variable 
in determining people’s normative commitments.
Discourse theory shares with substantive liberal justice certain normative principles 
such as a commitment to universal moral respect and individual autonomy, which 
will place it in contention with some conceptions of the good which regard such 
norms as a threat to their identity. Thus, it is impossible for it to be ethically neutral 
as Habermas has at least in the past seemed to wish. It is impossible to preserve the 
purity of discourse ethics from contamination by any substantive-ethical 
presuppositions. More positively, however, it will be argued that many of 
Habermas’s postmodernist critics have seriously underestimated the capacity of his 
theory to engage divergent conceptions of the good, particularly those of a religious 
nature in dialogue over substantive political issues without forfeiting an appeal to 
impartiality. It will be argued with reference to Benhabib’s refined version of 
communicative ethics that, while it cannot possibly satisfy the demands of 
postmodernists, discourse theory represents a coherent and plausible attempt to craft 
an interactive universalism in which universalistic moral norms are constructed out 
of the diversity of situated communities which comprise the modem polity. 
Furthermore, discourse theory by perceiving pluralism as a dynamic rather than 
static phenomenon posits a more accurate articulation of the complex 
interrelationship between the public and private spheres than either political 
liberalism (Rawls) or sectarian communitanamsm (Sandel) which presuppose in 
their different ways a strict quarantining of the political sphere from the particular 
contexts in which individuals obtain their identity.
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Reasoning in a Posttraditional Age
Of the many normative models of deliberative democracy which have been 
proposed in recent years as a means of bridging the gap between liberal and 
communitarian approaches to justice, none have been more influential than Jurgen 
Habermas’s discourse theory of legitimacy. The fundamental objective of this 
theory is to try and salvage a public basis for morality in a modem society 
characterised by a plurality of competing worldviews. In response to postmodernist 
scepticism over the possibility of recovering a rational basis for moral and legal 
norms, Habermas remains rooted in the Enlightenment tradition of thought by 
arguing that normative questions can be supplied with a cognitive content. At the 
same time, his theory involves a sharp break with traditional Enlightenment thought 
in his refusal to appeal to prepolitical conceptions of human nature. This refusal is 
motivated by the belief that we now live in a ‘postmetaphysical’ age in which 
religious and metaphysical worldviews can no longer serve as the public basis for 
morality. While, in contrast to radical antifoundationalists, Habermas argues that 
philosophy should continue to invoke universal standards of rationality, these 
standards can no longer be supplied with metaphysical foundations.
The normative foundations of the political must instead be derived from a purely 
proceduralist rendering of justice rather than located within any transcendent notion 
of reason. As noted by Thomas McCarthy, Habermas directs practical reasoning 
away from a transcendent realm and relocates it within modes of communication 
which gain legitimacy under certain ideal conditions. In this sense, Habermas s 
discourse ethics can be understood as a procedural reformulation of Kant s 
categorical imperative. Thus, Habermas attempts to redefine philosophy away from
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a paradigm of consciousness and replace it with a paradigm of intersubjective 
understanding. As Shane O’Neill notes:
the philosophy of consciousness sought to secure its foundations in the lone, 
isolated, autonomous subject...independent of all social and historical 
contingency. Even though these foundations would seem to have crumbled 
under our feet, we need not be paralysed philosophically by accepting the 
contingency of our situatedness in real historical and cultural contexts. We 
can be rescued from the fate of such a paralysis by refusing to see reason as 
disembodied, but...as historically situated in the communicative practice o f  
everyday life. 6
For this to be possible, an impartial assessement of normative claims can only 
proceed through actual dialogues in concrete historical contexts, rather than 
monologically, as Habermas claims occurs in Rawls’s original position in which the 
content of principles of justice are determined in philosophical isolation. It is 
Habermas' concern with rational deliberation in which the entire citizenry 
paticipates that explains the guiding conception of radical democracy which informs 
his most recent political writings, in particular Between Facts And Norms? In these 
writings, Habermas elucidates his procedural understanding of democracy in 
contradistinction to both the liberal and civic republican traditions which he 
believes are informed by untenable metaphysical presuppositions. At the same time, 
he attempts to weave together elements from both traditions into his discourse 
theory. It is this bold attempt to forge a republican-liberal hybrid which I now turn 
to below.
The Internal Relationship between the Rule of Law and Popular Sovereignty
Discourse theory departs significantly from both the liberal and republican 
paradigms in its understanding of the relationship between the rule of law and 
popular sovereignty. Ever since the Enlightenment theorist Benjamin Constant
200
posited his famous distinction between the liberties of the modems and the liberties 
of the ancients, political philosophers have disputed which one should be accorded 
primacy. Liberal philosophers have argued on the one hand that individual rights 
should be construed as external constraints on the exercise of democratic self-rule. 
On this account, the legitimacy of a polity is determined by its success in applying 
abstract principles of justice which are already known in advance. It is therefore a 
question of determining the substance of laws not who wrote them. The purpose of 
the state is to arrogate to individuals negative rights which insulate them from 
external compulsion. Habermas believes that this liberal vision of the state is 
flawed in that it subordinates political association to independently derived moral 
norms. In the context of a posttraditional society in which metaphysical and 
religious worldviews have been rendered obsolete, individuals can only be 
subjected to political principles if they are simultaneously able to recognise 
themselves as the authors of those principles:
Without religious or metaphysical support, the coercive law designed for legal 
behaviour can preserve its socially integrative function only insofar as the 
addressees of legal norms may at the same time understand themselves in 
their collectivity as the rational authors of those norms
In order to develop a truly autonomous conception of democracy, it is necessary to 
reject the classical or premodem ideal of a normative hierarchy whose pinnacle is 
characterised by independent moral principles such as the abstract right models 
which have informed liberal thought. In order to be truly modem, we must 
understand political principles as being embodied in the autonomous will of citizens 
who have full sovereignty over the laws which constitute them. At first sight, this 
characterisation of democracy appears to equate Habermas s discourse theory with
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the republican vision in the importance which it attributes to positive political rights 
of participation and his adaptation of the Rousseauean view that to be truly free 
individuals should only be bound by laws which they have collectively willed.
However, Habermas’s theory differs in important respects from the republican 
vision at least when it is given a communitarian reading. The problem with 
republican thought is that it breaks with the key modem insight that the state should 
be neutral between ethical conceptions of the good. Instead, the republican model 
articulates a substantive vision of the ethical life of the community. Thus, the 
republican tradition “overburdens” democracy by assimilating “politics to a 
hermeneutical process of self-explication of a shared form of life or collective 
identity”.10 Whereas the liberal model goes wrong in detaching normative validity 
claims from the process of political will formation, the republican model eschews 
the impartialist project altogether by subordinating individual rights to the collective 
self-understandings of a particular community. In contrast to both these positions, 
Habermas attempts to transcend this dichotomy by asserting the equiprimordiality 
of private and civic autonomy. The rule of law and popular sovereignty presuppose 
one another. “The private autonomy of citizens must neither be set above, nor made 
subordinate to their political autonomy”.11 In line with republicanism, discourse 
ethics emphasises the importance of political opinion and will-formation. However, 
the individual rights guaranteed by the constitution are not to be considered 
secondary. Instead, they are embodied within the rules of practical discourse 
themselves. Habermas insists that a procedural mode of argumentation is sufficient 
to ground impartial judgements and ensure the protection of private rights as well as 
public rights of participation. In this respect, Habermas departs from both Kant and
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Rousseau in his refusal to derive rights from prior prepolitical worldviews such as 
the metaphysics of natural law theory or conceptual devices such as the original 
position. On his view, rights are political from the outset, in the sense that they are 
derived from the intersubjective relations of citizens in actual debates.
The crux of Habermas’s philosophical argument, namely that a proceduralist 
conception of deliberative politics should replace both the republican conception of 
the state as the embodiment of a collective will and the liberal conception of the 
state as the protector of individuals' negative rights leads to a reconceptualization of 
the relationship between state and society. For all their differences, both the liberal 
and republican models “presuppose a view of society as centered in the state - be it 
as guardian of a market society or the state as the self-conscious institutionalisation 
of an ethical community”.12 In contrast, the discourse theory of democracy assumes 
the image of a decentered society in which independent public bodies distinct from 
both the market and state administration form the basis of popular sovereignty.
Discourse theory shares with republicanism a principal emphasis on political 
opinion and will-formation. It wishes to retain the key republican insight that civic 
self-determination is not parasitic on the strategic action which envelops market 
processes, but is instead rooted in a public communication oriented towards mutual 
understanding. The fundamental problem with the republican view is its reduction 
of society to political society and its assignment of the praxis of civic self 
determination to an all-encompassing macrosubject which embodies the will of a 
collectively acting citizenry. This makes the mistake of limiting politics to questions 
of ethical self-understanding in which it is assumed that practical reason cannot or
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should not be detached from its anchor in a specific historical or cultural
framework. The pluralistic character of modernity renders suspect the advocacy of
any one historical tradition or social convention as a source of moral legitimacy.13
The concept of deliberative politics, on the other hand, acknowledges the plethora
of forms of communication in the production of a common will. Consequently,
Habermas proposes a two-track theory of democracy based on the simultaneous
existence of formal and informal democratic-discursive arenas. Representative
institutions such as parliamentary bodies and constitutional courts (which constitute
the formal arenas) are forced to interact with a vibrant civil society which
encompasses voluntary associations, social movements and other networks of
communication. In this context:
discourse theory works... with the higher-level inter subjectivity of
communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and 
the informal networks of the public sphere. Within and outside the 
parliamentary complex, these subjectless forms of communication constitute 
arenas in which a more or less rational opinion and will-formation can take 
place.14
The open and fluid structures of civil society thus constitute locales of democratic 
discourse which, while unable to enact positive laws, serve as streams of public 
opinion which exert a key influence on the formal arenas which make positive law. 
As Jurgen Habermas notes, this has the effect of designating civil society as a proto­
legislative constitutional organ:
The power available to the administration emerges from a public use of 
reason... Public opinion worked up via democratic procedures cannot itself 
‘rule’ but it can point the use of administrative power in specific directions.
The multiple arenas for deliberating over society s problems thus serves as the basis 
for democratic self-government and political autonomy. The image of a decentered 
society constitutes an alternative to the republican view which monopolises power
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in a sovereign citizenry. Instead, democratic-discursive validation is dependent not 
on a “collectively acting citizenry”, but rather on an interplay between legally 
institutionalised will-formation and culturally mobilised publics.
Habermas’s relocation of the ideal of popular sovereignty in the institutions of civil 
society rather than in a unitary assembly is not simply an empirico/sociological 
response to the functional differentiation which characterises complex modem 
societies in which communicative action has to compete with the logic behind 
money and administrative power as means of integrating and regulating modem 
societies. Nor is it solely an acknowledgement of the exhaustion of the republican 
project and all other metaphysical worldviews in conditions marked by irreducible 
cultural heterogeneity. It is also a reflection of the importance which Habermas 
attaches to the lifeworld as both the locus of the individual’s psychological identity 
and as the linguistic context in which communicative action transpires. The 
lifeworld constitutes the matrix of cultural and social practices in which an 
individual’s conception of the good is fulfilled. Habermas regards the concepts of 
communicative action and the lifeworld as complementary. As Habermas states, 
“the network of communicative actions is nourished by resources of the lifeworld 
and is at the same time the medium by which concrete forms of life are 
reproduced”. 16
The importance which Habermas attaches to the concept of the ‘lifeworld’ 
illustrates the way in which he cannot be understood simply as an abstract idealist 
who conjures up a social world founded on a metaphysic or cosmology plucked out 
of the ether. The lifeworld forms the ‘context-forming horizon’ of social action and
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consciousness. Understood in phenomenological terms, the lifeworld is the 
substratum of all our conscious worldviews (Weltanschuugen). The way in which 
Habermas envisages the interrelationship between worldviews and the lifeworld is 
similar to the way in which the conscious is related to the unconscious for Freud. As 
Michael Pusey notes, “Just as Freud saw the conscious life of the ego as a 
fragmentary and partial expression of a great storehouse of forgotten but ever-active 
experience in the Unconscious, so also Habermas, in a similar way, argues that the 
lifeworld ‘stands behind the back of each participant in communication’”.17 
Phenomenologically, the lifeworld comprises the background consensus of 
everyday life, ‘the storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens’ which shapes the 
experience of our everyday interactions. It is Habermas states, ‘so unproblematic 
that we are simply incapable of making ourselves unconscious of this or that part of
• • 151it at will’. There is no vantage point of observation detached from the lifeworld. 
We cannot step out of the lifeworld into an unconditioned realm where we can 
function as noumenal agents.
It is important to note that Habermas’s use of the concept of the lifeworld does not 
only distance him from overly individualistic conceptions of practical reason which 
do not pay sufficient heed to the particular contexts in which individuals are formed. 
Through employment of the concept of the lifeworld, Habermas also repudiates 
functionalist notions of socialization in which individuals sense of identity and 
meaning are shaped by their conceptualisation of the world in terms of rigid social 
roles from which rewards and sanctions are distributed. Instead, the very idea of 
socialisation is reworked so that it is understood as a process of mutual learning, 
which develops incrementally within the expanding horizons of the lifeworld. The
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most important example of this is the importance which Habermas attaches to 
Laurence Kohlberg s theory of moral development as providing an essential 
empirical corroboration of his non-empirical theory of communicative action19. The 
essential insight which Habermas gleans from Kohlberg is that individuals develop 
morally in six stages. An individual’s maturity grows as he progresses through the 
six stages discarding the failed cognitive structures of the previous stage until 
ultimately by the time he reaches stage six he is able to adopt a fully reflexive 
attitude towards the socially current norms and expectations which he had 
previously taken for granted. This is the postconventional stage in which individuals 
are expected to adopt a hypothethical stance towards their own traditions. At this 
level concrete norms are subordinated to universal ethical principles.20 The research 
of psychologists such as Kohlberg reassures Habermas that humans develop into 
participants in argumentation. This is essential for Habermas as unlike other neo- 
Kantians he posits argumentation over abstract principles as the central component 
of communicative action. The problem as we shall see later is that this emphasis on 
postconventional reasoning in which a strict reification is drawn between the 
lifeworld and the discursive sphere where all social norms can be problematised 
seems to reinvite the charge of abstractionism which cannot simply be allayed by 
shifting from monological to dialogic modes of argumentation.
The dialectical interrelationship between the lifeworld and communicative action 
illustrates the importance in Habermas's view of moving from a philosophy of 
consciousness to a philosophy of intersubjective understanding. In response to 
objections that recognition can be achieved through solitary reflection, Habermas 
argues that the formation of an individual’s personal identity can only be achieved
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in the context of mutual recognition and intersubjective agreement which undergirds 
the lifeworld. Thus, communicative action is given precedence over strategic action, 
for the very existence of strategic action presupposes the maintenance and renewal 
of the lifeworld through which the socialisation of individuals occurs.21 The 
symbiotic relationship between the lifeworld and communicative action which 
informs Habermas’s discourse ethics has led proponents of his model to argue that it 
offers significant advantages over other versions of deontological ethics in that the 
conception of impartiality which it provides is grounded in the particular life 
contexts which shape individuals conceptions of the good. It is therefore, so the 
argument goes, much more sensitive to social and cultural diversity than other 
conceptions of impartiality which presuppose an unencumbered moral subject. It is 
this bold claim that Habermas has successfully developed a context-based account 
of impartiality that guides the main trajectory of debate surrounding his work.
Critiques of Habermas's Discourse Ethics
There can be no doubt that of the many versions of deliberative democracy the 
Habermasian model is the most theoretically sophisticated. It also appears to offer 
significant advantages over more liberal models of public reason. Its most 
fundamental insight is its shift from a monological to a dialogical mode of 
normative legitimation and its corresponding insistence on the intersubjective nature 
of rationality. This enables it to posit a much more expanded concept of the public 
sphere than that which undergirds political liberalism and hence allows its 
proponents to argue that it is more inclusive of diversity without abandoning the 
view that morality has a cognitive dimension. At first sight, therefore, discourse 
ethics appears to offer the best of both worlds. On the one hand, it continues to
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retain the perspective of universality and impartiality, while on the other, it eschews 
the Kantian subject by rooting communicative rationality in the particular life 
contexts which inform the individual’s identity.
Nonetheless, both the coherence and the desirability of the discourse-theoretic 
project have been subjected to sustained attack from many divergent theoretical 
positions ranging from postmodernists on the left to neoconservatives on the right. 
In spite of their ideological differences, their critiques tend to converge on one 
common theme. Namely, that despite insisting on the postmetaphysical nature of his 
theory, Habermas cannot steer a middle path between transcendentalism and 
contextualism. Instead theorists as diverse as Charles Larmore and Stanley Fish 
have argued that discourse ethics is bolstered by a set of substantive metaphysical 
assumptions which undermine Habermas’s claim to have formulated a universalist 
moral theory which is more sensitive to the reality of moral pluralism in a 
posttraditionalist world.22 While Habermas has attempted to avoid the rigid 
formalism which has hamstrung traditional versions of the Kantian project by 
providing an intersubjective basis for practical rationality, critics have argued that 
the reconstruction of reason in communicative terms does not insulate him from the 
charge that he fails to sufficiently incorporate contextualist insights within his 
impartialist project. This criticism is motivated by the binary oppositions between 
justice and the good life, morality and ethics, procedure and substance, and the 
generalized and the concrete other which inspire Habermas s deontological 
approach.
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Benhabib has argued that universalistic moral theories since Kant have suffered 
from a conflation between ethical cognitivism and ethical rationalism with the 
consequent occlusion of the affective and emotive bases of ethics.2^  The rationalist 
underpinnings of Kantian theories has led to an abstraction from difference and 
particularity and an exclusive focus on the standpoint of the generalised other in 
which individual identity is defined solely by an agent’s capacity for choice. 
However, as we saw in chapter three when we explored her critique of Rawls, 
Benhabib argues that the notion of a self prior to its concretisation is incoherent. 
The problem with Rawlsian constructs such as the original position and the veil of 
ignorance is that the equivalence of all selves qua rational agents which underpin 
such conceptual models means that individuals have only definitional identity. This 
invites the charge of epistemic incoherence which has been placed against 
universalistic moral theories, for in a situation where there is no criteria for 
individuating among selves, there can be no genuine reversibility of perspectives in 
which the agent is forced to take the standpoint of the other.24
At first sight Habermas seems well placed to escape Benhabib’s critique of Rawls. 
Rather than attempting to eradicate pluralism as arguably occurs behind the veil of 
ignorance, discourse ethics contains as its prerequisite real life moral argumentation 
between a plurality of participants. In Habermas s theory, differences between 
individuals are not effaced but rather are to be given full play in discourse . 
Dialogic impartiality requires an articulation of rather than an abstraction from 
difference. Concomitantly, communicative action is conceived as a historically 
situated activity in which all normative validity claims arise within a particular 
context. Rational discourses exist like “islands in the sea of everyday practice
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The revocation of epistemic restrictions on moral reasoning enables “complete 
reversibility to take place which can account for the concrete differences amongst 
actual moral discussants.
There is however, a serious ambiguity at the heart of Habermas’s theory of moral 
justification which leaves him vulnerable to the same charge of epistemic 
incoherence which has been placed against Rawlsian liberalism. The driving 
motivation of the discourse-theoretic project is after all to establish an impartial 
basis for critiquing existing social norms. The validity of a norm does not depend on 
the degree of its cultural embeddedness, but rather on the fact that it can be 
rationally justified in a practical discourse. It is in order to gain critical leverage on 
existing social practices which may be oppressive or exploitative that Habermas has 
posited throughout his work a sharp distinction between moral and ethical 
discourses. Whereas moral discourses aim to establish norms which can be justified 
universally, ethical discourses are rooted in particular conceptions of the good life 
and are thus not susceptible to universal agreement. Thus, as it is only by virtue of 
“the moral point of view” that one can forge agreements which are universal, what 
Habermas terms moral practical discourses “require a break with all of the 
unquestioned truths of an established, concrete ethical life , the distancing of 
oneself from the contexts of life with which one’s identity is inextricably woven .
At this point, communicative ethics appears to founder on a paradox which 
undermines the claim by its proponents that it more successfully incorporates 
contextualist insights into impartialist moral theory than Rawls does. On the one 
hand, the actors share as a background a lifeworld that forms the context for
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communication. However, these same actors are required by discourse ethics to 
detach themselves from that very background in order to problematize the 
commitments and convictions they have acquired as participants in the lifeworld. 
Moral discourse which determines substantive principles of justice must adhere to 
“communicative presuppositions that require a break with the certainties of the 
lifeworld and ...a hypothetical attitude towards the norms of action and claims of 
validity that have been made the object of attention”.27 As Shane O’ Neill notes, 
discourse ethics draws a sharp dichotomy between the unquestioned 
intersubjectively shared certitudes of the lifeworld and the content on which 
participants in communicative action reach agreement.28 This content has become 
detached from the diverse background culture of the lifeworld and taken on “the 
character of knowledge linked with a potential for reasoning, knowledge that claims 
validity and can be criticised, that is, knowledge that can be argued about on the 
basis of reasons”.29 This differentiation is what Habermas calls a decentered 
understanding of the world.
With this decentered understanding of the world, the lifeworld is distanced from the 
objective and social worlds in order that they can be problematized. In the context 
of the objective world, assertions which had been unquestioned may now be 
deemed true or false. In the case of the social world, the normativity of existing 
institutions is brought into sharp focus. The problem here as contextualist critics of 
Habermas have argued is that the requirement of communicative ethics that the 
conduct of moral discourses necessitates individuals to detach themselves from their 
favourite projects as a means of “relativising one’s own form of existence to the 
legitimate claims of other forms of life” seems to lead to the very abstraction from
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difference which prioritises the generalised over the concrete other.30 Consequently, 
this reintroduces the problem of epistemic incoherence which Benhabib argues has 
haunted the vast majority of Kantian theories.31 The suspicion that Habermas’s 
version of discourse ethics rests on a reification between the general and concrete 
other is further heightened by the fact that he asserts that the need to establish 
impartial moral norms to govern a social world constituted by an ever greater 
multiplicity of lifestyles “must be satisfied at higher and higher levels of 
abstraction. For this reason the consensual norms and principles become ever more 
general”.32
In response to assertions such as these, the postmodern literary theorist and one of 
Habermas’s strongest critics, Stanley Fish has argued in a fascinating exchange with 
Shane O’Neill, that contrary to the views of the latter, Habermas, “by demanding 
that you inhabit no particular point of view and especially not the points of view to 
which you have become attached,... asks of you exactly what the original position 
asks of you - to assume nothing and be nowhere,” with the only difference being 
that “you are to do it not in ignorance of everything you might become and desire,
• 33but in a wilful disregard of everything you have become and already desire . In 
order to combat this charge it is necessary for communicative ethicists to show how 
ethical goods can be successfully implicated in justificatory processes of moral 
legitimation without at the same time abandoning the strict criterion of impartiality 
on which discourse ethics ultimately rests. Such an attempt has been made by 
Benhabib, who through a dialectical engagement with the work of communitarians, 
postmodernists and feminists has tried to reformulate communicative ethics so that 
it is more sensitive to contextualist insights. In particular, she has criticised
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Habermas for attempting to restrict the domain of modem moral theory to matters 
of justice and argues instead for the inclusion of ethical goods in the subject matter 
of practical discourse as a means of correcting the one-sided formalism of most 
Kantian theories. The virtue of Benhabib’s attempt to expand moral theory so as to 
incorporate ethical discourses is that it enables her to emphasise the emotive and 
affective bases of ethics. She is thus responsive to the concerns of feminist theorists 
such as Carol Gilligan who criticize the narrow rationalism, the “epistemological 
blindness” of most universalist theories.34
Benhabib thus argues for the abandonment of Habermas’s distinction between a 
moral and ethical use of practical reason and the extension of the moral domain to 
encompass practical reasoning concerning particular conceptions of the good. She 
states in contrast to what she regards as the Habermasian model that 
“communicative ethics need not restrict itself to the priority of justice. I see no 
reason as to why questions of the good life as well cannot become subject matters of 
practical discourses”.35 Benhabib thus aims to respond to contextualist critics of 
communicative ethics who argue that its strong deontological assumptions which 
privilege notions of justice leave it with the same impoverished conception of our 
moral experiences as that of other Kantian theories by shifting to a ‘weak’ 
deontology which facilitates moral debate over our conceptions of the good.
In many respects, this reformulation of communicative ethics which discards 
Habermas’s distinction between morality and ethics and allows for intersubjective 
moral debate on evaluative questions renders the theory much more faithful to the 
dialogical assumptions underpinning discourse ethics as it does not arbitrarily
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restrict the moral domain to questions of justice. As Benhabib notes, since practical 
discourses do not theoretically predefine the domain of moral debate and since 
individuals do not have to abstract from their everyday attachments and beliefs 
when they begin argumentation {in contrast to Rawlsian liberalism}, “we cannot 
preclude that it will not be only matters of justice, but those of the good life as well 
that will be thematised in practical discourses... the line between matters of justice 
and those of the good life is not given by some moral dictionary, but evolves as the 
result of historical and cultural struggles”.36 Thus, Benhabib crafts a compelling 
vision of what she calls a postconventional sittlichkeit which more adequately 
situates a universalistic moral point of view within an ethical community than that 
achieved by other Kantian ethical theories, including Habermas’s. She locates her 
vision of an interactive universalism on a continuum between strong teleology and 
strong deontology. She argues that whereas the former position, most often 
espoused in the modem era by communitarians is unrealistic in its failure to 
appreciate the impossibility of asserting a univocal conception of the good in 
conditions of modernity, the latter remains wedded to the discredited metaphysical 
assumptions of Enlightenment universalism in which the moral point of view is 
perceived as an archimedean centre from which substantive principles of justice can 
be developed in isolation from particular historical and cultural contexts. By 
locating communicative ethics on a continuum between these two conceptual poles, 
she is able to enlarge the moral sphere to encompass both the generalised and the 
concrete other.
Before critically assesssing in more detail whether such a postmetaphysical 
interactive universalism can be sustained in the face of objections from
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postmodernists on the one side and Kantian liberals on the other, it is worth noting 
that her version of discourse theory is in fact much closer to Habermas’s own 
position than she realises. In particular, as we saw above, (and before the 
publication of Situating The Self), Habermas had clearly stated that respect for the 
dignity of the individual requires the protection of the intersubjectively shared 
bonds on which the individual’s identity is dependent.37 Thus, by starting from the 
perspective of a particular lifeworld rather than than that of an isolated agent, 
Habermas has already reconceptualised the moral self in such a way that moves him 
beyond the strict formalism of Kant. Furthermore, as Maeve Cook points out, while 
in the original version of discourse ethics, ethical issues are removed from 
deliberations on justice, Habermas has gradually relaxed his distinction between 
morality and ethics in ways which also distance him from the strong deontological 
position which prioritises state neutrality with respect to substantive conceptions of 
the good life and recognises the autonomy of individuals irrespective of their ethical
38convictions.
The three most significant developments in this regard are the inclusion of a 
category of ethical discourses, the insertion of such discourses into political debate, 
and the ethical patterning of the constitutional state. Whereas in The Theory o f  
Communicative Action, Habermas had restricted discourse solely to modes of moral 
argumentation which could lead to the development of universal validity claims, by 
the end of the 1980s, Habermas had enlarged the category of discourse so that it 
embodied dialogue concerning ethical questions.39 Then, in Between Facts and 
Norms, where Habermas developed his theory of deliberative democracy, he argued 
for the importance of discussion relating to ethical issues both in the formal
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institutions which characterise modem democracies and in the informal processes of 
will-formation in the sphere of civil society.40 Finally, in response to communitarian 
theorists, most notably Charles Taylor, who argued that deontological liberalism 
failed to sufficiently incorporate collective goals, Habermas now stresses ‘the 
unavoidable fact’ that every political community is ethically patterned41 The 
persons who constitute a given polity interpret normative questions in the light of 
their shared collective understandings which inform their sense of identity. Thus, 
Habermas now argues that constitutional principles will be interpreted within the 
context of a nation’s particular traditions, therefore the interpretation cannot be 
ethically neutral.42 In many respects, Habermas’s insistence in his revised version of 
discourse ethics that conceptions of the good should not be bracketed from public 
political discussion but rather thematised in public processes of deliberation seems 
to render his theory more consistent with both his holistic ontology concerning the 
intersubjective constitution of moral agents and more generally his emphasis on a 
dialogical conception of impartiality.
The attempts by Benhabib and the later Habermas to dissolve the dichotomies 
which arguably disfigure Kantian theory by developing a more context-sensitive 
version of universalism have been regarded with scepticism by postmodernists who 
argue that any theory which purports to universality and impartiality has by 
definition to be formulated in terms which avoid contamination by ethical goods or 
otherwise it will fail to overcome the charge of cultural contingency. Stella Gaon 
states bluntly the horns of the dilemma on which she believes discourse ethics is 
impaled.43 Habermas has no option but to maintain the rationality of the moral 
sphere against incursions from ethical beliefs for otherwise he cannot justify a
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universalist perspective and will fall prey to the biases of ethnocentricism and 
metaphysics. Thus Gaon argues that if Habermas is to detranscendentalise Kantian 
moral theory without forfeiting the claim to impartiality then he must conceive 
discourse ethics in purely formal procedural terms. Therefore, Gaon asserts against 
Benhabib that the morality-ethics divide is structurally indispensable to the 
coherence of discourse theory. The autonomy of the moral sphere is crucial to the 
establishment of universal validity claims. If this argument were to be sustained it 
would leave Habermas with the rather unwelcome task of defending a theory which 
is both ethically empty and yet normatively full. As Gaon herself notes, this can 
only be achieved by removing the individual subject from the contingencies of 
everyday life, a solution which Habermas as much as Benhabib would find 
unpalatable. Rather than defending such a position which Gaon agrees with 
Benhabib would lead to the epistemic incoherence which she associates with a 
transcendental subject, she states that Habermas has no option but to forego the 
discourse ethical claim to impartiality.
The central purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to defend discourse ethics 
against this postmodernist charge. This can be achieved by illustrating the extent to 
which moral and ethical discourses, particularly religious discourses are interwoven 
in normative disputes both within the particular contexts of political communities 
and across diverging cultural boundaries in such a way that they cannot possibly be 
separated. The consequence of adopting such a position however, is the need to 
develop and spell out more explicitly than Habermas has done the relationship 
between a postconventional morality which enshrines a commitment to substantive 
norms such as critical rationality and universal moral respect and those which
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uphold conventional forms of life which regard such ideals as an illegitimate 
imposition of a comprehensive form of liberalism. For it will be argued that while 
discourse ethics offers an advance on traditional versions of Kantian liberalism by 
refusing to banish ethical norms from public discourse, and therefore offers a much 
more realistic account of the dynamic interplay between conceptions of the good 
and norms of justice than that provided by Rawls’s overlapping consensus, the price 
of this position is the privileging of certain ethical norms over others, namely those 
which can most obviously be framed in terms which render them amenable to 
rational debate.
Discourse Ethics and Religion
In order to assess the claim put forward by proponents of communicative ethics that 
it is able to develop a universalism more sensitive to cultural differences than other 
species of Kantian philosophy, it is necessary to examine the role which Habermas 
accords religious discourses in his philosophy as they can be regarded as 
paradigmatic instances of conventional versions of morality. If Habermas and 
indeed other proponents of communicative ethics are to achieve the delicate task of 
crafting an “historically self-conscious universalism” which can be distinguished 
from Kantian formalism, then they must be able to demonstrate a greater ability to 
incorporate firmly held religious beliefs within public political processes of 
communication, while still retaining the capacity to redeem a umversalist and 
postconventional morality.
At first sight, discourse ethics with its emphasis on a productive interchange 
between competing ethical doctrines seems to offer a more promising basis for
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accommodating religious diversity than traditional models of liberalism. The strict 
reifications which liberalism has traditionally encouraged between public and non­
public and church and state have led to the confinement of religion (and in the case 
of political liberalism, the banishment of all comprehensive doctrines) to the private 
sphere. Nonetheless, the ambivalent and at times downright negative view with 
which Habermas has treated religious conviction intertwined with his powerful 
aversion to fundamentalism threatens to undermine the appeal and indeed relevance 
of discourse ethics in aiding attempts at fostering mutual reconciliation both 
between diverse religious traditions and between these traditions and secular 
humanists.
The central reason why Habermas has such difficulty identifying a place for religion 
within his theory can be attributed to the fact that, as Brian Shaw has shown in 
meticulous detail, he either regards it as a problematic form of ethical discourse or 
worse as a leftover relic from a premodem form of consciousness.44 In effect, he 
continues to adhere to the seemingly discredited secularization thesis in which 
modernity implies the political marginalization of religion. The exclusion of 
religious sentiments from the public sphere is a requisite harbinger for the release of 
citizens from metaphysical prejudice. In a similar manner to other proponents of the 
normative ideal of secularism who argue that the modem world has progressively 
eroded its religious foundation with whatever valuable ethical content it once had 
appropriated into modem modes of thought, Habermas states that religious views 
once stripped of their mythic and metaphysical underpinnings can be subsumed into 
the normative procedures which inform communicative action. While Habermas, in 
contrast to his earlier work no longer asserts the meaninglessness of religious
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speech conceding that postmetaphysical thought may be “able neither to replace nor 
to repress religion as long as religious language is the bearer of a semantic content 
that is inspiring and even indispensable”, the transition to doctrinally pluralist 
societies with the consequent redundancy of all metaphysical worldviews means 
that moral commands can no longer be legitimated with reference to a transcendent 
standpoint. 45
Habermas regards the fundamental aim of postmetaphysical theory as the rational 
reconstruction of the moral and ethical convictions that once animated the world’s 
principal religious traditions. In Habermas's view, this task is the sole preserve of 
moral philosophy. The transition from traditional to posttraditional societies has on 
his account been accompanied by the autonomisation of moral consciousness. 
Citizens by extricating normative validity claims from the natural and sacred 
contexts in which they were formerly embedded come increasingly to rely on 
linguistically achieved communication as the basis on which to make 
universalizable moral claims. He states that “the socially integrative...functions 
that were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action; the 
authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of achieved 
consensus”.46 Underpinning this view is Habermas’s developmental evolutionary 
interpretation of modernity and more specifically, modem rationality. It is 
Habermas’s contention that there is a progressive development from the rational 
structures contained in religious and metaphysical worldviews to the rational 
structures embodied in modernity. Thus, in Habermas s conceptual framework, 
there is an evolution from myth to metaphysics to modem communicative 
rationality.47 Social coordination, which formerly could only be based on a religious
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consensus can now be attributed to a “linguistically established intersubjectivity”.411 
As Stephen Lukes eloquently puts it:
Habermas postulates the possibility of society reaching a stage of transparent 
self - reflection...in the sense that mythological, cosmological, and religious 
modes of thought have been superseded and “rational will-formation can be 
achieved, free of dogmas and “ultimate grounds”, through ideal mutual self- 
understanding.49
As Shaw states, the devaluation of the cognitive and rational status of religious 
modes of consciousness irreducible to linguistic forms of communication will 
appear devastating from the perspective of the devout religious believer.50 He will 
regard the linguistic turn from transcendental subjectivity in order to relocate 
normative validity claims in grammatical structures as a serious impediment to what 
he regards as the non-negotiable truths of his faith and the political implications 
which flow from them. Ann Fortin Melkevuk states that to ground valid knowledge 
in fallible discursive procedures is to decide that “no statement pertaining to the 
individuals inner world could claim certitude” and that this inner world which 
constitutes the very basis of religious experience “must consequently be nothing but 
chaos, arbitrariness or disorder”.51 If this argument can be sustained, it makes little 
difference whether religious modes of thought are regarded as aesthetic-expressive 
discourses as Habermas used to believe or as he has argued more recently, as 
varieties of ethical discourse, for in either case they will be immune to critical 
inquiry. Indeed, their adherents will regard the claim that they should redeem their 
convictions discursively as the imposition of an all - encompassing comprehensive 
belief system. This point is brought home forcefully by Fred Dallmayr who in 
response to Eduardo Mendieta, points out that while it is true to say that Habermas 
is not an “anti- religion philosophe, this misses the point. Rather, the question is, in
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a functionalist...systems theory assigning a place or role to everything under the 
sun, where can there still be room for the “wholly other” and “absolutely 
unrepresentable” invoked by Horkheimer?”52 As stated by Mendieta, Habermas 
repeatedly acknowledges the importance of the Judeo-Christian legacy in paving the 
way for the Enlightenment and modernity. However, as Dallmayr points out, this 
merely serves to focus attention on the way in which Habermas views the 
philosophy of history as a developmental scheme in which religious modes of 
thought have been sublimated into discursive rationality which now represents the 
ultimate telos to which all conventional systems must bend.53 It is unclear in this 
context to what extent religions can retain their distinctiveness. More generally, it 
fails to acknowledge the degree to which religion continues to function as an 
autonomous variable in human affairs in a way which contradicts the Enlightenment 
assumption that with the shift to a post-modern society, the diverse and often 
rivalrous cultural identities manifest throughout human history can be characterized 
as an ephemeral or at least a merely developmental phase in the history of the 
species.
In an ironic twist, political liberals such as Charles Larmore turn the tables on 
communicative ethicists who have been so critical of political liberalism for failing 
to take diversity seriously enough by arguing that communicative ethics is itself 
rooted in a general philosophical vision which would be rejected by many religious 
believers.54 Political liberals have united with value pluralists such as John Gray to 
argue that despite the eschewal by Habermas of Enlightenment metaphysics implicit 
in his rejection of a philosophy of consciousness, he continues to endorse the 
philosophical anthropology of the Enlightenment in which cultural difference is
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viewed as a transitory incident in human affairs.55 In fact, some commentators have 
argued that religious worldviews fare better under political liberalism than in 
discourse theory as Habermas presents it.56 Whereas the former merely privatises 
religious belief while claiming at the same time to respect the invocation of absolute 
truth to which divergent religious doctrines appeal, the latter attempts to dismiss 
their truth claims altogether on the basis that they are a relic of a superseded past. 
Thus citizens who in a politically liberal republic are forced to subordinate their 
religious beliefs to public reason can at least reclaim the cognitive and rational 
content of their beliefs outside the public sphere. They are not saddled with the 
additional burden of having their belief system labelled as anachronistic whose 
valuable contents have already been sublated into more rational forms of public 
discourse. Nonetheless, it would be overhasty to conclude from this examination of 
Habermas's treatment of religion that there is an irreconcilable conflict between 
discourse theory and religious belief. Such a view would ignore the valuable insight 
asserted by many theologians and political theorists and often overlooked by both 
value pluralists and Habermas that the transcendental experience of God is 
intersubjectively mediated rather than purely monological in character. Once shorn 
of its rationalist underpinnings, discourse theory has the ability to welcome religious 
believers into the public sphere without at the same time denying the rational status 
of their convictions. Such a theory would discard a rationalist epistemology and 
develop a philosophy that is more sensitive to religious beliefs that do not conform 
to constraints imposed by reason. This should help to assuage critics who fear that 
Habermas dismisses religious claims too easily by appealing to philosophy s
57authority as “the guardian of rationality”.
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Fortunately, the transformations which Habermas has undertaken in his latest work, 
most notably in Between Facts and Norms where he has weakened the binary 
oppositions which characterised his earlier thought has helped to facilitate a more 
conciliatory approach towards religious perspectives. In particular, his concession 
that the boundaries between moral and ethical discourses may be substantially more 
fluid than he earlier supposed seems to pave the way for the development of a less 
reductive view of religion. After all, as Shaw notes, “once Habermas acknowledges 
the ethical character of religious belief and admits the permeability of discourses 
both within and among the various validity spheres, there remains no good reasons 
presumptively to disqualify citizens religious convictions”.58 It is important to state 
at the outset that the decision to abandon the purity of discourse theory in which it is 
rendered free from contamination by ethical-substantive commitments has a 
paradoxical dual effect. On the one hand, there is little doubt that admitting ethical 
doctrines into public discussion helps to foster a much more pluralistic vision of the 
political sphere. At the same time, however, it also serves to make more explicit the 
substantive presuppositions which inform discourse theory from the outset, in 
particular, a commitment to the ideals of individual autonomy and universal moral 
respect. These substantive commitments set limits to or at the very least 
problematize certain kinds of ethical convictions, namely those, which reject the 
priority of individual autonomy. To put the point another way, a postmetaphysical 
Sittlichkeit which by definition eschews an ethical formalism in favour of an ethical 
cognitivism is still going to be unwelcome to a conventional belief system which is 
constrained by a cognitive barrier beyond which it cannot argue. Communicative 
ethics, no more than political liberalism can extricate itself from this problem. As 
Benhabib, one of the most contextualist proponents of communicative ethics puts it,
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incidentally, in a way strikingly similar to Rawls, “when there is a clash between the 
metanorms of communicative ethics and the specific norms of a moral way of life, 
the latter must be subordinated to the former”.59 A couple of pages earlier she states 
even more bluntly that such belief systems, due to their need to withdraw from the 
process of reflexive justification are flawed in not being comprehensive and 
reflexive enough.60 The upshot of this conclusion is that conventional moralities 
must transform themselves into a postconventional form in order to attain sufficient 
reflexivity which in turn requires arguments which are based on universalisable 
grounds. Evan Chamey concludes that the implications of this are “either the end of 
associations in civil society or their melding into one association a la Rousseau’s 
general assembly”.61
Perhaps more worrying in the present context is the fact that the examples she cites 
of viewpoints which fail due to the inability of their adherents to distance 
themselves from them in order to examine them critically are nearly all religious. 
She cites the difficulty which a Mormon or a Muslim would face in attempting to 
justify to those who do not subscribe to either belief system the legitimacy of 
polygamy or the natural inequality between the sexes through invocation to the 
teachings of Joseph Smith or Mohammed. Her rejection of this way of defending 
one's beliefs as exclusive in dividing the moral conversation into insiders and 
outsiders ( i.e those who accept the literal meaning of the sacred text and those who 
do not) may lead one to suspect that even a revised version of communicative ethics 
will end up embracing an epistemological scepticism which will penalize religious 
discourses due to their unreflexive nature in which case the concession of inviting 
such discourses into dialogue will prove to be of little comfort. There is no desire
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for adherents of such views to participate in a dialogue if they feel the rules of the 
game are biased against them by denying the legitimacy of their mode of 
conversation. In the final part of this chapter, I want to argue briefly that this 
conclusion is not entirely warranted. While I agree with Benhabib and indeed 
Habermas that the attempt to justify one's normative commitments through appeal 
to the infallibility of the one true teaching serves as the ultimate conversation 
stopper and thus excludes certain species of fundamentalism, this mode of 
argumentation is hardly exhaustive of religious discourses in general. It is perfectly 
plausible contrary to the claims of postmodernists such as Stanley Fish and 
communicative ethicists such as Habermas and Benhabib to believe in the absolute 
truth of one's religious convictions and thus reject scepticism at the epistemic level 
while still retaining a commitment to the normative ideals which inform 
communicative ethics. This will be illustrated in the next chapter through an 
exploration of the fundamental tenets animating post -Vatican II Catholicism.
It is essential that discourse theorists address the charge leveled against them by 
their critics that the attempts to transcend Enlightenment metaphysics founders on 
their continuing adherence to an Enlightenment philosophical anthropology. Value 
pluralists such as John Gray have argued strongly that theorists such as Habermas 
who eschew Enlightenment foundations while still subscribing to an Enlightenment 
philosophy of history cannot adequately accommodate radical diversity within their 
conceptual framework.^  Underpinning this criticism is the belief, not only that the 
inability of many political theorists to account for the pervasiveness of cultural 
difference makes Enlightenment thought normatively unappealing, but more 
fundamentally that it renders their thesis empirically absurd. This charge has special
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relevance for discourse theory as the attempt to harmonise the liberties of the 
ancients with the liberties of modems which is the fundamental object of 
Habermas’s political theory, cannot be achieved as long as the political content of 
the conventional moralities which inform individuals normative beliefs are 
neglected or regarded as a transitory phenomenon.
At times Habermas proceeds as if these conventional moralities do not exist or 
alternatively survive as a curious atavism from a previous age or as an unhealthy 
by-product of modernization.63 Either way they play no legitimate role in the 
evolutionary development of the human species. This view fails to take sufficient 
heed of the stubborn persistence of particularistic forms of human identity which 
resist sublation into postconventional forms. As a consequence, the emphasis placed 
by communicative theorists on intersubjective rationality as an alternative to the 
philosophy of subjectivity is not sufficiently aware of the extent to which many 
modes of discourse fail to satisfy the rigorous requirements of communicative 
ethics, not least that they be critically reflexive all the way down. Thus, in the eyes 
of one acerbic critic, Habermas’s philosophy of intersubjectivity operates with a 
monological vigour inspired by a blind faith in the consensual powers of reason.64 
In order to forestall this criticism and rescue communicative ethics from the charge 
that it is just one more parochial instance of a western philosophy that has no 
universal validity, it is necessary to understand the manner in which conventional 
and postconventional moralities are interwoven in the contemporary world in a way 
not adequately thematised by either Habermas or Benhabib.
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Conclusion
As this chapter has shown, Habermas’s notion of “communicative reason” is an 
attempt to respond to the postmodernist critique of the abstract rationalism which 
allegedly animates Enlightenment thought without discarding its key normative 
commitments. The most distinctive contribution of discourse theory is its rejection 
of the “subject-centred” monological view of reason associated with traditional 
forms of liberal individualism and its insistence that reason depends on dialogical 
processes of justification. Habermas believes that his “communicative Kantianism”, 
while continuing to insist on the importance of redeeming moral norms in an 
impartial and universal manner, can avoid the charge of empty formalism, which he 
argues disables Rawls’ version of Kantianism, by emphasising that rationality 
requires a genuine discussion amongst a plurality of participants. This position leads 
him to the view that liberal thinkers go wrong when they hold that the normative 
justification of political associations are determined by moral norms given in 
advance, such as the belief that individual rights set limits to the exercise of 
democratic self-rule. In the conditions of postmodemity, when metaphysical 
worldviews have lost their authority, we can only justifiably submit to political 
principles if we can simultaneously regard ourselves as the authors of those 
principles.
The key problem is whether this turn to intersubjectivism is in itself sufficient to 
guarantee that radical diversity is taken seriously, or even adequately conceptualised 
in the political sphere. The problem stems from the fact that due to his belief that 
metaphysical and religious views no longer have the authority to serve as means of 
social integration, he thinks that it is necessary to insist on the autonomy of the
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political sphere. As critics have pointed out however, the more Habermas stresses 
the purity of his discourse theory, in which it is freed from contamination by 
substantive-ethical commitments, the more formal and empty it risks becoming. The 
equation of the political sphere with communicative rationality in which agreement 
is deemed fully rational only when it is based on the unforced force of the better 
argument can only be achieved according to postmodernist critics such as Gaon by 
presupposing the possibility of a transparent, ahistorical, culturally unencumbered 
rationality.65
This suspicion that Habermas’s thought is still too reliant on the severing of the 
morally right from concrete conceptions of the good is given further credence by the 
binary oppositions which inform Habermas’s thought, most notably his very sharp 
and rigid distinction between morality and ethics. The “violently distortive” way in 
which he portrays “actually existing” ethical traditions on the one hand and moral 
discourses on the other illustrate the arbitrary way in which he employs distinctions 
such as these. As we have seen, he asserts that moral-practical discourses need to be 
untethered from the concrete contexts in which an individual’s identity is formed. 
This view is premised on his narrow view of ethics in which ethical discourses can 
never have a universal scope. This has led postmodernists such as Fish to claim that 
his theory is no less abstract and no more context-sensitive than Rawls s. Indeed, 
Habermas and his postmodernist critics appear to adhere to the same dichotomy. 
Both seem to believe that the available options are exhausted by either stressing the 
autonomy of the moral sphere vis-a-vis conditional, evaluative questions of the 
good, or by discarding the strict criterion of impartiality and accepting the reality of
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concrete discussants who are not impartial, transcendental subjects but rather are 
partial, situated individuals.
The reason why Habermas’s version of communicative ethics continues to attract 
doubts concerning its responsiveness to the demands of ethical diversity can be 
attributed to his denial of the possibility of metaphysics in the conditions of late 
modernity. All evaluations of totality are culturally specific rather than universally 
valid. Consequently, with the demise of metaphysics it is impossible to redeem the 
public and cognitive claims of religion. The procedures by which religious claims 
find redemption lack the discursive and argumentative character that would enable 
them to survive the shift from traditional “subject-centred” to dialogic modes of 
consciousness.
There are a number of problems with this construal of religious claims. In 
particular, by placing so much stress on the irrelevance of metaphysical worldviews 
in conditions of late modernity, Habermas seems wedded to a secularisation theory 
that assimilates ethical cognitivism with ethical rationalism. This has the result of 
delegitimising or at least consigning to the aesthetic-expressive sphere religious 
claims which cannot be recast in postmetaphysical terms. The problem with 
interpreting discourse ethics in this manner is that it fosters an epistemological 
scepticism or “methodical atheism” which compromises Habermas s own desire to 
render discourse theory more ethically sensitive. The recent moves that Habermas 
has made to enhance the role of ethical discourses in the public sphere are 
undermined by his continuing denial of the cognitive validity of ethical discourses 
that are underpinned by background convictions which are considered infallible and
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thus resist value reflexivity and differentiation. Severing moral universalism from 
the excesses of Enlightenment rationalism as Benhabib attempts to do will not by 
itself solve this problem. Even a “weak” deontology in which justice is no longer 
placed at the centre of morality and which facilitates instead intersubjective debate 
over conceptions of the good will still seem to place religious worldviews at a 
disadvantage. After all, it could be argued that their very existence is dependent on 
not being subject to moral reflection and moral transformation along the lines that 
Benhabib envisages. The dilemma can be stated as follows. The principles of 
discourse ethics are principles of universalisation. The problem with those who 
adhere to conventional moralities is that their perspectives are not sufficiently 
universalisable from the standpoint of all involved. In order to attain sufficient 
reflexivity, these doctrines, of which the paradigmatic examples are religious 
doctrines, must transform themselves from conventional to postconventional 
moralities. In the process of doing so however, they in effect commit suicide. After 
all, their very identity is dependent on emphasising their distinctiveness, i.e. the 
non-universalisability at an epistemological, normative and institutional level from 
the wider political culture in which all normative claims to be accorded legitimacy 
have to be universalisable in principle. If this argument were to be accepted, 
Benhabib can no more respond to the concerns animating the proponents of the 
politics of difference than can Habermas, for the problem in discourse ethics is not 
primarily its rationalist epistemology. It is rather its privileging of a secular, 
universalist and reflexive culture which permeates all aspects of civil society and 
thereby suffocates difference whose distinctiveness is dependent on adherence to 
traditionalist values which are irreducible to the intersubjective nature of rationality.
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The belief that religious worldviews are particularly ill-suited to survive the 
conversion from monological to dialogic modes of consciousness is a view which 
seems to be shared by a diverse array of thinkers. It encompasses political liberals 
such as Rawls and Chamey, postmodernists such as Fish through to communicative 
ethicists such as Habermas and Benhabib.67 All three schools of thought respond to 
this fact in very different ways. Political liberals argue that the problem is not with 
the principle of universalisation but rather with how discourse theorists administer 
it. They argue for a more limited conception of the public domain that insulates 
public reason from the diverse associations that comprise civil society. The 
problems concerning this approach of insulating the public sphere from 
comprehensive conceptions of the good have already been explored in an earlier 
chapter. The second more radical solution proposed by postmodernists is simply to 
abandon abstract ideals such as universality and impartiality altogether as 
Enlightenment conceits. Finally we can like Habermas welcome or at least not 
regret the demise of conventional moralities that belong to a pre-modem age and 
accept it as an inevitable consequence of the transition to exclusively secular 
procedures of discursive reason.
In the next chapter I want to suggest that in contrast to all of these approaches the 
real challenge is to enlarge the moral sphere in such a way that it can encompass the 
complex interweaving of conventional and post-conventional moralities. The key 
insight neglected by political liberals, postmodernists and communicative ethicists 
in the forni outlined by Habermas and Benhabib is the extent to which conventional 
and post-conventional moralities interact with each other in the public sphere. This 
is particularly true of monotheistic religions such as Roman Catholicism that is
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often cited as an example of a belief-system whose beliefs are in conflict with the 
normative claims of discourse ethics. Such a position however involves two 
erroneous assumptions. Firstly, that epistemological scepticism is an essential 
feature of discourse ethics. It is not. Secondly, and often presented as a corollary of 
the first assumption, that the background certainties which animate a belief system 
such as Catholicism preclude dialogue with discussants that are committed to 
conflicting belief systems. I will attempt to show in the next chapter through using 
Catholicism as a case study that the fact that individuals start from different 
epistemic starting points in no way predetermines the normative beliefs which they 
hold as a result on issues such as religious freedom and the justification and 
application of just war theory.
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objectives by internal means by specifying in advance the preconditions on which an agreement will 
be reached. In the case of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, this will involve a 
commitment on behalf of all discussants to refrain from using deception when advancing arguments.
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CHAPTER SIX: SITUATING CATHOLICISM IN THE MODERN WORLD 
Introduction
The last chapter illustrated how Habermas’s belief in the importance of critical 
rationality as the basis for normative validity claims rather than cultural tradition or 
sentiment resulted in him viewing with scepticism religious belief systems which from 
his perspective are anathema to reasoned discourse due to their intrinsic inability to 
engage in critically reflexive reasoning in regard to the key tenets of their faith. As a 
consequence, Habermas treated religion as a monological and subjective form of 
consciousness which, in an ironic echo of the position of Habermas’s bete noire Stanley 
Fish, could only be sublimated into discourse ethics by shedding its religious 
component.1 Thus, Habermas seems to agree with Fish that the conflicting 
epistemological premises which underpin discourse ethics and religious belief systems 
with proponents of the latter resisting the redemptive force of discourse as inimical to 
their absolutist convictions, renders impossible any reconciliation between the two 
systems of thought.2 If this argument were to be accepted then it would have serious 
implications not only for the ability of discourse ethics to fulfil its claim of being 
inclusive of ideological diversity but more generally would seem to presuppose the 
inevitability of intractable conflict between the liberal tradition as a whole and 
comprehensive religions who place no value on the key liberal tenets of tolerance and 
reciprocity in their desire to colonise the public sphere.
This conclusion would be particularly problematic for as Roxanne Euben has 
perceptively noted, while liberal theorists such as Rawls and Habermas have embraced
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the anti-foundationalist turn in political theory and presented their theories as justifiable 
without recourse to metaphysical truths, political practice is being increasingly 
influenced by those who take such truths as given.3 As has been argued in this thesis, 
the divide between political theory and political practice has not been sufficiently 
grasped by either Rawls or Habermas who have mistakenly assumed that a social 
evolutionary process of modernisation will simultaneously result in the rationalisation 
of the public sphere although Rawls argues that this will be confined to Western 
democracies whereas Habermas argues that the process is universal. While this thesis 
has taken issue with this claim, and argued that the attempt by Rawls and Habermas to 
salvage Enlightenment values by virtue of an anti-Enlightenment methodology is 
incoherent, it is not my contention that liberals are thereby forced to choose between 
two dichotomous alternatives; Either to endorse a comprehensive liberalism whose 
commitment to rational enquiry leads it to regard with hostility all religious truth 
claims or to perceive liberal beliefs as the contingent product of particular types of 
society. In contrast to both these positions, I wish to argue through an examination of 
the doctrinal development of orthodox Catholicism, that while both comprehensive 
liberals including on my analysis Habermas, and postmodernists such as Fish, are 
correct to stipulate that liberalism is reflexively closed in relation to truth claims which 
challenge its commitment to tolerance and egalitarian reciprocity, both schools of 
thought seriously underestimate the extent to which traditional belief systems such as 
Catholicism do themselves engage in doctrinal reflexivity. Furthermore, in the case of 
traditional Catholicism, this has resulted in an evolution towards an embrace of 
Enlightenment ideals while rejecting the Enlightenment s rationalist epistemology.
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The relationship between Catholicism and liberalism in the Western world is one that 
historically has been characterised by mutual suspicion and hostility. Liberal criticism 
to Catholicism has, as John Langan notes, usually taken one of two forms.4 The most 
common approach, which is prevalent amongst liberal and progressive secularists, is to 
categorise Catholicism in terms of its institutional architecture and its philosophical 
worldview as centralised, authoritarian, traditionalist, spiritual, abstract and theoretical. 
This conceptualisation of Catholicism is then pejoratively juxtaposed with a modem 
world, which is predominantly polycentric, democratic, innovative, material, concrete 
and practical. In this understanding, Catholicism is perceived as the paradigm of a 
premodem religious faith, which is ultimately rendered redundant or at least politically 
insignificant in a world characterised by secularisation. This is a view which can 
perhaps be most prominently associated with Kantian liberals including Habermas 
who, as we saw in the last chapter, subscribes to a version of the secularisation thesis in 
which Christianity can no longer serve as a unifying metanarrative for a world 
fractured by a multiplicity of conceptions of the good.
The depiction of Catholicism as a premodem mode of consciousness, an archaic 
element of a pre-Enlightenment worldview incapable of moral reflexivity competes, 
however, with a second approach, which is equally dubious, concerning the 
possibilities of forging a rapproachment between Catholicism and the modem world. 
This approach which is prominent amongst Marxists, Feminists and other proponents
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of multiculturalism differs from the first view in regarding Catholicism not as an 
otherworldly phenomenon, but as an overtly political pressure group disseminating 
traditionalist values. These values serve to buttress the interests of conservative 
political elites who wish to roll back the gains made by traditionally oppressed groups 
such as women and homosexuals. Thus, irrespective of whether one is considering its 
views relating to abortion, euthanasia or contraception advanced in the public sphere or 
its allegedly oppressive doctrinal practices such as its refusal to allow either the 
ordination of women or married priests, Catholicism is portrayed as an overtly political 
actor legitimising the interests of a conservative status quo. This negative construal of 
the Catholic Church is informed by the view that the Vatican has hardened its 
opposition to progressive policies such as abortion, women’s equality, academic 
freedom and gay rights. Furthermore, this critique of contemporary Catholicism does 
not confine itself to evaluating the role of the current Pope in opposing the perceived 
liberalising trends of late modernity. Rather, it attempts to locate the alleged anti- 
modernism of the current Pontificate within a much broader historical narrative, which 
emphasises the church’s culpability in bolstering reactionary positions throughout 
Western history.
Although Langan presents these two negative approaches to Catholicism s relationship 
with the modem world as separate, they are in my judgement complementary in that 
many critics of Catholicism avail themselves of both approaches and more importantly, 
because they both presuppose the same underlying premise. Namely, that there is an 
inherent opposition between Catholicism and liberalism, which as a hierarchical and
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authoritarian institution is incapable of recognising the importance of human 
autonomy. As the last chapter showed, all strands of liberalism, including those which 
claim to eschew Enlightenment metaphysics, presuppose a certain conception of 
individual autonomy as it is intrinsic to their belief in the importance of adopting a 
postconventional approach to all spheres of human relations. This chapter will argue 
that both the theoretical approaches outlined above marginalise the significance of the 
Second Vatican Council in reorienting the Church’s relationship to the modem world.
It would be a serious mistake to conclude too quickly that Catholicism is conceptually 
unsuited to a culture of modernity defined by its capacity for comprehensive moral 
reflexivity. The basic reason for this is that it fails to capture the heterogeneous and 
contextualist dimensions of Catholic thought. The abstract, ahistorical rationality, 
which is attributed to Catholicism is symptomatic of a methodology which is too 
narrow in its focus. As Alan Wolfe has stated, “postwar liberal intellectuals often wrote 
as if there was no such thing as a Catholic left wing - or even a Catholic centre. They 
knew the church from its spokesmen and that was all that they needed to know5. 
Rather than focusing on the hierarchical, corporatist aspects of Church doctrine, it is 
more productive (and accurate) to explore the dialectical encounter between 
Catholicism as a believing community governed by a hierarchical structure with a 
variety of other systems of belief and social theory. There has developed within the 
main body of Catholic social thought a growing ambiguity over the basis of 
justification for the normative proposals which the Church advances. There are three 
principal bases. The first is natural law, which has played a pivotal role m Catholic
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thought since the time of Aquinas. The second is scripture, which the Church has given 
greater prominence to since Vatican II. The third is the formation of contingent 
judgements mediated by context in response to historical developments.
While many of the Encyclicals, which the current Pope has formulated, have been 
interspersed with appeals to scripture and natural law, increasingly documents such as 
Centesimus Annus have been suffused with empirical judgements. In this context, the 
shift away from either a purely scriptural or natural law approach to one which allows 
room for considerations of culture and history enables a much greater level of 
philosophical pluralism than is often appreciated by conservative Catholics and their 
critics. In order to demonstrate this claim, the chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section aims to show that the concerns of discourse theorists outlined in the last 
chapter over the potential for comprehensive religious traditions such as Catholicism to 
colonise the public sphere are well justified. It will be argued in contrast to theological 
conservatives such as Neuhaus that the Judeo-Christian tradition cannot in any useful 
fashion serve as a unifying moral discourse in which ethical disagreements are 
adjudicated without doing violence to the diversity of ethical discourses which 
comprise the public sphere. The second section aims to show how a more pluralistic 
reading of Catholicism than that offered by both conservative Catholics and their 
secular critics show how, in the light of the reforms inaugurated by Vatican II, the 
Church, by detaching itself from its prior entanglement with the state, has come to 
embrace a liberal, Kantian cosmopolitanism in which the rights of states are 
subordinated to a universal common good. In the final section, this claim will be
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illustrated through an exploration of how, many Catholics, have reformulated just war 
theory so that it serves as a means for critiquing the actions of the U.S government in 
their war against terrorism.
Taken together, the three sections which constitute this chapter show that the diversity 
of views which informs Catholics situated within a plurality of different historical 
contexts repudiates the perception of Catholic teaching as one deductively derived from 
scripture or natural law. Instead, it paves the way for a more nuanced, pluralistic 
understanding of the Catholic community which is properly understood not as a 
monological entity in which reason is conceived in a transcendental manner. Rather, it 
is one mediated by culture and historical context in which reason is the contingent 
achievement of linguistically socialised, finite, embodied creatures in a way which 
makes Catholicism potentially compatible with a dialogical conception of morality.
The Tension between Discourse Ethics and Religion: The Case of a Christianised 
America
The last chapter examined the difficulties involved in reconciling discourse theory with 
its insistence on adopting a post-conventional mode of moral reasoning with 
conventional moralities, which almost by definition are resistant to the secular, 
universalist, reflexive culture presupposed by communicative ethics. The latter regards 
debate and contention over both conceptions of justice and the good as a cognitive 
virtue. On the other hand, conventional moralities of which religious traditions can be 
regarded as a paradigmatic example, fear that exposing their belief systems to the
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open marketplace of ideas in which their convictions are subject to reasoned critique, is 
neither possible nor desirable. Religious beliefs are incorrigible in the sense that their 
absolutist nature makes them resistant to compromise. They thus cannot possess the 
openness requisite for democratic deliberation. As this chapter will show, the 
conviction that religious beliefs are incorrigible is embraced by a wide diversity of 
theorists including many religious believers themselves. Religious apologists who 
subscribe to this view tend to adopt one of two strategies pertaining to religion’s 
relationship to the public domain. The first is to adopt a sectarian strategy in which 
religion is accorded an independent or autonomous sphere insulated from external 
critique. The second is to deny the autonomy of the political realm and instead attempt 
to colonise the public sphere with a comprehensive religious vision of the good. 
Whereas the first strategy appears to condemn religion' to political irrelevance, the 
second presupposes a homogenous public sphere in which a particular religious 
perspective is advocated as the basis for confronting public disagreements over moral 
questions. Understandably, discourse theorists regard this latter strategy with suspicion, 
as they do not believe that under conditions of modernity it is possible to formulate an 
overarching vision of the human good. It will be argued below with reference to 
Richard Neuhaus’s attempt to invoke the Christian tradition for just such an objective 
within the context of the American political culture, that this fear is well founded. 
However, this should not be taken as an argument for precluding religious beliefs from 
the public sphere. Rather, it is an indication that contrary to religious conservatives and 
their critics, religious beliefs are not as incorrigible as is often supposed, at least when 
determining their normative political content.
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This section aims to show more clearly the limitations to the fashioning of a pluralistic 
public discourse occasioned by the appropriating of liberal ideals to an exclusivist 
Christian standpoint based on the premise that only a freedom oriented to absolute truth 
can sustain a liberal society. In order to do this, it is instructive to consider briefly the 
work of the influential neoconservative Richard John Neuhaus. Neuhaus is of course 
most famous for his lamenting of the naked public square, which he believes is the 
product of late modem societies.6 Unlike many contemporary communitarians, 
however, who are somewhat ambivalent about the role which religion can play in 
restoring a secure moral foundation, Neuhaus is adamant that in the context of the 
United States, which serves as the frame of reference for his writing, only the Judeo- 
Christian tradition can serve as that foundation.7 It should be noted immediately that 
Neuhaus does not wish to erode the boundaries between church and state. He 
acquiesces with the oft quoted remark from the recent papal encyclical Redemptoris 
Missio, “the church does not impose, she only proposes”.8 At the same time, however, 
he insists on the importance of religion in clothing the public culture in transcendent 
values. More specifically, this role is allocated to Judeo- Christian values whose 
tradition furnishes the American polity with a common moral vocabulary and ready­
made public philosophy. Of course, the argument that religion should not be excluded 
from the public domain is hardly the preserve of neoconservatives such as Neuhaus. It 
is shared by both liberal theologians such as David Tracy and Christian left thinkers 
such as Jim Wallis.9 What does distinguish Neuhaus from Tracy and Wallis is the 
inherently conservative function which he envisions for religion in public discourses.
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On the one hand, Tracy aims to confront the scepticism of Habermas by illustrating the 
symbolic resources which religion can exploit in order to advance the emancipatory 
project of modernity, a project which he shares with Habermas. More radical Christian 
thinkers such as Wallis and Ronald Thiemann emphasise the role of religion in 
providing a moral critique of the polity’s fundamental assumptions.10 In contrast, 
Neuhaus attaches to religion a sociological function, one in which it serves a unifying 
role for culture and polity, a role he claims it is well-placed to play due to the 
proliferation of religious belief in America.
Neuhaus’s argument can be seen as a frontal challenge to liberal deontological ethics as 
embodied in the work of Rawls and Habermas. For all their differences, the latter 
thinkers are united in regarding reasonable pluralism as a sociological/empirical given 
requiring the foregoing of any attempt to base civic harmony on the establishment of 
any one comprehensive worldview. In contrast to this position, Neuhaus stresses that 
the stability of a political community or indeed individual dignity cannot be guaranteed 
through abstractions such as a well-functioning constitutional state (Rawls) or an ideal 
communication community (Habermas), but rather by grounding individual dignity in a 
public consensus on philosophical or religious truths. There can be no doubt that 
Neuhaus’s belief that such a consensus is possible will strike many as excessively 
optimistic. It should be emphasised that Neuhaus does not seek a sacralization of the 
polity. He is not a theocrat who advocates a fusion between the church and the state. 
Nonetheless, the fact that politics is a function of culture means that if that culture is 
conceptualized in a hegemonic fashion, in which many public discourses are excluded,
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it will also lead to a restriction of the amount of moral diversity which will be allowed. 
Neuhaus shares with deontological ethicists a belief in the importance of commonality 
and a singular public language, which serves as the basis for adjudicating moral 
differences. Whereas, in the case of Rawls and Habermas, this language is one which 
constrains the input of divergent ethical discourses through the critical leavening of 
Kantian rationality, for Neuhaus it involves the equation of moral discourse with the 
adoption of an exclusive ethical belief system.
The idea that the moral legitimation of a polity can be grounded in one particular 
ethical-religious tradition is both sociologically implausible and normatively 
undesirable. Furthermore, it actually constrains the role which religious beliefs as well 
as non-religious discourses can play in critiquing rather than simply legitimating the 
prevailing consensus. It would of course be wrong to ignore the distinctive role, which 
Christianity has played in providing the common symbols for American political 
culture throughout the nation’s history. The function which religion has performed in 
America bears a much closer resemblance to the way Rousseau perceived it in The 
Social Contract than it does to other eighteenth century philosophers, most famously 
Locke who envisaged the complete removal of religion from the public sphere. While 
Rousseau shared with these philosophers the view that sectarian religion in which truth 
was defined through the revealed dogmas of a particular faith inevitably bred 
factionalism, he nonetheless believed that the emergence of a nonsectarian civic piety 
was crucial to the existence of a peaceful social contract. As Thiemann notes, for 
Rousseau, civil religion would express the general will of the people and serve to
249
legitimate the beliefs and actions of civil society while still retaining its independence 
from the state.11 The particular species of civil religion that was nurtured in America, 
which can be described as nonchristological theism performed a similar role. It 
provided the common rhetorical and ideological framework in which differences could 
be adjudicated, while, as the very term implies, being broad and inclusive enough to 
encompass a religiously diverse populace. To give just one example, while American 
schoolchildren are requested to recite the words “one nation under God”, it is agreed 
that it would be unnecessarily divisive to recite the words “one nation under God, the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit”. 12
Shortly after The Second World War, Will Herberg wrote an influential book 
Protestant, Catholic, Jew. in which he praised the unique ability of America’s civic 
faith to incorporate newly influential religious communities, a faith which transcended 
the doctrinal divisions which traditionally separated these communities.13 The key 
difference between Neuhaus and more liberal theologians is that while Neuhaus 
continues to believe that the America described in Herberg’s book remains valid, more 
liberal theologians such as Thiemann disagree, and are surely right to do so. While 
initially, America’s civic religion seemed able to incorporate emergent Catholic and 
Jewish minorities, the divisive political debates that began in the 1960s and have 
continued ever since under the rubric of the term culture wars would appear to dispel 
the misplaced optimism of the 1950s in which Herberg s thesis was written. For 
example, in the African-American community, black theologies were spawned that 
repudiated the Anglo-Saxon tradition and sought to articulate the uniqueness of their
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own particular traditions. Feminism in both its secular and religious guises equated the 
Judeo-Christian tradition with a white, patriarchal heritage, which had subjugated 
women for centuries. In general, the upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s ruptured the 
notion of a common religious and political unity which could manage substantive 
disputes permeating American public life as was evident by the spread of the 
“hermeneutic of suspicion” to issues such as affirmative action and abortion.15
It could of course still be objected that America remains a largely religious and indeed 
Christian society and certainly it would be a grave error to ignore the influence of 
religion in shaping many of the disputes which constitute American society such as 
whether God should be left out of the Pledge of Allegiance altogether. It is also true as 
the events subsequent to September 11th illustrate, that religion plays a much greater 
unifying role in America than in other Western societies.16 This shows the wisdom of 
the revisions in Habermas’ latest work where he stresses that all constitutional states 
are ethically patterned.17 The fact that the citizens that compose a nation are embedded 
in a network of shared traditions constitutive of their identity means that the legal 
system will be partly reflective of a particular life form and not just an articulation of 
universal rights. Nonetheless, two important features separate Neuhaus s vision from 
that of Habermas’s. Firstly, as Maeve Cook stresses, Habermas argument is empirical 
rather than normative. Habermas does not argue that the constitutional state should be 
ethically patterned, simply that it unavoidably is. In contrast, Neuhaus openly 
embraces the Judeo-Christian tradition from a normative standpoint. Secondly, 
Habermas still insists on the. importance of decoupling the majority culture from the
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wider political culture whereas Neuhaus invokes the majority status of the Christian 
religion as a key reason why it should function as the principle moral discourse.
These differences have important implications for the role of religion in a pluralistic 
culture. From the perspective of communicative ethics, all substantive principles are 
open to thematization in public processes of deliberation provided that these processes 
reflect the ethical commitments of all citizens and do not privilege any particular 
subculture. From Neuhaus’s viewpoint in contrast, Christianity or the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, (Neuhaus prevaricates between the two in a way which will be problematic 
for many Jews who insist on the distinct nature of their particular identity) has a 
privileged place in the American polity. Neuhaus’ position is a non-starter, for the 
Judeo-Christian tradition will be burdened with so much substantive weight that it will 
inevitably drown out public discourses which do not accept its key assumptions (such 
as for example, those which assert America is too closely connected to Israel due to the 
influence of the Jewish lobby aided by Christian evangelicals). Alternatively, it will be 
conceived in such a weak way that it cannot possibly be used as a mechanism to 
resolve the normative disputes which engulf the polity.
If the above argument can be sustained, then it appears to show that Habermas and 
Benhabib in accordance with the demands of a weak deontological theory are right in 
their refusal to assimilate moral discourse to the insights of any one particular mode of 
ethical self-understanding. There remains the problem, however, in whether religious 
worldviews whose identity is predicated on a belief in absolute truth can be admitted
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into a public discourse on equal terms with other worldviews when their primary 
allegiance is not to the procedures which make that discourse possible, but to the truths 
they work to establish. Fish is quite clear that he does not believe that this is possible. 
He states bluntly, “the religious person should not seek an accommodation with 
liberalism; he should seek to rout it from the field, to extirpate it root and branch”.19
Underpinning this view which Fish develops at length in an invaluable article 'Why We 
All Just Can’t Get Along' is the belief that any accommodation with liberalism will lead 
to religion being co-opted or neutralized.20 There is an epistemic divide between the 
devout religious believer and the secular rationalist, which makes any attempt at even 
understanding each other, let alone coming to a consensus impossible. Fish states that 
the problem is not, as is commonly portrayed, that one side reasons while the other 
does not. Rather, the key point is that both the secular rationalist and the devout 
believer reason from a prior premise, which is literally incomprehensible to the other. 
Thus, for Augustine, a reasonable mind is a mind closed to the possibility that certain 
basic claims, in Augustine’s case “Chnst has risen” could be questioned. A reasonable 
mind is a narrow mind. For secular liberals, of whom Fish takes Mill as an example, 
open-minedness is the key virtue which defines a reasonable person. All cherished 
convictions should be subject to critique and discarded if they are found wanting. 
According to Fish, the attempts made by scholars such as Stephen Carter, Michael 
McConnell and George Marsden amongst others to resist procedural liberalism s 
marginalization of religion by pointing out that its appeal to inclusivity excludes 
believers who claim to be in possession of the absolute truth, is besides the point.
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These scholars wish to revise liberalism, by making it more open to religious 
viewpoints and thus more faithful to its underlying principles of liberality and open- 
mindedness. However, to invite religion to the public table as McConnell advocates 
would be disastrous for it would still be liberalism’s table in which religious expression 
would be considered as just one more voice in a dialogue which refuses to privilege 
any particular voice. Thus, the attempts to sanitize religion by ensuring that the 
religious impulse is checked by the imperatives of civility and free inquiry as Marsden 
advocates, will inevitably result in civility becoming the new religion.22
If this argument were to be sustained, the conclusions resulting from it would be very 
unsettling not just for liberalism but for religion. In effect, Fish is saying that the only 
authentic religion is fundamentalist religion. Any accommodation with liberalism 
would mean the death of religion. The fate of religion in Habermas’s work does seem 
to bear out this contention. On the one hand, he condemns fundamentalism for its lack 
of reflexivity, on the other, even moderate religion is denied any cognitive status unless 
it is shorn of its metaphysical and soteriological warrants. There are, however, serious 
problems with Fish’s position which result ironically from the fact that although he is a 
contextual jst, his understanding of religion is ahistorical and decontextualised. He fails 
to examine the way in which culture shapes not just the evolution of doctrine but also 
how religious believers conceptualise the relationship between their faith and their 
understanding of the world. In Fish’s abstract depiction, once a person is in possession 
of the conviction that there is a god, then he will determine his views of right and 
wrong from that premise. It is his belief in that premise that enables cognitive activity
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to proceed. It does not seem that external factors such as culture will mediate these 
views in any way. His normative views will naturally follow from his religious 
convictions and because these religious convictions are not subject to rational critique 
nor are the views which he then reasons from them. Thus, Fish like Habermas, is 
arguing that religion retains its foundation in a philosophy of consciousness and by its 
inherent nature is monological rather than historically situated in the communicative 
practice of everyday life.
Towards a Dialogical Faith: Fighting For the Soul of Vatican Two
The weakness in this chain of reasoning is the assumption that one can deduce a 
believer’s substantive views from the answer to the question of whether they believe in 
God. While the weak thesis which Fish proclaims, that a devout believer cannot sever 
his normative beliefs from the motivational sources which underpin them is true, he 
then proceeds to conflate this assumption with an erroneous stronger thesis, in which he 
asserts that the initial premise from which individuals begin to reason predetermines 
their normative beliefs. It is this that leads him to the view that these normative beliefs 
cannot be intersubjectively mediated. In order to show why this monological view of 
religion is wrong, it is instructive to consider the reforms within the Catholic Church 
that have followed Vatican II. Here two developments are of particular interest, (a) the 
relationship between the state and the church and (b) the role of dissent within the 
Contemporary Catholic Church.
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The Relationship between State and Church
Through the affirmation of the importance of universal human rights, and in particular 
the right to religious liberty, the current papacy can plausibly be regarded as a 
continuation of Vatican II. In particular, the current papacy has been anxious to uphold 
Dignitatis Humane (the most famous document produced by that Council), in which 
the Catholic commitment to religious liberty was advocated on theological rather than 
purely prudential grounds.23 The enshrining of religious freedom at the heart of 
Catholic doctrine marked a decisive rupture with the tradition’s past. Previously, it had 
been wedded to a Constantinian legacy, in which the purpose of the state was to uphold 
Catholicism as the one true faith, thus rejecting any notion of granting religious liberty 
as heresy.
In contrast, Dignitatis Humanae espoused the Enlightenment view that there should be 
a separation between church and state and renounced the use of state power as a means 
of advocating its mission. Freedom of belief is grounded in divine revelation in which 
humans voluntarily seek out the truth and act upon it. As the current Pope said at the 
time, human dignity involves a “moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious 
truth”. This obligation cannot be fulfilled unless people enjoy both psychological 
freedom and immunity from external coercion . Thus, the Christian humanism 
embodied in Vatican II and asserted in the current papacy maintained that a genuine 
commitment to human dignity required a deep respect for each human s right to 
worship as they choose and a commitment to persuasion rather than coercion in 
preaching the gospel. Weigel, claims that underpinning these twin commitments is a
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universal empathy with others which requires an engagement with rather than 
bracketing of one’s particular convictions. One way of measuring the truth of particular 
convictions is their ability to respond empathetically to the “other” in a manner that 
enriches the whole of humanity. Thus, for example, in the papal encyclical, 
Redemptoris Missio, the Pope stated that tolerance is not a question of avoiding 
differences but of engaging differences respectfully, in the conviction “that our deepest 
differences make all the difference in this world and the next”.25 The importance of 
engaging differences respectfully was seen as the most effective antidote for a post 
cold-war world, which was becoming increasingly polarised between global capitalism 
on the one hand and ethnoracial tribalism on the other. In this perspective, it was 
necessary to avoid the pathological manifestations apparent in the assertion of certain 
forms of cultural identity, which spawned racism and xenophobia. This was perceived
by the Pope as especially important in the context of recent history in which the fear of
26difference had led to the denial of the very humanity of the other.
Thus, the recent evolution of Catholic doctrine appears to belie the pessimism of both 
postmodernists and Habermas himself who despair of the possibility of incorporating 
orthodox religious belief systems in public moral discourses where participants are 
obligated to present their validity claims in ways which are reflexive and 
universalizable. Catholic doctrine with its commitment to religious freedom and 
interreligious dialogue now appears to share with communicative ethics a belief in the 
primacy of substantive principles such as universal moral respect and egalitarian 
reciprocity. Furthermore, Catholicism also seems to share with critical theory a belief
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in post-conventional morality as it too distinguishes between cultures that are socially 
conformist, and those, which are comprehensively reflexive. Thus, orthodox 
Catholicism shares the view affirmed by critical theorists that moral persons develop 
within a network of dependencies. At the same time, it is also important to recognise 
that every human culture as a historically conditioned reality has its limitations. In 
order to prevent the perfectly desirable goal of cultural belonging from degenerating 
into xenophobia, each culture has an obligation to show receptive openness to others 
and be prepared to subject its normative practices to discursive justification. The 
affinities between Catholicism and communicative ethics are particularly evident in one 
papal document where the Pope asserts that:
The authenticity of each human culture, the soundness of its underlying ethos,
and hence the validity of its moral bearings, can be measured... by its
commitment to the human cause and by its capacity to promote human dignity at
27every level and in every circumstance.
The convergence between Catholicism and discourse ethics is most apparent at a 
substantive political level in which both worldviews, due to the cosmopolitanism 
inherent in both their positions, have been amongst the most enthusiastic supporters of 
international institutions. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the Catholic Church 
has since 1945 advocated the internationalisation of the values and practices of liberal 
democracy. This marks a major rupture with the Catholic Church of the past in two 
significant ways. Firstly, it is a reflection of the fact that the intimate relationship 
between religion and political power that marked Catholicism in the West from 
Constantine to Napoleon and which explains part of the antipathy towards liberalism 
which Church leaders expressed in the Nineteenth Century was no longer considered
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desirable. Secondly, the endorsement by contemporary Catholicism of the 
democratisation of social and political life is a repudiation of the traditional Aristotelian 
and scholastic view affirmed, for example, by St Thomas Aquinas, that believed that no 
constitution was superior in the natural order of things. What can be justly called the 
new ‘Kantian’ turn in Catholic political thought received its first most explicit 
articulation in Pope John XII’s encyclical, Pacem in Terris. This document provided 
the conceptual basis for the Catholic contribution to post-conciliar peacemaking, 
namely that human rights were the essential underpinning for any durable peace.28
In accordance with this shift in worldview, the excoriation of regimes, which violate 
human rights has been a constant theme uniting all the Popes since the Second World 
War irrespective of their theological outlook. Thus, dictators which purported to be 
defenders of Catholic values such as General Pinochet in Chile and Ferdinand Marcos 
in the Philippines have been scrutinised in a much sharper way than were previous 
Catholic regimes such as, for example Francisco Franco in Spain and Antonio Salazar 
in Portugal. Furthermore, on many current issues the thinking of the Vatican dovetails 
with cosmopolitan liberals. The political umversalism which Catholicism now views as 
the corollary to its theological umversalism has seen the Vatican adopt positions which 
are at variance with those who, following Carl Schmidt, adopt an ethnic conception of 
nationality and also the particularist umversalisms subscribed to by militant 
fundamentalisms in which human rights are regarded as the exclusive preserve of one
. 29particular cultural tradition.
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Perhaps, most importantly, the Vatican s ‘post-Constantinian5 reading of the world has 
led it into increasing tension with American neo-conservatives, both Catholic and 
secular. Neoconservative ideology is informed either by secular sources such as 
Hobbes, Machiavelli and Leo Strauss or (particularly amongst Catholic neo­
conservatives such as Weigel and Michael Novak), a very narrow reading of Just War 
theorists such as Thomas Aquinas.30 Neo-conservatives derive from these eclectic 
sources a public philosophy which buttresses the unfettered national sovereignty of the 
world’s leading superpower. They justify this as a necessary response to what they 
perceive to be in line with Samuel Huntington’s thesis advocated in the Clash o f 
Civilisations, a civilisational state of nature in which Islam is perceived as the chief 
perpetrator of Global violence.31 In contrast, the Vatican has reacted with great 
scepticism to the notion that any one hegemonic power, even one advocating liberal 
democratic values like the United States, can adequately sustain universalist principles.
Furthermore, if one accepts Kagan’s influential thesis that American and European 
perspectives are diverging with the former enmeshed in an anarchic Hobbesian world, 
where world security depends on the deployment of military power which the latter 
increasingly eschews in its yearning for a ‘Kantian’ post-historical paradise, then it is 
clear that the Vatican is much closer to the latter perspective. Indeed, one could go 
further and argue that it is the exemplar of the Europeamst worldview and its most 
principled proponent. From Pope John XXIII onwards, it has repeatedly extolled the 
virtues of the United Nations as the principal mechanism for promoting peace and 
human rights.33 Furthermore, despite the attempts of Catholic neo-conservatives to pass
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these differences off as prudential questions concerning which institutions are best 
suited to promote universal peace (unilateral or multilateral ones), it has become 
increasingly apparent that they reflect profound ideological divergences over how best 
to respond to the political challenges animating the post-modem world. On numerous 
issues such as its increasing reluctance to endorse war in any circumstances, its 
ecumenical overtures to Islam, its affirmation of unfettered immigration, its support for 
European institutions, and its endorsement of the International Criminal Court, the 
Vatican has resisted the American tendency towards unilateralism. The Vatican’s 
positions on these issues are not simply ad hoc responses motivated by strategic 
considerations but rather, as evident in its employment of rights discourse, the 
culmination of a reorientation to modernity and the Enlightenment worldview 
embedded within it.
To take just one example from this list, the contentious topic of immigration, the Pope 
has recently asserted that Catholics should work to create “societies in which the 
cultures of migrants.. .are sincerely appreciated, and in which manifestations of racism, 
xenephobia and exaggerated nationalism are prophetically opposed . In order to 
create the sense of universal solidarity, it is necessary to inculcate the requisite 
cosmopolitan virtues in the citizenry. Needless to say, this position is not particularly 
welcomed by neo-conservatives who reject the ultimate conclusion of this logic, that 
there should be a world without boundaries of any kind in which each respects and 
honours each others particularity. Commenting on this view one neo-conservative 
states:
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A culture can only exist as a culture among a group of people who have grown 
into it together and feel that among themselves they can take it for granted. Such 
conditions cannot exist in a group that feels obligated to be utterly and 
continuously open to numerous new arrivals...and called to honour them in all 
their otherness.
The most striking feature to note about this comment is that the argument that the 
Vatican is insufficiently sensitive to conventional moralities is a charge that can be 
levelled against any species of cosmopolitan liberalism. It explains the increasing 
discomfort of Catholic neo-conservatives who in seeming contradiction to their 
exhortations in other circumstances for Catholics to obey the Vatican, dissent from 
Vatican injunctions when it offends their own ideological convictions. I will attempt to 
argue below that these disagreements are best viewed not as an idolatrous 
subordination of theological doctrine to subjective ideological beliefs. Instead, they 
should be considered as the inevitable product of the need to make contingent 
judgements based on moral considerations which while possibly informed by 
theological doctrine (such as for example, the criteria stipulated by the Catholic 
theologian St Thomas Aquinas pertaining to when a war is just), cannot possibly 
predetermine them. Thus, as I will now argue below, it is a serious mistake to regard 
dissent from Papal injunctions as the product of rebellion against the Catholic Church 
per se. Rather; it is the inevitable corollary of the diversity of viewpoints, which 
encompass a global community mediated by differences in cultural perspective.
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The Role of Dissent in the Catholic Church
In a recent article Richard MacCormick, who has been aptly described as the 
dialogical theologian par excellence, sets out to establish why dissent has occurred 
within the church.37 One answer, proposed by James Hitchcock, is to see dissent as the 
result of the subversion of authority.38 He juxtaposes dissent with orthodoxy, regarding 
the former as inevitably corrosive of the faith. Underpinning this view is the belief that 
the authentic teaching of the Magisterium, which distils the faith in a pure and pristine 
form, is being corrupted from without, by a secular culture instinctively hostile to the 
church’s authoritative teaching. Hitchcock insists that Vatican II did not legitimize the 
dissent, which consumes the present church. McCormick begs to differ. He enumerates 
a number of factors authorised by Vatican II detailed below which he believes 
encouraged the emergence of a new critical awareness in the post conciliar church.
At an institutional level, the church redefined itself away from the juridical model that 
had prevailed for centuries, which consisted of a pyramidal structure in which truth and 
authority were descended from above. In this model, a small group of people in Rome 
had the exclusive authority to determine church doctrine on spiritual, social and 
political matters. Vatican II inserted in its place the notion of the church as the People 
of God, a ‘communio’. In this concentric model, the people are the repository of 
wisdom. In the words of Cardinal Suenens, “the pyramid of the old manuals was 
reversed”.39 This alteration in the church’s self-definition from a hierarchical to a 
participatory model was prompted by external cultural factors, which impacted upon 
the changing dynamics of the power relations within the church. Many of these changes
263
were largely sociological in nature. For example, one can cite the evolving role of the 
mass media. As McCormick notes, for centuries, the dissemination of information in 
the church and the world was slow and restricted. By contrast, we now live in a world 
of instant communication in which people are much better informed than they were 
previously and are exposed to many modes of thought. The consequences of this 
democratisation of knowledge for relations between the church and laity and indeed the 
wider world as a whole are dramatic. Whereas in the past, doctrines were established 
by a select group of people in isolation from broader social and intellectual currents, 
Catholics are now profoundly immersed in the social and intellectual world in which 
they inhabit. In the preconciliar model, ecclesial attitudes would be formed without 
reference to contemporary sciences and therefore, there was a lack of awareness of the 
moral complexity of certain issues on which the church pronounced judgement. 
Education is much more widely dispersed than it was previously. This entwined with 
the intense specialisation that has accompanied modernity, means that the clergy can no 
longer be assumed to have a monopoly on the distillation of church teaching. It was 
inevitable that with sociological changes such as these, the idea of the ‘Magisterium’ as 
the issuance of authoritative decrees would be eroded.40
In the final section of this chapter, I wish to explore the debate that has been raging in 
Catholic circles over how best to respond to the War on Terrorism. The principal 
objective is to illustrate through a concrete example, the pervasive nature of the depth 
of disagreement, which exists within the Catholic Church when deliberating over 
normative political disputes. Most importantly, as the tensions within the Catholic
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community over how best to respond to the US war on Iraq showed, these 
disagreements can lead Catholics with politically conservative views as well as those 
with a progressive liberal disposition into dispute with the Vatican. In particular, the 
contested nature of the Just War tradition provides a clear illustration of the extent to 
which the theological positions that inform Catholics do not in themselves provide an 
incorrigible basis for the substantive political beliefs to which they adhere.
Just War or Just Wars: Catholic Thinking on Just War in the Twenty-First 
Century
The just war tradition originated in early Christianity’s first encounter with classical 
antiquity, when it became clear that as the interregnum between the Resurrection and 
the Second Coming was going to be much longer than was originally anticipated, it was 
necessary to develop a tradition of moral reasoning about politics and international 
affairs. The just war tradition which was formulated in this period has retained a 
remarkable vitality ever since. Indeed in the latter half of the twentieth centuiy it has 
undergone a renaissance serving as the template for moral discussion over the validity 
of deterrence policy during the Cold War and the ‘war on terrorism which followed in 
the aftermath of the events of September 11th. However, the pervasiveness of just war 
thinking in debates concerning war and peace should not be interpreted as reflecting 
any degree of consensus over how these principles should be applied in practice. This 
can be seen in relation to Catholicism where the interpretation of just war thought has 
become increasingly contested. The purpose of this section will be to examine the 
nature of these divisions in order to amplify the larger claims of this chapter. Namely,
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that the Catholic Church s engagement with the modem world will always be mediated 
by considerations of culture and history and by the divergent ideological persuasions of 
Catholic thinkers thus mandating a need for tolerance of philosophical pluralism within 
the Catholic community as a whole.
In the Christian teaching, the criteria of just war are differentiated into two categories- 
ius ad bellum and ius in bello. The first category delineates the reasons, which 
legitimate the use of force, while the second provides instruction on how a just war 
should be conducted. In line with the first set of criteria a just war must be defensive, 
undertaken in response to unjust aggression, must have as its objective the right 
intention of establishing a just peace and can only be pursued as a last resort once all 
other avenues to peace have been exhausted. There must be a reasonable probability of 
success in achieving the aims of war and perhaps most importantly of all, any use of 
force must be sanctioned by a legitimate public authority. The second set of criteria, ius 
in bello, can be reduced to two principal moral imperatives, proportionality and 
discrimination. The first mandates that the means used to prosecute the war must be 
proportional to the ends sought. The second pertains to ‘noncombatant immunity’, in 
which any killing of innocent civilians is prohibited. There is general agreement 
amongst Catholics as to the validity of this set of criteria in differentiating a just war 
from illegal uses of force. There is much disagreement however as to how these criteria 
ought to be applied, disagreements which arguably go beyond questions of prudential 
interpretation despite protestations to the contrary and instead involve prior moral,
266
ethical and strategic considerations (to invoke Habermasian terminology) which 
interlocutors bring to the discussion.
The contemporary Catholic discussion over the just use of force is animated by 
disputes between two competing schools of thought, which can be divided into those 
who favour a permissive use of force in order to pursue justice and those who seek to 
limit the scale of war by seeking to apply just war criteria in a much more restrictive 
fashion. The first school is largely populated by Catholic neoconservatives such as 
Weigel, Neuhaus and Michael Novak who contest the increasingly orthodox view 
amongst Catholic thinkers that the strictures of just war criteria imply a “presumption 
against violence”. In contrast, their starting premise is a ‘presumption for justice.’41 
The second group who repudiate war in all but the most exceptional circumstances 
consists of a disparate group of thinkers. They range from theological conservatives 
including arguably the Pope and the Vatican through to those on the Catholic left who, 
while dissenting from the Vatican on matters of church doctrine share its much more 
progressive view of the political and social world.42 The self-declared differing starting 
points from which the two sides begin in their evaluation of just war criteria cannot be 
seen as simply differences in emphasis over how the criteria should be applied in 
practice. Rather, they reflect fundamentally divergent understandings of the political 
and moral universe, which go well beyond mere discourses of application.
In particular two key differences exist between the two contrasting schools of thought. 
Firstly, there is a major disagreement over which cluster of criteria should take priority
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in determining the justification for war, those pertaining to the reasons for going to war 
( ad bellum questions) or those concerned with conduct in the prosecution of war (in 
bello) questions. Catholic neoconservatives in particular argue that religious 
commentary on just war has been hamstrung by a prioritisation of the latter set of 
criteria over the former, reflected for example in the great reluctance of many Catholic 
thinkers to sanction a war that may involve large-scale civilian casualties. Scholars 
such as George Weigel argue that this has the effect of turning the tradition inside-out 
by placing the heaviest burden of moral analysis on what are contingent judgements 
which cannot be accurately assessed in advance rather than on the morally prior ad 
bellum questions which determine the moral propriety of advocating war in the first 
place.43
Neoconservatives are wrong however in implying that this is the only source of dispute 
between the two schools of thought. For the two sides begin from two contrasting 
hermeneutic starting points which in turn reflect very different perceptions of political 
reality. The crucial point to note here is that for a war to be considered just it must be 
initiated by a competent authority which is recognised as legitimate. There is no 
competent authority, which is recognised as legitimate by the two sides in this dispute. 
Neoconservatives in line with their ideology, emphasise the pivotal role of the nation­
state, specifically the U.S nation-state as the principal arbiter of decisions governing 
war and peace. This identification of the particularist aims of America with universal 
Christian ideals appears to reverse the view held by much recent Catholic thought on 
the import of an international common good and the need for an international public
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authority to promote that common good.44 While Catholic neoconservatives such as 
Weigel and Novak do not deny the existence of an international common good they see 
no objection to that good being maintained by one country. In contrast, critics regard 
this view as an example of the ‘Constantinianism’ in which the objectives of the church 
are conflated with those of the state, a position that contemporary Catholicism has been 
attempting to repudiate since Vatican II.
The differences that have emerged within the Catholic tradition over how best to utilise 
Just War theory in the post-September 11 world that we now inhabit, as demonstrated 
in the debates over the legitimacy of the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq, should 
not be regarded in isolation from the wider themes of Catholic political thought 
discussed in this chapter. They should rather be seen as the crystallisation of trends, 
which have been evident at least since Vatican II, in which Popes, from John XXIII 
through to John Paul II have increasingly condemned the use of force in virtually all 
circumstances. These trends have been viewed with alarm by Catholic neo­
conservatives, particularly in the United States, who regard such beliefs as a 
capitulation to a secular liberal culture, a culture that especially in the wake of the 
Vietnam War, has viewed war with suspicion. There is an element of truth in this 
analysis. In the last century there has been a legalisation of the Just War tradition in 
which it has been forced into an intellectual framework that emphasises notions of 
universally applicable moral rules. This contrasts sharply with the moral reasoning 
prevalent in the medieval and early modem just war tradition, which was casuistical 
and particularise45 The Vatican has almost uncritically appropriated this transmutation
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of just war theory from a theory of statecraft into one delimited by universal rules, with 
the result that it now regards international institutions such as the United Nations, 
rather than the nation-state, as the main forum of political legitimacy. In practice, this 
has led many Catholics, including the Vatican to embrace a ‘functional pacifism’. 
Thus, Pope John Paul II denounces the “insane arms race” precipitated by the Cold 
War and condemns those nations that have “an unacceptably exaggerated concern for 
security”, since they obstruct the movement to a world in which nations are “united in 
cooperation.. .for the common good of the human race”.46
The increasing articulation of the belief within contemporary Catholicism that war is 
abnormal and eradicable is contested by Catholic neo-conservatives such as Weigel 
who assert that this view is sheer utopianism. According to Weigel, classic Catholicism 
assumes that conflict is a constant in the world, which can only be ameliorated through 
the legitimate use of force. In the current context of the War against Terrorism, that 
duty falls to the United States as the legitimate guardian of the public good. Catholic 
neoconservatives have a much more expansive notion of the role of politics in the 
international sphere than their opponents. Whereas orthodox Catholicism wishes to 
replace conflict with consensus and transform the world into a pacified domestic 
sphere, neoconservatives, following Machiavelli, believe that conflict is a given which 
can be challenged but never finally resolved through the marshalling of military force. 
These very different ideological assumptions which animate the two Catholic schools 
of thought, one affirming the goals of the Enlightenment tradition, the other influenced 
by the pre-Enlightenment thought of Machiavelli and Hobbes, in which the nation-state
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is paramount and retains full political autonomy, explains the degree of estrangement 
that exists between Catholics over how best to understand the just war tradition.47
The purpose here is not to determine which side has presented the most accurate 
account of Catholic doctrine or the most plausible interpretation of historical reality. 
Rather, it is to demonstrate the extent to which political judgements cannot be based on 
unimpeachable theological foundations, which can be rendered self-evident to all 
genuine Catholics. In addition, it also serves to illustrate the extent to which secular and 
theological discourses are interwoven with each other. In arguing over the application 
of just war theory, Catholics have been divided by both incommensurable philosophical 
discourses, and divergent interpretations of empirical reality. Thus, whereas, for 
example, many Catholics have adopted a Kantian view of international relations, 
arguing that it represents the best means for the pacification of the world, others, 
drawing inspiration from Hobbes and Machiavelli, have argued for the exact opposite 
conclusion. Responding to the Pope’s assertion that war always “makes it more 
difficult to find a just solution of the very problems which provoked the war, one 
neoconservative quips, “history and above all the history of the twentieth century 
proves otherwise”.48 Sometimes, war is a necessary instrument for the pursuit of 
justice, and can thus be undertaken in a manner which is sinless. The contrasting 
conceptions of human nature and understandings of history underpinning these two 
schools of thought are irreconcilable and can thus not be adjudicated through appeal to 
an overarching theological standard.
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The disagreements over the application of the just war tradition engaged in by 
Catholics serves to highlight the wider aims of the chapter. As noted by John Langan, 
Catholic social teaching should not be regarded as a teaching derived deductively from 
scripture or traditional formulations of natural law which are the classical sources of 
Catholic teaching.49 Rather, it should be perceived as an evolving body of ideas, which 
will be transformed and mediated through its engagement with empirical reality and 
competing traditions of thought. One key point which, protagonists on both sides of the 
debate need to be cognisant of is that there is no pristine, pure Catholic position 
unmediated by social context and the ideological presuppositions of individual 
Catholics. To put the point in the language of communicative ethics, the universality of 
moral discourses will inevitably be interwoven with ethical and strategic discourses 
especially when the flexibility of just war criteria can be used to buttress many 
divergent theoretical positions. This is true not only of Catholicism but of all secular 
and religious traditions that employ just war criteria.
Conclusion
A fundamental methodological problem, which often goes unacknowledged, in 
attempting to assess the possibility for an accommodation between Catholicism and the 
modem world is the extent to which it makes sense to conceptualise Catholicism as a 
monolithic entity, what Rawls would call a “comprehensive moral doctrine . One 
factor, which makes it tempting, even sensible to portray Catholicism in this way can 
be adduced to the fact that unlike Islam, for example, Catholicism contains a central, 
authoritative religious structure led from the Vatican which unifies and guides the
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community of believers. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the Roman Catholic 
Church is the most visible religious institution in the history of the world. Thus, in 
certain respects, it is perfectly natural for academic and journalistic interpreters of 
Catholicism to focus on the centre - the papacy and the hierarchy. The papacy as the 
embodiment of an authoritative set of teachings serves as the frame of reference for 
normative disagreements, whether they are theological, moral or ecclesiastical. Thus, 
regardless of the issue at stake, whether it is child sex abuse, just war theory or 
abortion, both Catholics and non-Catholics attach a major significance to the comments 
uttered by the Vatican. Thus, irrespective of whether one agrees with the Church’s 
stance on a particular issue, it will inevitably form the parameters in which the debate 
takes place.
However, this concentration of attention on the Vatican and the Pope in particular is 
also problematic. By focusing exclusively on pronouncements by the hierarchy, it 
invites the impression that there is one ‘Catholic position’ on all substantive disputes 
which can be logically deduced from the theological bases which have traditionally 
informed Catholic thought, in particular natural law. Underpinning this view is the 
assumption that Catholic thinking on any particular issue can be conducted in a way 
detached from the multiplicity of intellectual currents, many of which are secular, that 
impinge upon the church at any one time. Thus, by failing to comprehend the way in 
which the Church is forced to act as a concrete actor rather than a purely abstract one, it 
is easy to see how the Church ends up being viewed as a collective subject whose
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thinking is conducted in a rigid, monological manner rather than through a dialogical 
and reflexive encounter with competing traditions of thought.
Of course, it serves the interests both of apologists for the Vatican and its most 
redoubtable opponents to portray the Church in this way. By doing so, however, they 
obscure the extent to which the Church performs as a situated actor. The theology and 
metaphysics which might on their own render its philosophy dogmatic and even 
absolutist is forced into a dialectical interplay with a globalised world whose 
complexity and contingency negate the moral certainties that natural law provided in a 
previous age. The difficulties which the Vatican faces in reconciling theological 
absolutes with a global society, constituted by reasonable pluralism both in terms of 
value differentiation and cultural diversity, is evident in the contradictions that have 
characterised the reign of the current Pope and the Roman Curia more generally. These 
contradictions are displayed in the conflict between the official theology of the Church, 
which teaches that membership of the Catholic faith is a prerequisite of salvation and 
the Pope’s own encounters with other faiths. These encounters are notable for their 
attempts to strive for a common language which transcend doctrinal divisions.Even 
more graphically, the paradoxes are revealed in the disjunction between his sincere 
employment of human rights discourse, and the authoritarian, command and control 
structure, which permeates the current structure of the Vatican.
To the extent that the perception is formed that the Vatican exists to preserve its own 
power, the ability of the Church to influence not only fellow Catholics but also the
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outside world in general, is diminished. This is a pity for it obscures the importance of 
intellectual trends, which were set in motion by Vatican II. Far from being reversed, 
these trends have actually accelerated under the current Pope. In particular, the political 
universalism, which animates Catholic thought, furnishes secular liberals with 
symbolic resources that can enhance the emancipatory project of modernity. On 
numerous issues ranging from immigration to the war on terrorism, Catholic 
neoconservatives, who like to portray themselves as the defenders of orthodoxy have 
found that the ideological views which they adhere to are in conflict with the accepted 
wisdom of the hierarchy. The reason for this, as discussed earlier in the chapter, is that 
the church learning from the mistakes of its history has been greatly sensitised to the 
dangers which subsist in any form of alliance between church and state. As the ever- 
perceptive John Langan notes, “both Catholicism as an institution and Catholicism as a 
community are likely to resist recruitment into the task of defending western primacy 
or American hegemony. No Pope is likely to take up the post of chaplain blessing 
American arms or International Monetary Fund conditions on loans to stricken third 
world countries”.50 In relation to notorious historical events of the past in which the 
Church has been implicated, the current papacy has shown an unprecedented degree of 
humility in re-evaluating its role in episodes such as the Crusades, the Spanish and 
other empires, the Inquisition etc. In this context, it seems inevitable that the Church 
will keep a distance between itself and the primary centres of political and military 
power in the twenty-first century. This trend will almost certainly be accentuated by the 
truly global nature of the Church with its highest levels of recruitment now occurring in 
the Third World. As a consequence, the institutional and intellectual leadership of the
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church will increasingly shift from its traditional Western base and its perceived 
ethnocentric bias. This again illustrates the extent to which contemporary cultural 
dynamics impact upon the way the Church understands its mission in the world.
The disaggregation of the Church from its previous entwinement with the machinations 
of empires should not be taken to mean that the Church no longer perceives itself as a 
political actor. On the contrary, Catholicism has attempted to accommodate itself to 
liberal democracy and as this chapter has shown has often used Kantian modes of 
political discourse in order to defend its positions. This is most obviously the case in 
relation to its new found support for the United Nations, a position greeted with much 
bemusement by neoconservatives who cannot understand why the Church has so 
uncritically adopted the stance that the United Nations is the exclusive locus of moral 
authority in international affairs at least pertaining to matters of war and peace. The 
explanation is quite simply that in the same way that Catholics have accommodated 
themselves to and indeed, enthusiastically embraced the International Human Rights 
regime, they have also uncritically accepted one of its consequent results, the 
legalisation of the just war tradition. Neoconservatives, on the other hand, still wish to 
exploit the classical understanding of just war as a tradition of practical reasoning cast 
in a particularist and ‘casuistical’ mould, to be deployed in particular contexts when 
appropriate.
By contrast, many Catholics have adopted the view that the dominance in the modem 
world of notions delimiting universal rules has consigned casuistry to secondary
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importance. Many Catholic neoconservatives regard this as a pulverisation of a 
tradition, which depended on the traditional understanding of state sovereignty for its 
vitality. The import of this debate is not to determine who is right or wrong but rather 
to illustrate that both sides are informed by ideological presuppositions that militate 
against the establishment of any one true Catholic position divorced from any historical 
context. The debate over the meaning of just war and the role of international 
institutions in the world generally is a classic example of how Catholic positions are 
animated by secular discourses, whether it is Kantian cosmopolitanism in the case of 
one or unfettered state sovereignty in the case of the other. Thus, the argument of post­
modern theorists such as Stanley Fish who assert that Catholicism and liberalism are 
incommensurable moral discourses divided by competing epistemic premises, is 
misleading in that it ignores the extent to which divergent moral discourses are 
encapsulated within broad religious traditions such as Catholicism. As a consequence, 
the attempt by theological conservatives such as Neuhaus to invoke Catholicism as a 
moral framework in which to establish commonality and consensus in the public sphere 
is bound to falter due to the ideological diversity embodied within the Catholic 
tradition itself.
Catholicism’s relationship to the modem world has with some justification, been seen 
to be adversarial which can be attributed to its metaphysically encumbered ethical 
doctrines. This leads Catholic Conservatives to argue on occasions that the legitimacy 
of democratic procedures is conditional on their conformity with divine law, a position 
problematic to discourse theorists who wish to emphasise the co-originality of law and
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democracy. However, Catholicism is not a closed body of ideas, but one, which has 
been enriched by contact with diverse cultures and philosophical movements. The 
processes of globalisation which currently predominate seem likely to further facilitate 
this mutual contact harnessing in turn the intentions of many Vatican II reformers who 
wish to shift the church away from a hierarchical to a concentric model of governance. 
If they are successful in this project, they will not only foster a more pluralistic and 
reflexive church, but also leave Catholicism both as an institution and as a world 
community better equipped to face the challenges posed by the modem world.
The objective of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the depiction of religious 
traditions adhered to by both comprehensive liberals such as Habermas and post­
modernists such as Fish is defective in that it perceives religion as a monolithic and 
reified phenomena thereby ignoring their capacity for critical reflection on many of 
their most cherished beliefs, a reflection which is in fact necessitated by religious 
traditions encounter with complex social evolutionary and cultural processes such as 
globalisation and divergent philosophical schools of thought. Thus, in the case of 
Catholicism, which has been the main focus of this chapter, Vatican II inaugurated a 
whole swathe of revolutionary doctrinal and institutional changes, the most important 
of these being its affirmation of the role of the laity in shaping church doctrine rather 
than having it solely determined by the official hierarchical structure. Thus Vatican II 
served to demonstrate the church’s desire to engage in reasoned critique of its teachings 
and practices. In fact, far from being severed from practical reason, religious traditions 
such as Catholicism are comprised of a multiplicity of discourses. This has been a
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feature of their development from their very inception and is not simply a defensive 
reaction to the uncoupling of secular from sacred knowledge which governs the 
transition to a post-modem era. The formulation and refinement of just war theory, a 
theory which despite its origins in Catholic political thought permeates secular 
discourses about war and peace is just one example of this. Indeed, as this chapter has 
shown, both discourse ethics and Catholic International Relations theory have 
converged on the adoption of a Kantian historical trajectory which is an integral 
component of the Enlightenment strand of liberal thought. In the process, Catholic 
doctrine has shown its reflexive ability to relativise itself in relation to other religions 
without relativising itself in relation to its own core doctrines.
At the same time, however, it is also true that it remains the case that the continuing 
reluctance of orthodox Catholicism to reflect critically on its stance towards 
disadvantaged groups such as homosexuals means that important disagreements 
continue to persist between Enlightenment strains of liberal thought such as 
Habermas’s discourse ethics and orthodox belief systems such as Catholicism in 
relation to cultural issues such as abortion and homosexuality. As was noted in chapter 
two, in relation to conservative Catholic attitudes towards homosexuality, any attempt 
to foster a normative consensus which encompasses both progressive liberals and 
conservative Catholics will simply obfuscate the competing substantive premises which 
underpin the two traditions of thought. It is important to note that even the Catholic 
Church’s new enthusiasm for democracy does not mitigate these problems for as 
Habermas has recently made clear, majority rule is repressive if it enables citizens {and
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policymakers} to deploy religious arguments in a way which violates the idealising 
presuppositions underpinning the Enlightenment conception of autonomy, in particular, 
that all policy proposals should require publicly accessible justifications. Even if 
religious traditionalists are capable of formulating arguments in publicly accessible 
terms, it is less clear that they can justify them in those terms as well. At the same time, 
however, it needs to be recalled that these competing discourses animate debates over 
the legitimacy of church doctrine and institutional practices within the Church itself. 
Progressive Catholics, by exploiting the emancipatory potential implicit in Habermas’s 
discourse ethics to argue for participative equality within the church’s institutional 
practices demonstrate that it is a mistake to perceive religion in monolithic and reified 
terms.
280
Chapter Six: Endnotes
1 It is important to note that Habermas’s views pertaining to religion have undergone a significant 
mutation over the years in a way which parallel Rawls’s. In fact, I would argue that Habermas’s 
interpretation of religion can be divided into three stages. In the first stage, Habermas concluded that 
religion had become superfluous in modem life with the collapse of religious and metaphysical 
worldviews. In the second stage, he moved from regarding religion as a defective ethical discourse to a 
position where he argued for its positive role as an aesthetic discourse providing existential comfort in 
the face of life’s tribulations. For an instructive discussion of Habermas’s transition from the first to the 
second stages, see William J Meyer, Private Faith or Public Religion? An Assessment of Habermas’s 
Changing View of Religion, The Journal of Religion, vol.75, no.3, (July 1995), pp371-39.1 would argue 
that Habermas’s conception of religion has now entered a third more complex stage which can be traced 
roughly to the period after September 11, 2001. In one of his latest writings he now argues that while 
“post-metaphysical thought draws... a strict line between faith and knowledge...it rejects a narrow 
scientistic concept of reason and the exclusion of religious doctrines from the genealogy of reason”. 
Jurgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 1, (April 
2006), ppl-25, pl6. It can be argued however that Habermas’s seemingly more indulgent view of 
religious discourses is more rhetorical than substantive. In the same paper he states that religious 
adherents are confronted by cognitive dissonances that are spared secular citizens such as an epistemic 
stance toward the priority that secular reasons enjoy in the political arena, ibid, pl4. He also states that 
the use of public reason requires cognitive pre-conditions that are pre-political in origin, pre-conditions 
which ensure that political decisions are both formulated and justified in a language equally accessible to 
all citizens. That the religious use of reasons must be subject to these epistemic constraints seems 
unavoidable from a Habermasian perspective. However, the veiy use of the word pre-political to describe 
these constraints seems a Freudian slip in that it appears to support Charles Larmore’s claim that 
discourse ethics is informed by substantive presuppositions which are extrinsic to the political process 
itself. See Charles Larmore, The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism, The Journal of Philosophy, vol.96, 
no. 12, (June 1999), pp599-625.
2 Compare for example Habermas’s view that because all faith traditions are underpinned by absolute 
truth claims religious discourse is “limited in its freedom of communication”, with Fish’s claim that “a 
firm adherent of a comprehensive religion doesn’t want dialogue about his beliefs; he wants those beliefs 
to prevail. Dialogue is not a tenet in his creed”. Stanley Fish, Our Faith in Letting It all Hang Out, New 
York Times, Feb 12 2006. While Habermas is primarily making an epistemological claim and Fish a 
normative one, both thinkers converge in regarding the normative tenets of a faith as being pre­
determined by its underlying epistemological premises.
3 Roxanne L Euben, Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits o f Modern 
Rationalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p3. It is interesting to note that Habermas 
himself now acknowledges the salience of objections to the claim that Max Weber s Occidental 
Rationalism’ far from being the universal paradigm on which world-historical development will 
converge is in fact confined to Europe. As he himself states, “the Occident s own image of modernity 
seems, as in a psychological experiment, to undergo a switchover: the normal model for the future of all 
other cultures suddenly becomes a special case scenario”. Jurgen Habermas, Religion m the Public 
Sphere, p2. At the same time, however, Habermas does not regard the emergence of militant 
fundamentalism as an intellectual challenger to the Enlightenment project, perceiving it mste a:s; e ect
of the colonisation of the lifeworld by the systemic imperatives of instrumental rationality which is of 
course for Habermas a symptom of modernisation which can only be remedied by communicative 
rationality. See for example, Giovanna Boiradora Philosophy in a Ttme of Tenor Dialogues mth 
Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2°03), p32.
4 John Langan, The Catholic Vision of World Affairs, Orbis, vol.42, no.2, (Spring 1998), pp241-261, pp 
241-242
5 Alan Wolfe, Liberalism and Catholicism, The American ™]‘ p ^ ’T L
6 Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B Herdsman Pubhshmg
Council, 1984), pp 79-93.
281
See for example, Richard John Neuhaus, The Liberalism of John Paul II, First Things vol 73 no 5 
(May 1997), pp 16-21
g Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris Missio, March 25,1987 accessed at www.vatican.va/..
9 See for example, David Tracy, Defending The Public Character of Theology, Christian Century (April 
1 1981), pp350-351
10 Jim Wallis, God’s Politics, why the Right gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get it, (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2005). Ronald Thiemann, Religion in Public Life, A Dilemma For Democracy 
(Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press, 1996), ppl38-140
11 ibid, pp28-30
12 ibid, pp28-30
13 Will Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew (New York: Doubleday, 1955).
14 Ronald Thiemann, Religion in Public Life, p35
15 ibid. p35
16 Thus, for example, it is salutary that following the events of September 11, the first assembling of the 
nation’s leaders and the first detailed address by the President was in a cathedral. Similarly, that Irving 
Berlin’s God Bless America became the country’s unofficial national anthem.
17 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
18 Maeve Cook, Authenticity and Autonomy: Taylor, Habermas and the Politics of Recognition, Political 
Theory, vol.25, no.2, (April 1997), pp255-288, p277
19 Stanley Fish, Why We Can’t All Just get Along, First Things, vol.60, no.2, (February 1996), pp27-34, 
p27.
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 Michael McConnell has provided interesting responses to Fish’s criticisms. McConnell, for example, 
argues that Fish makes the mistake of regarding liberalism as a comprehensive philosophy of life rather 
than a prescription for government. In a typical Rawlsian move, McConnell argues that constitutional 
liberalism is not based on denying the possibility of truth, (including religious truths), but rather on 
abstaining from the use of force to adjudicate between conflicting claims to truth. He makes the familiar 
claim that far from being incompatible with Christianity; this argument for liberalism was originally 
developed by Protestant Christians who argued that coerced faith is a contradiction in terms. Thus, far 
from wishing to “extirpate” liberalism “root and branch”, as Fish claims, Christians believe that it is only 
under conditions of freedom that genuine belief can occur. See Michael McConnell, Getting Along, First 
Things, vol. 64, no.6, (June/July 1996), p2. See also in the same volume George Marsden’s reply to
Stanley Fish, pp3-4.
23 As George Weigel reports, the question of religious freedom was the most controversial topic to 
occupy Vatican II. Some Council Fathers adopted the traditional philosophical position that Error had no 
rights. This Constantinian stance is most commonly associated with the notorious Syllabus o f Errors 
issued by Pope Pius IX in 1864, which argued in favour of Catholicism as the one true religion. As a 
consequence, the syllabus opposed the separation of church and state and denounced freedom of worship 
as heretical. As Weigel documents, the present pope who, at that time was the archbishop of Krakow, 
argued strongly for “The Declaration of Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) basing its justification 
not on the autonomy of human reason but rather as a matter of revealed truth. See Pope VI, ‘Dignitatis 
Humanae’, December 7, 1965, accessed at www.vatican.va/.
24 Dignitatis Humanae, accessed at www.vatican.va/. c
25 Richard John Neuhaus, Christian Mission and the Third Millennium, First Things, vol. 13, no.5, (May
1991) t>826 George Weigel, John Paul II and The Crisis of Humanism, First Things, vol. 98, no. 12, (December
27 PopePJohnPaul II, Dialogue Between Cultures for a Civilisation of Love and Peace, 1 January 2001
28 Pope John XII Pacem in Terris April 11 1963. What is most significant about this document is the
282
Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Modern World (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2001). In 
it, he argues that Christians are wrong to synthesise liberal democratic and Christian principles. While I 
cannot explore his philosophical argument in any detail here, one key point should be noted. Firstly, he 
points out that prior to the twentieth Century, it was generally accepted that there was “something 
inherently hierarchical in the Christian religion”. He finds evidence for such a hierarchy in the notion of 
the Apostolic Succession, and also in the Platonic-Anstotelian conception of a hierarchy of being and 
substance. These hierarchical principles contrast with the emphasis on the notion of absolute human 
dignity, which can also be found in scripture. Tension between these two notions partly explains why 
Christianity has traditionally refused to sanction any one particular form of government. It also serves to 
highlight the revolutionary shift, which Catholicism has undergone in the modem era.
29 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
The most important intellectual in the neoconservative movement is Michael Ledeen whose vision of 
world leadership is shaped by Machiavelli. See for example, Machiavelli: On Modern Leadership, (St 
Martin’s Press, 1999).
31 Samuel Huntington, The Clash o f Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and 
Schuster, 1997).
32 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the new world, (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2003).
33 See for example, Pacem in Terris, where Pope John XXIII applauds the creation of the United Nations 
expressing hope that this organisation along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by 
the U.N General Assembly would presage a new era in which everyone’s basic human rights would be 
recognised.
34 Pope John Paul II, Pope’s Message For the World Day of Migrants and Refugees, 2003 accessed at 
www.vatican.va/.
35 Jim Kalb, The Pope’s Left turn on Immigration, FrontPage Magazine, 10 December 2002 accessed at 
www.frontpagemag.com.
36 See Craig Bartholomew’s piece, The Importance of Worldview, Geographa International Conference, 
Chicester, England Aug 19-22, 1999 located at www.gegrapha.com for an interesting discussion of the 
extent to which one’s understanding of what the Gospel demands is distorted if one is not able to apply 
the Christian story to the particular culture one inhabits and ask the question, “What time is it in our 
culture”. He points out that White male South Africans were able to internalise the Christian message 
without realising that it was a time of racism and subjugation in the context which they were situated.
37 Richard McCormick, The Church and Dissent, How the Vatican ushered in a new way of thinking?, 
Commonweal, Feb 27 1998, located at www.highbeam.com.
38 See for example, James Hitchcock, Was Vatican II “Pre-Conciliar”? Catholic Dossier, (Nov/Dec 
2000). Located at http://www.catholic.net
39 Cardinal Suenens cited in Richard McCormick, The Church and Dissent located at 
www.highbeam.com.
40 ibid
41 See’for example, George Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War, First Things, vol. 128, no.l, 
(January 2003), pp20-27. This is arguably the most incisive account of the Catholic neoconservative 
position in relation to just war theory and how it can be mobilised to support e pre-emptive useo fftce 
by the United States in relation to the war on terrorism. Richard John Neuhaus, The Sounds of Religion 
in A Time of War, First Things, vol. 133, no.5 (May 2003), PP76-92. Michael Novak, Asymmetrical
Warfare and Just War, N ational Review, Febmaiy 10,2003 accessed ^  war
42 This second school of thought defies theological and political boundaries. The belief that the just war
tradition starts from a presumption against the use of force e^ c®Pl 35 a r®s° *s Cnn
throughout the Catholic theological and political spectrum and has exercised a huge mflu 
Catholic discussions relating to how just war theory should be applied in the ^ n t  context. See fo 
example, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Living with Faith and Hope after September 11, 14 
November 2001, which can be found at http://www.usccb.org
43 George Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War, pp20-27.
283
44 From Pope John XXIII through to Pope John Paul II, it has been consistently argued that the body 
considered most appropriate to fulfil that role is the United Nations.
45 See Nicholas Rengger for a very perceptive account of the transformation of the Just War tradition 
over the last few centuries. On the just war tradition in the twenty-first century, International Affairs, 
vol.78, no.2. (April 2002), pp353-63
46 Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, Section 18, 1 May 1991 accessed at www.vatican.va/.
47 It should be noted that these ideological differences in relation to the political dimension are 
accentuated by theological disagreements between the two schools of thought which it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to discuss in any detail here. Much Catholic thought subsequent to Vatican II, has 
seen what one classic just war theorist describes as an “eclipse of moral reasoning” which has seen the 
displacement of traditional authorities such as Thomas Aquinas, and the natural law philosophy to which 
he subscribed and a renewed focus on the literal meaning of scripture. As a consequence, many 
Catholics, in the same manner as the “historic peace churches”, (Mennonite, Brethren Quakers), attempt 
to apply Jesus’ words in the Sermon on the Mount directly to foreign policy. This position is regarded 
with contempt by Catholic neoconservatives, who argue that the fundamental question is not ‘What 
would Jesus do?, but rather ‘What would Jesus have us do? Thus, ironically, in their attempt to salvage 
classic just war reasoning from what amounts to the functional pacifism of much Catholic thought, 
neoconservatives are much more forceful than their liberal critics in arguing that one should not 
extrapolate from the Bible, an unimpeachable basis for political practice. In this case, pace Stanley Fish, 
they are anything but fundamentalists. For an illuminating account of these theological differences, see 
Dr. Blosser, “War and the Eclipse of Moral Reasoning” at http://www.ratzingerfanclub.com/
48 Damon Linker, “John Paul II”, Policy Review, No. 103, Oct 2000 located at www.policyreview.org. 
This is a very rare example of a Catholic neoconservative taking issue with the Pope’s understanding of 
recent history and illustrates that the gulf between the Catholic hierarchy and neoconservatives in their 
perceptions of empirical reality are rooted at least as far back as the Cold War. A clear example of this 
gulf is illustrated by Weigel’s criticisms of the 1983 U.S Bishops pastoral letter, "The Challenge of 
Peace” (TCOP). TCOP, by emphasising questions of in bello proportionality and discrimination, came to 
the conclusion that the most serious threat to peace was not Communism but the possession of nuclear 
weapons whether in the hands of the U.S or the Soviet Union. Weigel argues that this position represents 
a distorted reading of world politics induced by starting from the premise that the ‘presumption against 
violence”, is at the root of the just war tradition. The principal threat to peace was not nuclear weapons 
but Communism. See George Weigel, “Moral Clarity in A Time of War”, p27.
49 John Langan, “The Catholic Vision”, p243
50 John Langan, “The Catholic Vision”, p253
284
CONCLUSION
It has increasingly become conventional wisdom amongst political theorists that the 
perceived dispute between the liberal and communitarian traditions has exhausted its 
ability to yield any useful insights. The fundamental contention that has been argued for 
in this thesis is that the debate was always misconceived in the first place. The terms 
‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ are too broad and indeterminate to account for the 
complexity of positions, epistemological, ontological and normative, that are subsumed 
under these labels. The principal reason why it has often been argued that a normative 
consensus between liberals and communitarians has been achieved - or at least that 
there are no great metaphysical differences between these two groups of political 
theorists to adjudicate between -  can be adduced to the fact that the focus of the debate 
has centred around how best to understand Rawlsian liberalism. In particular, both the 
scope and substance of the changes that Rawls has undertaken since the publication of 
A Theory o f Justice, the work which inspired the communitarian critique of 
contemporary liberalism in the first place, have been subjected to exhaustive (some 
would say obsessive) analysis. Rawls’s much discussed distinction between political 
and comprehensive liberalism and his rejection of the latter in favour of the former has 
often been hailed by liberal commentators as an audacious attempt to integrate the key 
insights of communitarianism; namely, that political theory including liberal political 
theory can only be understood with reference to the shared historical contexts and 
experiences which constitute our personal identities, while at the same time retaining 
the Kantian normative vision which communitarians, most notably of course Sandel,
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had argued could only be sustained by embracing an untenable metaphysics. In short, 
Rawls’s theory was Hegelian in form but Kantian in substance.
The main tenor of Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice, which offered the 
most thoroughgoing critique of Rawls’s project from a communitarian perspective, was 
that the Kantian methodology, which comprised the basis for the conceptual equipment 
deployed in A Theory of Justice, most notably the veil of ignorance and the original 
position, resulted in an abstract and ahistorical conception of the self unencumbered by 
prior moral commitments.1 Theorists such as Sandel argued that this impoverished 
conception of Kantian personhood ignored the extent to which individuals are formed 
by unchosen social attachments which cannot be reflected upon from an impartial 
perspective. Thus, any political theory which failed to capture these ontological truths 
was seriously defective. While Rawls has always denied that the revisions which he 
undertook subsequent to the publication of A Theory of Justice were influenced by the 
communitarian critique of his theory, it is reasonable to interpret these changes in the 
context of the critical response prompted by the formulation of his theory of justice. In 
particular, Rawls seemed to implicitly agree with Sandel that A Theory o f Justice had 
been underpinned by a Kantian conception of human nature which could not be 
sustained in the pluralistic conditions of late modernity. Thus, rather than try to defend 
the unencumbered self against the communitarian critique, or argue that his project did 
not entail any commitment to an unencumbered self, strategies which Rawls could have 
adopted, he chose instead to defend a metaphilosophical thesis concerning the scope 
and nature of liberal political theory.
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This manoeuvre enabled Rawls to retain the substantive principles of justice articulated 
in A Theory o f Justice while eschewing the theoretical foundations, which had 
previously underpinned them. Whereas traditional varieties of liberal theory, which 
Rawls coined ‘comprehensive liberalisms’, had sought to legitimise liberal principles 
by reference to metaphysical philosophical conceptions such as God, natural rights or 
substantive accounts of human nature, the novelty of ‘political liberalism’ lay in 
abstaining from these philosophical controversies and thus staying ‘on the surface’ of 
philosophy.2 The ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ mandated this, because the plethora of 
irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines which pertain to liberal democracies and the 
fact that these doctrines are reasonable in the sense that they are fully consistent with 
the exercise of human reason means that, as Talisse explains, the attempt by 
comprehensive liberals to legitimate liberal values by reference to substantive 
philosophical premises is self-refuting.3 As Rawls states, “the question the dominant 
tradition tried to answer has no answer”.4 The fact of reasonable pluralism precludes 
the possibility of establishing the truth of any one comprehensive doctrine. Thus, in 
order for liberalism to be liberal all the way down, it must not only be liberal in its 
conception ofjustice but also in its conception of political justification.
As this thesis has shown, Rawls’s attempt to purge liberalism of controversial moral 
and metaphysical claims by defending a neutral framework which avoids appeal to any 
particular comprehensive moral and metaphysical theory, while audacious, ultimately 
fails. As chapter four showed, Rawls, in order to affirm his distinction between political
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and comprehensive liberalism, must insist on the autonomy of the political sphere, an 
autonomy which will be resisted by proponents of illiberal comprehensive doctrines 
such as religious fundamentalists, who wish to utilise state power in order to promote 
their conception of the good. Now, of course, Rawls can respond that comprehensive 
doctrines such as these are unreasonable in that they fail to take into consideration the 
reality of reasonable pluralism. However, the argument that disagreement between 
comprehensive doctrines is both reasonable and permanent is in itself a claim requiring 
philosophical justification. In order to justify this claim, Rawls in effect assumes a 
pluralistic theory of moral epistemology that will be resisted by at least some exponents 
of comprehensive moral doctrines who will dispute the notion that the truth of their 
philosophical worldviews can be doubted.
This is problematic because an acknowledgement of reasonable pluralism and the sharp 
public/private dichotomy which such a position entails would appear to exclude not 
only the intolerant religious fundamentalist, but also many other comprehensive 
doctrines such as utilitarianism and Marxism, all of which may be reluctant to confine 
their conceptions of justice to the private sphere. Furthermore, it also pays insufficient 
attention to the views of value pluralists, both liberal and otherwise, who do accept the 
existence of reasonable pluralism, but who do not accept that the embrace of such an 
epistemological position necessitates convergence on the principles of political 
liberalism. In other words, reasonable pluralism, which is the starting premise for 
political liberalism, is not a value neutral axiom external to philosophy, but is in itself a 
controversial philosophical argument. In addition, even if one accepts the premise of
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reasonable pluralism and the importance which such an acceptance has for normative 
political theory, one is not thereby required to accept the substance of political 
liberalism as Rawls defines it.
Of course, as chapter four argued, it is necessary to disentangle two different meanings 
of stability, which Rawls employs in Political Liberalism. First of all there is 
theoretical stability which concerns the notion that liberalism is not coherent if it relies 
on a particular comprehensive doctrine. This is the form of stability discussed above. 
The second form, which has received much more press and is often wrongly conflated 
with the first, is that in order for a political theory to be stable, it must be located within 
the shared understandings of liberal democracies. This is what might be described as 
empirical stability. It might be thought that Rawls can extricate himself from the 
suspicion of epistemological scepticism produced by his attempt to render political 
liberalism theoretically stable by construing reasonable pluralism not as a philosophical 
axiom, but rather as an empirical fact of modem liberal democracies. Indeed, it was the 
belief that Rawls’s later writings should be interpreted in this way which fuelled talk of 
the ‘hermeneutic’ turn in Rawls’s project. Rawls’s principles of justice could be 
legitimated not by appeal to Kantian metaphysics, but simply by excavating the shared 
conventions embedded within liberal societies. This would blunt the force of the 
communitarian critique in the process, for it would show that the exercise of immanent 
social criticism, which communitarians such as Sandel and Walzer regarded as an 
alternative to liberal individualism, could be deployed instead as a contextual support 
for liberal theorizing.6 Unfortunately, this attempt at relativising Kantianism is
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oxymoronic. In order for it to succeed it would need to be shown that liberalism 
constituted a dominant public culture rather than simply one ideological strand of 
thought in competition with illiberal doctrines. Rawls cannot show this because he 
underestimates the extent to which reasonable pluralism informs not only the private 
sphere but the public sphere as well. Thus, if reasonable pluralism is understood in an 
empirical sense, there seems no reason why it cannot pertain to questions of justice as 
well as questions of the good life.
Rawls’s reluctance to accept the existence of pluralism in the political sphere can be 
adduced to the fact that, while he wishes to extricate political theory from philosophical 
controversies, he wishes to preserve the lexical priority of his principles of justice. In 
the process, however, he circumscribes cultural pluralism in a way that renders political 
liberalism indistinguishable in practice from Millian and Kantian conceptions of 
comprehensive liberalism. Furthermore, his theory is actually much less able to 
accommodate cultural diversity than, for example, theories such as Galston’s, which 
attempt to predicate liberal political theory on the basis of comprehensive value 
pluralism.7 The reason for this is that a red thread running through Rawls s project right 
from its inception through to his final revisions is an assumption of the architectonic 
nature of the political community. Rawls does not simply insist on the autonomy of the 
political sphere but also on its sovereignty. This is most evident in the emphasis which 
political liberalism places on civic education, which requires children reared in illiberal 
communities to be inculcated in the virtues of political liberalism. This is particularly 
troubling bearing in mind Rawls’s neo-republican conception of citizenship, which
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includes a commitment to autonomy at least in the context of the political sphere. The 
real issue pertaining to Rawls’s political liberalism, therefore, is not the supposed 
communitarian or relativist’ turn in his theory. Rather, it is the consistently 
collectivist nature of his project in which the political community is accorded ultimate 
normative value, an aspect of his theory which is much more pronounced in Political 
Liberalism than in A Theory o f Justice. Rawls’s attempt to increase the appeal of his 
theory by freeing it from any comprehensive worldview is unsuccessful. On Rawls’s 
own terms his metaphilosophical thesis fails. The assumption of reasonable pluralism 
requires appeal to a prior substantive philosophical premise to support it, one, which 
would require taking sides in theoretical controversies. Rawls’s attempt to 
circumnavigate this obstacle by locating his theory on empirical foundations fails as 
reasonable pluralism resists any dichotomy between the public and private spheres and 
therefore would fail a priori to vindicate only his principles of justice.
Sandelfs Pluralistic Communitarianism
While Rawlsian liberalism in the face of the communitarian critique attempted to 
develop a more context-sensitive basis on which to ground liberal values, 
communitarians were also trying to demonstrate how their own anti-liberal metaphysics 
related to the particular contexts which individuals inhabited. It became common 
amongst those who were in neither the liberal or communitarian camps to say that, 
while the liberal conception of the political sphere was too formal, the communitarian 
conception was formless. As Amy McCready has aptly demonstrated, one of the 
striking features of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice is that Sandel in outlining his
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communitarian alternative to liberal individualism actually replicates the philosophical 
abstraction and ahistoricism which he castigates Rawls for.  ^Sandel5s own argument for 
the constitutive conception of community is buttressed by an empiricist realism which 
requires transcendence from particular contexts in order to posit independent facts 
which can be established a priori This left Sandel vulnerable to the charge by value 
pluralists such as John Gray that both he and other communitarian thinkers have 
invoked a concept of community which is as abstract and unhistorical and therefore as 
unserviceable as the Kantian and Benthamite conceptions which they refute.10 By 
theorising the idea of community from a universal perspective, communitarians cannot 
take account of the pervasive nature of ethical conflict in late modem societies, a 
conflict which encompasses both relations between individuals and between 
communities. In short, they conduct discourse about community in the singular when it 
would be much more illuminating to conduct it in the plural.
The uncertainty about precisely what normative implications flow from the 
communitarian critique of liberalism has resulted in many liberal critics assuming that 
communitarian thinkers such as Sandel are unabashed cultural relativists. On this 
reading, the formlessness of commumtananism can be attributed to the fact that it 
abjures any external standard for determining what practices are just, instead affirming 
that the circumstances of justice and morality are decisive in determining the meaning 
of morality and justice. In other words, what can reasonably be described as just or 
moral is parasitical on the practices affirmed by any particular community. The lack of 
specificity in Liberalism and the Limits o f Justice over what conceptions of community
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should be privileged is largely responsible for this relativist reading of Sandel. In his 
recent work, as detailed in chapters one and two of this thesis, Sandel has been anxious 
to combat it. His attempt to clarify the content of his alternative to liberalism is 
reminiscent of the mutations which Rawls’s project has undergone in that he too is 
attempting to engage in the practice of immanent social criticism and thus jettison 
purely abstract conceptions of human nature while simultaneously proffering a 
normative vision which avoids the relativism which his embrace of hermeneutics might 
seem to entail. It is in this context that his embrace of civic republicanism and his 
eagerness to illustrate the extent to which it can be shown to be embedded in American 
history should be understood.
As Sandel has now made clear, while he continues to believe that justice is relative to 
the good, rather than independent of it, this does not mean that he considers it relative 
to whatever values a particular community may affirm. To do this is to make justice a 
creature of convention and to deprive it of its critical character. Rather, principles of 
justice should be predicated on the inherent moral worth of the ends which they serve. 
This avoids the dual error of deontological liberals and cultural relativists who both try 
to abstain from making critical judgements over particular goods. While Sandel is 
correct in this argument and shows eloquently how minimalist liberalism as advocated 
by Rawls and Rorty is incoherent, his project founders on its inability to elucidate 
clearly precisely what substantive conception of the good should be installed in place of 
Kantian liberalism. Under the rubric of civic republicanism, he conflates three 
conflicting conceptions of the good, none of which bear much relation to civic
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republicanism as historically understood. In his discussion of certain issues such as 
abortion, he seems sympathetic to a liberal metaphysics of autonomy. In relation to 
other issues such as free speech jurisprudence, he affirms a more perfectionist 
liberalism, affirming that it is not illiberal for courts to adjudicate over the substantive 
content of speech acts. Finally, in other places such as for example, in relation to 
religious freedom, he implies the opposite argument that contemporary liberalism, by 
affirming substantive ideals of individual autonomy is not liberal enough in that it is 
blind to religious communities for which liberal ideals are of little value. Underpinning 
the ambiguity over the content of his substantive vision is a continuing insistence on 
juxtaposing the unencumbered with the encumbered self. The relativistic connotations 
of the latter notion, (after all, to be encumbered by communal attachments says nothing 
about the normative worth of these attachments) seems to fit uneasily with his 
understanding of the good as a categorical imperative rather than a socially prescribed 
goal.
It can be plausibly argued that the vagueness concerning the substantive content of 
SandeTs republican project can be explained by his desperation to reconcile the value 
pluralism implicit within American political culture with civic republicanism 
understood as a hegemonic public philosophy. In the same way that Rawls provided an 
ideal-type historical account of how liberalism became the dominant public philosophy, 
thereby rendering liberal ideals synonymous with the intuitive convictions held by 
reasonable citizens in liberal democracies, so Sandel counters in Democracy s 
Discontent, (by focusing more narrowly on the United States) with an ideal-type
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historical narrative which aims to show that it is in fact civic republicanism which is the 
hegemonic public philosophy, with liberalism only usurping its role very recently. The 
problem with both these accounts is not principally that their rendering of American 
history is inaccurate (although it is), but rather that they ignore the extent to which the 
public sphere is infused with multiple ideological strands which both intersect and 
compete with each other. It is therefore no more accurate to conceive of American 
history as a Manichean contest between two competing ideologies as Sandel does, with 
each one predominating at various stages, than it is to portray it in teleological terms as 
the gradual evolution towards the instantiation of liberal political ideals as Rawls does. 
Sandel’s civic republicanism is incoherent in that it attempts to subsume divergent 
ideologies within the confines of one philosophy. It is simply not possible to synthesise 
history and political theory in this way. The attempt by way of the contingent to 
transcend the contingent is doomed to failure. One can only embrace the contingent and 
accept that this rules out appeal to any one universal metanarrative (such as liberalism 
or civic republicanism) or acknowledge that defending any substantive philosophy 
cannot be done solely by immanent social criticism. It is not possible to square the 
circle.
Habermas's Discourse Ethics
Habermas’s discourse ethics has often been perceived either as an attempt to move 
beyond the liberal-communitarian debate or as an effort to attain a plausible synthesis 
between the two traditions. Like Rawls, he wishes to justify a deontological ethic 
without invoking any metaphysical foundations. In contrast to him, however, he does
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not believe that this can be achieved by abandoning universalism and thereby 
repudiating the Enlightenment project altogether. Habermas believes that he can 
salvage the Enlightenment project without embracing Kantian metaphysics and thereby 
avoid resort to the pre-modem notion of a normative hierarchy in which the public 
sphere is shaped by independent moral principles. Despite Rawls’s attempt to render 
his theory post-metaphysical, his monological conception of reason means that he 
remains enmeshed in the metaphysics of human subjectivity. For example, while Rawls 
wishes his political conception of justice to be affirmed from within diverse 
comprehensive doctrines, this convergence takes place without there being any 
dialectical encounter between these doctrines. In its place Habermas affirms a 
dialogical conception of justice in which all normative validity claims must be 
redeemed intersubjectively.
Habermas claims that the legitimation of moral norms through discursive processes 
rather than monological reasoning means that his theory is better equipped to respond 
to the existence of reasonable pluralism in late modem societies than either civic 
republicanism or political liberalism. Both political liberalism and civic republicanism 
seek, from a Habermasian perspective, to arbitrarily constrict political discourse by 
subordinating it to antecedent substantive moral norms. In the case of civic 
republicanism, this occurs by its desire to assimilate politics to an ethical process of 
self-explication of a communal conception of the good. By this measure, a substantive 
ethical consensus can be attained in advance of actual political discourses. By contrast, 
political liberalism demotes political discourses to secondary status by subordinating
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them to normative principles of individual rights, thus vitiating the aspiration of 
political liberals such as Rawls to avoid the metaphysics of comprehensive liberalism. 
Both civic republicanism and political liberalism share in common, an adherence to the 
classical notion of a normative hierarchy which has at its apex, independent moral 
principles to which political association must defer. The advantage of discourse ethics, 
so its proponents argue, is to avoid the mistakes of the republican and liberal positions, 
by recognising that normative principles in a post-modem age can only be redeemed by 
anchoring them in the autonomous will of actual citizens.
In other words, civic republicans negate value pluralism by asserting the possibility of 
discovering or constructing a normative consensus (the former in the case of Rousseau, 
the latter in the case of Sandel), rooted in a substantive ethical vision. Rawlsian liberals, 
by contrast, believe that while value pluralism cannot be erased, it can be transcended, 
thereby enabling neutral principles of justice to be formulated which can then be 
applied exclusively to the public sphere. Discourse theorists claim that their position is 
superior to both the liberal and republican approaches in that value pluralism is built 
into the very structure of discourse ethics thereby guaranteeing that it is neither erased 
nor effaced. Rather than positing a sharp dichotomy between the public and private 
spheres as Rawls does, or subordinating the latter to the former as civic republicans do, 
Habermas envisages politics as one informed by a dialectical interplay between the two 
spheres in which normative validity claims are assessed not behind a veil of ignorance 
but rather by open, inclusive procedures which do not bracket the pluralism of
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comprehensive worldviews a priori but rather engages them in rational discourse 
amongst free and equal citizens.
At first sight, Habermas’s discourse ethics seems to offer compelling advantages over 
both Rawlsian liberalism and Sandel’s pluralistic republicanism in that it can establish 
universal validity claims which possess moral legitimacy without invoking substantive 
ideals. By arguing for the extrication of politics from the normative hierarchies which 
had previously constrained it, discourse ethics seems to promise a greater sensitivity for 
social and ideological pluralism than either Sandel or Rawls’s theories. Unfortunately, 
however, there are good reasons to be sceptical about whether discourse ethics succeeds 
in its aspiration to defend Kantian universalism by engaging with rather than 
transcending the political, social and cultural contexts which serve as the basis for 
formulating impartial moral norms. In order to understand this, it can be recalled from 
my discussion of Rawls’s political thought that Enlightenment liberalism was 
underpinned by three key components; its commitment to philosophical foundations, a 
universalist mode of justification and an aspiration to normative consensus. Habermas 
shares with Rawls the belief that it is no longer possible to legitimate normative validity 
claims with reference to substantive foundations in the way which animated 
comprehensive liberal theorists. At the same time, he shares with Rawls the belief that 
it is possible to salvage the consensus aspiration of Enlightenment thought and diverges 
from him in arguing that practical reasoning can and indeed must in order to be truly 
normative, appeal to universal moral principles. It is Habermas’s commitment to two 
out of the three criteria which inform the Enlightenment project that has fuelled doubts
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from a diversity of ideological perspectives ranging from post-modernist critics such as 
Stanley Fish through to political and comprehensive liberals such as Evan Chamey and 
Charles Larmore that he has really supplied a political theory which recognises the 
autonomous fact of reasonable pluralism, i.e. its non-contingent nature which resists 
absorption into a neutral, singular form of public discourse.12
It is important to disentangle two different criticisms which have been levelled against 
Habermas concerning his reliance on the Enlightenment project as the basis for 
legitimating moral norms. The first concerns the claim, made by post-modernists such 
as Stanley Fish and Stella Gaon that discourse ethics is philosophically incoherent.13 As 
Fish points out, Habermasians such as Shane O’ Neill claim that discourse ethics is 
better equipped to respond to cultural particularity than Rawlsian liberalism due to the 
fact that communicative action is historically situated rather than transpiring amongst 
noumenal agents in the disembodied, original position. At the same time, however, 
discourse ethics requires actors to relativise their principal convictions, thereby 
detaching themselves from the normative contexts in which their convictions and 
investments were formed. Fish argues that this is impossible without presupposing the 
metaphysics of the unencumbered self which Habermas’s theory aimed to repudiate. 
Habermas’s philosophy requires a sharp and ultimately impossible demarcation 
between questions of justice and questions of the good. As this divide is structurally 
indispensable to the theory, attempts to render it less rigid such as those of Seyla 
Benhabib’s do not succeed.14 As a consequence, discourse ethics is impaled on the 
horns of a dilemma: Conceived as a procedural, formal theory, protected against
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incursions from contingent goods, it is no more coherent epistemically than Rawlsian 
liberalism as it relies on the same untenable conception of the unencumbered self. If, on 
the other hand, Habermas attempts to respond to this problem by relaxing the rigid 
dichotomy between moral and ethical discourses which underpins discourse theory, 
then he can no longer maintain the rationality of the moral sphere which is central to his 
Kantian deontological distinction between the right and the good.
Rather than arguing that discourse ethics is philosophically incoherent, political liberals 
such as Rawls and Larmore argue, in contrast to Fish and Gaon, that there is no 
problem with a principle of universalisation per se. Rather, the key issues surround the 
scope of a principle of public reason and Habermas’s sharp distinction between 
procedure and substance. As Larmore has forcefully argued, discourse ethics, despite 
Habermas’s claims to the contrary, is informed by antecedent moral norms which 
include a commitment to principles of universal moral respect, egalitarian reciprocity 
and critical reflexivity which requires that the validity of normative practices be 
legitimated by reasons which are universally accessible to all individuals. This 
commitment to moral post-conventionalism can be contrasted with moral 
conventionalism which does not require individuals to provide reasons which are 
universally accessible, but rather is premised on the moral legitimacy of cultural 
practices which resist the impartial questioning of their normative procedures of 
justification. Habermas’s claim that discourse ethics recognises the particular in 
intersubjective forms of communication obscures the extent to which conventional
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modes of morality have to transform themselves in order to satisfy the post - 
conventional ideal of discourse ethics.
In this context, political liberals can argue that the fundamental problem of discourse 
ethics is not that it is substantively empty or trivial as postmodernists claim, but rather 
that it is invested with so much normative substance that it violates its own claim to be 
a postmetaphysical, deontological theory. In particular, it does not accept that conflicts 
between comprehensive moral doctrines are the legitimate product of rational activity 
thereby necessitating that any normative theory must not conflict with the diversity of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Habermas tries to circumvent this objection by 
embedding discourse ethics within a theory of social evolution which presupposes the 
existence of discrete historical periods which can be delineated from each other. In this 
context, he employs a hermeneutic methodology similar to that of Rawls and Sandel. 
Thus, in a manner not unlike that of Rawls, Habermas argues that modernisation can be 
understood as an historical process which is convergent with a teleological progression 
towards Enlightenment liberalism as the normative belief system which fills the 
vacuum created by the displacement of metaphysical worldviews as modes of 
normative legitimacy.
Unfortunately, Habermas encounters the same problem which afflicts Rawls’s attempt 
to legitimate a normative conception of public reason with reference to the historical 
conditions of post-modernity; namely, that the stubborn fact of value pluralism 
comprising incommensurable metaphysical worldviews vitiates any attempt to
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segregate historical periods as discrete epochs in the manner that Habermas like 
Rawls's and Sandel, attempts to do. Habermas, no more than Rawls and Sandel, 
succeeds in marrying an historical narrative with a philosophical metanarrative. In the 
last analysis, Habermas fails to adequately deal with the challenges which ideological 
pluralism poses for his theory for similar reasons to Rawls and Sandel. Discourse ethics, 
like political liberalism and civic republicanism, is informed by substantive principles 
which impose both epistemic and normative constraints on the degree of cultural 
diversity permitted in the public sphere. The nature of these constraints underlies 
Habermas’s commitment to a substantive conception of individual autonomy which is 
obscured by his presentation of discourse ethics as a procedural theory which is neutral 
in relation to competing worldviews.
The argument defended in this thesis, that neither Rawls's nor Habermas’s conceptions 
of public reason adequately respond to the challenges posed by the irreducible 
existence of ideological and social pluralism, should not be interpreted as a plea for 
dispensing with liberalism as a political tradition altogether or even with it understood 
as a descendant of the Enlightenment legacy. Accordingly, this thesis rejects the 
arguments which have been presented by a diverse array of anti-liberal critics, who in 
one guise or another can be defined as anti-foundationalists, who have claimed that the 
difficulties embodied in Rawls's and Habermas’s attempts to resuscitate liberal political 
ideals without presupposing philosophical foundations require the discarding of 
liberalism as a normative program altogether. Rather, this thesis has argued that the 
solution to the problems inherent in Rawls's and Habermas’s theories can be located
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within the intellectual resources supplied by liberalism itself. It is important to 
emphasise this point, because both Rawls and Habermas have attempted to respond to 
many of their critics, particularly radical democrats, by arguing that their respective 
theories are not exclusionary in the way that they are often depicted by emphasising 
their ability to accommodate divergent conceptions of the good within public 
discourses. Thus, Rawls, for example, has claimed that far from presupposing a static 
conception of the public sphere from which diversity is excluded that political 
liberalism actually allows for what I have called the pluralisation of public reason by 
admitting divergent comprehensive doctrines into the political sphere. Habermas, has 
similarly in his later work claimed that it is possible to relax the rigid dichotomy 
between moral and ethical discourses, a position argued for at length by Seyla 
Benhabib.15 Thus, both Rawls and Habermas have attempted to democratise the public 
sphere.
The problem with these strategies from a liberal perspective is that they ignore the fact 
that the logics of liberalism and democracy are different. Whereas liberalism at its heart 
represents a defence of the ideal of negative liberty, a defence of democracy requires 
either, in its civic republican variant, a commitment to collective self-government, or in 
its radical pluralist form a public sphere characterised by radical contingency. Thus, 
rather than enlarging or expanding the sphere of the political as both Rawls and 
Habermas have attempted to do; any genuinely liberal theory which wishes to be more 
attentive to cultural diversity should instead endeavour to limit the scope of the political 
realm. This is the insight which has been developed by the diversity strand of the liberal
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tradition which emphasises the importance of limiting the power of the state. Its 
proponents have been suspicious of the autonomy strain which I have argued 
encompasses both Rawls and Habermas’s political theories, in that they privilege the 
political over the non-political, a feature of their projects which is actually amplified in 
their later work. This point has often been neglected because both thinkers have 
presented their theories as the only ones which are equipped to deal with radical 
pluralism while retaining a normative liberal substance.
This thesis has argued that Rawls and Habermas are correct in defending a liberal 
conception of public reason in the face of criticism by anti-foundationalist critics. 
However, neither theorist has acknowledged the substantive presuppositions which 
underpin both their theories and the extent to which these presuppositions commit both 
theorists to a conception of the public sphere which is too expansive in scope at least 
from the perspective of the diversity strain of liberal thought. This is largely because 
both thinkers have expended their critical energies on attempting to explicate how any 
normative political theory can be justified in the conditions of late modernity and not 
enough on the actual substantive core of their theories. In fact, however, neither 
objective can be distinguished from the other. Thus, for example, Habermas’s 
procedural rendering of his theory which argues for the co-originality of individual 
rights with participatory democracy obfuscates the extent to which any defence of 
negative liberty requires the adoption of substantive a priori presuppositions. Similarly, 
Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism obscures the extent
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to which he himself is wedded to a formative project which vitiates his own distinction 
between the public and private realms. In sum, this thesis has claimed that while Rawls 
and Habermas are right to reject the potentially coercive nature of the formative project 
implicit in the work of communitarian critics such as Sandel, their own theories are also 
defective. In claiming that they can be defended without reference to metaphysical 
foundations they obfuscate the substantive presuppositions which do in fact inform 
their projects. I have argued in contrast, that liberalism can only be defended by 
presupposing an a priori conception of the political which can be juxtaposed with both 
Sandel's and Rawls’s substantive versions of republican liberalism and also with 
Habermas’s purportedly procedural rendering of communicative ethics.
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